The Silver Fern

With the recent rumours about Frizell potentially returning to NZ and the persistent questions surrounding the AB blindside position, I thought it would be interesting to take another look at the past, present and future of the 6-jersey.

Specifically, I’m interested in the selection policies and thought processes, why exactly it’s been so hard for the selectors to find a suitable, long-term replacement for Jerome Kaino, and how current candidates in 2025 would fare in the face of historical selection patterns and requirements. In the end, it boils down to the perennial question: what is a blindside, really?

There’s a lot to unpack, as you’d expect. Apologies in advance for the rather lengthy post.

The past: a Kaino-sized hole
8 July 2017. This was the last Test start for Jerome Kaino in the #6 jersey, against the British and Irish Lions at Eden Park. Since that time, 12 players have worn the jersey across 95 tests over 7 years, with varying degrees of success and duration. This is the list of all the Tests played, the starting 6, opponent, and result.

When looking more specifically at some of the cumulative numbers of the different players – number of starts, starting streaks, and win percentages – we get the following table.

I’ve highlighted a few things, Frizell, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been the most consistent name on the team sheet, making 26 starting appearances between 2018 and ’23 as the starting six. Behind him figures Akira Ioane, with 15 starts. Ioane had a somewhat consistent spell in the jersey from 2020 onwards, only to be unceremoniously dumped ahead of the 2023 Test season.

Neither of these two players were ever obvious first-choice selections, with both only ever stringing together 5 consecutive starts. And while rotation is normal – Kaino’s longest starting streak was 9 consecutive Tests across 2 seasons, starting during the 2015 Rugby World Cup and finishing after the 2nd 2016 Test against Wales – both players often lost their place against top tier opposition, something which was much rarer for Kaino from the 2009 season onwards. So the selectors never really settled on a single player, the closest being Frizell during the 2023 Test season, where the selectors seemingly finally backed the Tongan flanker as their main man.

It certainly didn’t help that the post-Kaino heir apparent, Liam Squire, was unable to put together a consistent streak of performances due to a number of factors, only ever starting 3 Tests consecutively as the AB blindside. And while someone like Vaea Fifita had some intriguing performances around this period, the fact that Fifita was the 2nd-choice behind Squire, despite being such a different type of player, already anticipates some of the muddled thinking of then-AB selectors on what they actually wanted from their six.

So what could’ve been some of the factors in this inability to produce consistent blindside appearances? Selection policy is certainly partly to blame: players were put into the jersey without seemingly any sort of preconceived or long-term plan in mind. An example of this is someone like Dalton Papali’i being tested out in the position during a crucial Test against Ireland in Dunedin during the 2022 Test series. When the results don’t go as planned, however, the player isn’t seen in the jersey again. So why was he put there in the first place?

Perhaps the best example of this is the appearances of players in the 6-jersey during crucial World Cup matches who didn’t have any experience of playing there – Barrett against England in the 2019 semi-final, and Vaa’i against France during the 2023 group stages. There seemed to be a too strong belief in the power of tactical surprise and not enough belief in the power of future-proofing from both Hansen and Foster. Faced with obsessive planners during the World Cup – Eddie Jones with England in 2019, Fabien Galthié with France in 2023 – their response seemed to consist solely of the selectorial equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. Particularly clever, it ain’t.

Why is it so hard for the ABs to find the right six?
Another factor surely is not so much the timing of the selections, but the selected player profiles themselves. The first two blindsides selected after Kaino are a good example of this, Squire and Fifita: one is a hard-nosed flanker who excels in the close quarter collisions; the other is at his best out wide, playing and accelerating into space. Fifita’s own interpretation of the blindside’s role – “I like six, because I can use my athleticism to do what I can do on the outside, rather just stay tight and do the hard work, like running into a brick wall and getting your body tired” – is telling in its own right.

Squire, on the other hand, had a very different view on the requirements of the jersey. Speaking on James Marshall’s What A Lad-podcast, he commented: “I just wanted to run into it as hard as I could... I sort of knew if I could hit someone as hard as I possibly can each time, then I’d most likely win the contact.” It’s hard to imagine more contrasting mindsets as those of Squire and Fifita.

So why were both selected then? My own guess is that the AB selection criteria for the jersey suffer from a kind of schizophrenia, where the selectors really want two playing profiles for the price of one: on the one hand, they want the player to comply to the Test requirements of a proper blindside – someone who is a physical presence, dominates the collisions, while bringing a more dynamic element to core tight five roles such as cleaning and carrying up the middle. This Test blindside has size, grunt and mongrel, which needs to be used to stop mauls, bring carriers down quickly and to smash breakdowns.

This, however, isn’t enough for the voracious demands of the AB selectors, adding on game-specific requirements unique to their own game plans: their blindside needs to do all of the above, while also being comfortable as an edge forward, someone who has an offloading game, attacking vision as well as a genuine athletic edge. It’s not hard to imagine the AB selectors looking at Pieter-Steph Du Toit and telling him to work on his handling and attacking support play.

If this sounds like an unreasonable and overly long list of demands, then you’d be right. To me, one of the foundational reasons for the AB blindside-conundrum is, in other words, self-inflicted, with the requirements of the player simply being too demanding. What is described here are two players, not one. This becomes further obvious if we were to re-classify the previous blindside-suitors into two groups, those of tight and loose blindsides.

It is important to mention now that this distinction isn’t in any shape or form meant to be normative, meaning that one style is by definition better than the other. Both styles are requirements, not options, within the AB game plan. My classification here is mostly based on what I consider to be the respective player’s foremost strength, the style which fits closest to what the player themselves consider to be their bread and butter.

Furthermore, I’m also not claiming that these players aren’t able to thrive playing those other styles. Dalton Papali’i has fantastic abilities on the edge, while Ioane can be destructive in the tight. My argument is more that these players, like almost every other player, excel in a particular part and space of the game, be it in the tight or the loose.

The AB selectors, however, have made no decision on what kind of style they want their blindside to focus on. The six needs to be able to do everything, almost equally well, in their view. This is where the problems start.

The present: decisions, decisions
So what does this mean for the present and the upcoming selection of potential AB blindsides? If we were to separate these two styles, as we did above, then the New Zealand rugby landscape offers plenty of potential candidates:

This isn’t meant as an exhaustive table of potential blindside-candidates, more a selection of players who clearly fit one of these two specific playing styles. Others who are more difficult to categorize, like Jacobson, an undersized tight six candidate, I’ve left out for now.

The distinction is pretty clear: the players on the left are typically lock/6s, while the players on the right are equally comfortable at 6 and 8. The players on the left are proficient in the lineout, have high tackle numbers and prefer to spend most of their time in the middle of the field. The players on the right have a more developed attacking identity, able to play in space on the edge, have an offloading game and, importantly, possess rapid acceleration. All of these players can play blindside at Test level. But they are considerably different in their focus, style and areas of specialization.

The issues start when tight sixes are being asked to do loose six-roles, and vice versa, something which already acts as a predictor of potential issues at Test level within the AB game plan. Take the Round 10 clash between the Chiefs and the Highlanders, for example, which puts a tight six like Oliver Haig opposite a more loose six like Samipeni Finau. Very quickly, the differences between the two become apparent due to the distinctive nature of each of the two halves.

In the first half, the match was stop-start, a continuous struggle between the two forward packs for territory and possession. The ball went from set-piece to set-piece, from kick to kick, with most of the rugby being played between the 22s as a contest for the ball. This kind of style suits a player like Haig, who likes to play in a supporting role, whether it be in the tackle, carry or clean, alongside the tight forwards.

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Playing tight: Haig likes to stay close to his tight forwards, contesting for possession in the middle of the field

Haig could most often be found in or around the ruck in defence, typically in partnership with either Holland or Lasaqa

While Haig seemed to enjoy this contest- and forward-focused first half, a player like Finau thrives in the open spaces with the ball in his hand. When the ball barely reaches the edge, however, due to the nature of the breakdown contest in the middle of the field, Finau finds it more difficult to involve himself in the game.

Finau, away from the ball, calling for the ball to come his way but the movement doesn’t reach the end of the chain

Instead of getting caught up in the forward tussle in the middle of the field, Finau keeps his width, waiting for the ball to eventually come his way. While this width stresses the defence somewhat, it leaves the Chiefs tight five with fewer bodies to contest the breakdown battle.

Again, it’s not as if Finau doesn’t or isn’t able to effectively clean, with this dynamic clean on Renton preventing a certain turnover.

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Finau clean

But it’s less of a central facet to his game than it is to Haig: if Brown doesn’t slip, Finau probably continues moving out wide to take up an attacking position rather than execute a dominant clean alongside the Chiefs openside flanker. In contrast to Haig, Finau doesn’t continuously work in pairs, like Jacobson, Brown, Vaa’i and Ah Kuoi do for the Chiefs.

If Haig felt at ease during the first half forward slog, with Finau struggling to get into the game, the roles would completely reverse in the second, with the game suddenly breaking open for the attack.

With Finau, you get a player who is incredibly comfortable in open space, who is able to see attacking opportunities unfold before they’ve happened. He also possesses a skillset which is invaluable in unlocking certain attacking movements on the fly. For the Chiefs’ first score after the break, Finau first runs a great, self-spotted line from the lineout, while then calling himself as the spontaneous backdoor passer in the following phase, when the ball shifts back to the open.

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Here, Finau is at his best, acting as a crucial link player between forwards and backs. Ten minutes later, Finau’s persistence on the edge would be rewarded when McKenzie finds him with a well-executed cross-kick.

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Finau try

The contrast in attacking sensibilities between Haig and Finau is strong. While the latter is like a fish in water in attacking spaces, the former looks more like a deer in headlights. In a rare moment when the ball came to him in attack on the edges, Haig struggled to move away from his natural tendency to play a supporting role and keep his width.

Early in the first half, for example, with the ball moving out wide with the Highlanders on attack, Haig needed to drift on his opposite, creating space for his inside man while providing the latter with a legitimate passing target. Instead, Haig’s tight instincts immediately kick in, looking to position himself on his inside man’s shoulder as a support and cleaning option.

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Closing the space

But the unintended effect is that the space becomes shut down as well as the attack, with the Highlanders being saved from being turned over courtesy of an earlier penalty advantage.

During the second half, with the game breaking up a bit more, Finau started to thrive while Haig struggled to find his feet out wide, the latter being hooked relatively quickly in the half with TK Howden coming on.

Both Finau and Haig’s issue, in other words, is that they struggle to switch up how they play, making them relatively dependent on the in-game context for them to be effective rather than being able to impact the game no matter the type of contest. And this is where the blindside’s role becomes important. As the player who connects the tight five with the loose forwards, the blindside is a player who needs to be able to take on a multitude of roles and styles: sometimes playing creatively on the attacking edge, and sometimes playing in close support, being closely bound with the tight forwards in collective play.

More than anything, it’s what the ABs seemingly demand from the position, as someone who can play in the right style, at the right time. This is, however, far easier said than done, and Finau’s and Haig’s contrasting skillsets show why. While both have their own unique strengths, playing as the AB 6, they will be expected to be equally proficient in both the loose and the tight.

But when this isn’t a skillset which comes particularly naturally to those players, they are on a hiding to nothing. We have seen how players, when faced with the difficult demands of Test rugby and Test coaches, start playing outside of their natural game. It’s easy to imagine how both players would look to overcompensate their own perceived weaknesses in the Test arena – Finau starting to play tighter and more conservative, Haig looking to force himself to stay wide on attack – to detrimental effect.

Someone like Taniela Tupou is on record as saying how he’s starting to feel like he doesn’t know how to play rugby anymore, after constantly being told to change certain parts of his game. A similar difficulty potentially awaits AB blindsides, as long as the selectors have such ambitious demands of their number six.

Future: the key(s) to the blindside position
So what is a blindside, really? From an AB perspective, more than a lineout option, a physical presence, an edge forward, or a collision specialist, the ideal blindside is essentially someone who is equally proficient in tight and loose responsibilities. And, perhaps even more importantly, is someone who has mastered the art of knowing when to play tight and when to play loose, at the right time.

Wallace Sititi did an admirable job during the 2024 Test season as an interim blindside: his incessant work rate and energy allowed him to be (relatively) effective in both tight and loose situations, showing up all over the field while being a bruising physical presence. But Sititi is about as natural a number 8 as there is: he will carry relentlessly and put his team on the front foot, using both his considerable physical power as well as his skillset to break tackles and gain terrain. He seems destined to end up at the back of the AB scrum.

So what are the options available to the coaches? What the AB selectors will be looking out for, I think, is a player who falls into one of the two aforementioned categories, but who shows genuine ability in playing the other style as well. And the player who has shown the most improvement in this sense, during the 2025 SR season, has been Simon Parker. Parker has always been a player of promise, a big body who moves well and shows solid technique in the tackle, carry and clean. But what he has shown this season is a new dimension on attack, a willingness to play a central role on attack.

This moment late in the recent game against Moana Pasifika highlights Parker’s newfound confidence on attack, first throwing the wide pass before running the support line and throwing a beautiful offload for the Ratima try:

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Parker double involvement on attack

To look at this development a bit more closely, the game against the Crusaders in Round 2 nicely encapsulates the growth of the Kaiwaka flanker’s game. In the first half, Parker was able to display his traditional strength, his work and physicality in the tight exchanges.

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Aggressive cleans, dominant tackles, multiple involvements on both attack and defence through the middle, typically in close cooperation with the tight five

But what he has improved upon this season is his development of a genuine attacking game, running great lines, being creative in the wider channels and showing a deft array of passing.

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Number 8 skills from Parker: finding gaps and keeping the attack alive

So someone like Parker will be of great interest to the AB selectors, as he fits the template of an AB blindside, currently. He is able to impact the game, no matter the type of encounter, due to his ability to be efficient in both the tight and the loose. The grunt of a lock and the soft skills of a number 8, this is, in the end, what they are looking for in a blindside flanker.

For a final note on this already way too long collection of thoughts, it’s relevant to emphasize the importance of coaching in Parker’s development. The Chiefs have been clear about how they want to play during games, taking on the opposition pack in a direct tussle during the first half in order to tire them out, before playing a more expansive game in the second. Parker clearly knows his assignments during each half, making it easier to balance between tight and loose styles of play and to make decisions on attack and defence.

Herein also lies a key directive for the AB coaches in their search for a new blindside: clarity around game plan and requirements eases the task of the blindside flanker, who already has to juggle different styles and roles across 80 minutes on the field. There are plenty of suitable candidates in NZ to be a quality number 6 at Test level: what is needed is a clear selection policy as well as a straightforward plan, which allows these varied skillsets to shine. Whether it be a tight or a loose blindside, or someone who is able to switch between the two, performance starts with the long-term planning and vision of the AB coaches. And looking at the state of the jersey for the past 7 years, it’s clear they have some work to do.

What exactly is decline? It’s a term that’s pulled out whenever the ABs lose and never more so than when they lose in the traumatic manner they did on Saturday in Wellington. I’ve personally always been hesitant to use the word: it’s an incredibly emotional term, one that was popularized by Romantic authors such as Edward Gibbon (The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1776-‘89) and Oswald Spengler (The Decline of the West, 1918-’22) as a way of weaving moralistic tales together on just why certain societies end up collapsing. It is a non-Biblical Sodom and Gomorra, with just a slightly more modern touch.

Like that other politicized metaphor – Orwell’s description of sport as “war minus the shooting” – it can feel a bit silly to apply such heavy thoughts to what is essentially just a game. And yet, Saturday feels important. Whether it were those empty seats before the game was over, the ecstatic scenes in the Springbok coaching box or the thousand-yard stare of Scott Barrett in the post-match interviews, it is not enough to simply “flush the dunny”, as it were. The possibility of a decline needs to be taken seriously.

Like cart-horses playing race-horses
As it so happens, I am currently reading a book where the topic of decline runs as a theme throughout. Jonathan Wilson’s Inverting the Pyramid: the History of Football Tactics (2008) discusses how soccer formations evolved from the 19th century’s 2-3-5 onwards, while also reflecting on why England slid from the sport’s originator and primary director to just another contender, one that, furthermore, was mostly on the backfoot for most of soccer’s tactical revolutions.

This perpetual slide, however, is often brought back to a single match, Hungary’s destruction of England right in their spiritual home of Wembley in 1953. Labelled the “Match of the Century” due to the considerable reputation of both teams, the match itself was largely one-sided, Hungary’s 35 shots on goal dwarfing England’s 5. While Hungary had a generational team – led by such luminaries as Ferenc Puskas, Sandor Kocsis and Nandor Hidegkuti – it was through the combination of tactics and technique that the Three Lions were so thoroughly outthought and outplayed by their Eastern European counterparts.

An injured player from the English team, Tom Finney, watching from the side said that it was “like cart-horses playing race-horses”, the Hungarians able to consistently find space through their unique M-M formation (the classic striker playing more from midfield) while having the technical skills to make this given space count. The game would end up 6-3 in favour of the visitors, a crushing loss for a side which had up to that point only suffered the one solitary defeat in their home country.

The Hungarian team’s M-M formation, and the complex passing interplay it allowed, orchestrated by its false nine, Hidegkuti (source: Wilson, Inverting the Pyramid, 90)

While the Hungarians would go on to push onto the World Cup final a year later, the loss brought something of a spiritual crisis to English football, with “a slew of books” being published right after, “lamenting the passing of a golden age.” (122) Then again, the defeat helped pierce through the myth of English superiority and forced managers throughout the country to start experimenting with formations and tactical shifts. One of the players in the game, right-back Alf Ramsey, would coach England to their biggest achievement on the international stage, winning the World Cup at home in 1966. But even if some good came from the match, the English national football team would never again reclaim its spot as the leading side in international football.

From the Cake Tin to Wembley to HBF Park
It is impossible to know what Saturday’s destruction will eventually lead to, with it being still up in the air whether the game’s administrators in NZ will take it seriously or will just consider it a blip. There is a chance that it will simply be ignored, last week’s performance in the ABs’ spiritual home enough to keep the faith.

But reading Wilson’s book, one thing did stand out to me in his discussion of the so-called “Match of the Century”. Reflecting on whether it was mainly tactics or technique which separated the two sides, Wilson came to a nuanced conclusion: “Perhaps it is wrong to divide the two, for although the tactics permitted the technique to flourish, without the technique the tactics would have been redundant.” (89)

It brought me back to a moment, not from Saturday’s big occasion at the Cake Tin but from a much more obscure game from 2022, so obscure even that I can’t quite recount what game it was exactly. All I remember is a perfectly chiselled jaw, a beautiful mane of black hair touched by shades of grey and the most tidy execution of draw and pass, so tidy that I’ve consistently been recalling it in my mind for the past 3 years.

That draw and pass, in case you hadn’t realized it yet, belonged to Richard Kahui. Kahui was around 37 years old at the time, playing for the Western Force near the end of his career. His body, after the raft of injuries throughout his career, struggled with the pace of the game and he was mostly a bench player for the Force in that final season. And yet, his vision and skill execution stood out to such a degree that I instantly think back to that particular moment, whenever I see an All Black make yet another poor pass.

Not quite the moment I remember but close enough: Kahui’s rugby contrapposto is a thing of beauty

While the draw and pass seems pretty simple – ball in two hands, slight lift on the inside leg before passing, soft pop to your outside – the devil really is in the details: the ability to control the height and force of the pass by sufficiently swerving your upper-body and hips, the positioning of your feet before the pass in order to draw the defender, the angle of your run towards your opponents’ outside shoulder and the distance between you and your opponent when passing. All of these details are crucial for a perfect draw and pass, and Kahui stands out to me as an example. While his athleticism was no longer of the level required for Super Rugby, the sheer excellence of his basic skills still made him a valuable attacking player, allowing for flowing offensive moves towards the edge.

Back to the Cake Tin
Is there a decline in New Zealand rugby? If there is, the first thing I’d look at is its attempted implementation of tactics and technique, and ask whether the players’ skillsets are really up to scratch for the game plan that’s being tried.

While the “Match of the Century” brought existential angst to English football, at the very least it pierced through some myths. Saturday’s Test against the Springboks should do the same for the All Blacks, namely the idea that NZ rugby players are more skilled than their counterparts. The painful reality is that right now the ABs should probably be ranked dead-last in the TRC, when discussing basic skillsets.

Several try-scoring opportunities went begging against the Springboks, simply because the skill execution wasn’t good enough.

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The attack moves slower than the defence due to poor skill execution

There is just one pass that puts pace on the attack, and that is Proctor’s catch-and-pass to Barrett. All others are either too loopy or behind the receiver instead of in front, which makes it easy for the Bok scramble to reach the space before the ball. And if your skills are up to scratch, the ball should always beat the man.

Compare this to the Wallaby attack against the Springboks: rather than go wide-wide, the Wallabies first condensed the Bok defence in the middle of the field, before using the cut-out ball to bypass the outside-in rush.

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Simple rugby: find the right combination of tactics and technique

It gives much fewer opportunities for the Bok defence to build defensive momentum or get a potential intercept, while allowing the attack to get immediately behind them.

With the Wallabies, we see the combination of tactics (midfield rucks against rush) and technique (the JOC bridge pass) put to good effect. No such clarity can be found within the AB game plan right now, mostly because it is still built on the myth of the NZ skillset. The AB phase play attack requires an accumulation of skilful plays, and there are no indications that enough ABs actually possess these skillsets.

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The draw and pass simply isn’t good enough, as the lack of detail in skill execution is clear to see

Tactically, there are too many links in the chain and technically, there are not enough links that can do what is asked of them. It’s great to have an edge forward who can beat defenders out wide but when this forward (Sititi or Savea) can’t cleanly execute a draw and pass, then there’s an issue with your tactical game plan. Similarly, if your backs are known for their issues with passing (Beauden Barrett with keeping his shoulders straight, Jordan connecting with his outsides after the break) then you might want to rethink some of your tactics as well.

A rugby nation in decline?
In 1953, it was impossible to know for English football to know whether it had truly entered into a state of decline or whether it just represented a bump in the road. A year later, England would meet Hungary again, this time losing 7-1 in Budapest. For many, it represented a final nail in the coffin. For others, like Alf Ramsey, it simply presented an opportunity for change. Ramsey would eventually lead England to their only World Cup win in 1966.

What was immediately clear though, in 1953, was the fact that English tactical supremacy was a myth. Thoroughly outthought by an innovative M-M formation and outplayed by superior Hungarian skills, it required a reset of English football. A similar picture certainly appears for NZ rugby, after the ABs’ capitulation in the capital. The attempted combination of tactics and technique is built on a fatal myth, that of superior NZ handling and passing skills.

Now firmly in the bottom of TRC skillsets, it is time for NZR to seriously address either the way they want to play the game or the manner in which they build their skillsets, as right now both facets of the game aren’t complimentary of each other. While Wellington might not represent the end of future NZ rugby supremacy, it certainly signals a fork in the road, with administrators needing to make decisions and take action.

They would do well to remember a player like Richard Kahui, who showed in the twilight of his career in the Australian backwater that is HBF Park, that the ball will always beat the man if you have to skills to draw and pass.

A much better performance by the ABs, in my opinion. Especially on defence they looked much more switched on, as opposed to the Eden Park Test where they let the Wallabies make too many soft metres around the ruck. And while Fainga’anuku and Tupaea weren’t perfect, their added breakdown ability put the Australian attacking ruck under a lot more pressure. It’s not difficult to see how slower opposition ball makes defending a bit easier.

The thing which drew my eye the most was the coaches’ approach to the number 8-jersey during the Bledisloe series. Both Sititi and Lakai got the exact same minutes in these two Tests against the Wallabies. Both had a start, played for 61 minutes and were then replaced by the other. It allows us to make a very clear comparison between the two playes, and try to answer a simple question: who should start and who should be on the bench? (apologies, it's another long one)

The starting number 8
Sititi started the first Test against the Wallabies at the back of the scrum, as he had done for the previous two Tests against South Africa. Sititi has come under some scrutiny for his performances, with some accusations of him suffering from the so-called second-year syndrome.

With Sititi starting at 8 instead of 6, it’s clear that his role has somewhat changed: while the Chiefs loose forward played in a (very) free role in his rookie year, he is being entrusted with added responsibilities in his second year. As the number 8, he is to act as a carrying focal point for the side while also having a more prominent role within the attacking shape as a decoy runner and distributor. To me, it looks like Sititi is somewhat struggling with juggling these different responsibilities (while also just coming back from a serious injury, of course).

As a result of some of these struggles, it seems the coaches wanted to test the depth of the position, giving Peter Lakai a shot against the Wallabies in the second Test. Lakai is a very different player to Sititi: whereas the latter is all power and potential, the former is a much more polished player already. Communicative, hardworking, and, importantly, incredibly consistent, Lakai is a typical glue player who will do whatever the side requires in different moments.

So which of these two players is ultimately more suited to starting at 8? Below is a table of their involvements as starting players in the two Tests against the Wallabies.

Number 8-numbers: attacking rucks attended (ARA), defensive rucks attended (DRA), carries (C), gain line carries (GC), defenders beaten (DB), offloads (O), tackles completed and misses (TC/TM), and turnovers won and lost (TO W/L)

This table is yet another example of the beauty of statistics: while the numbers would indicate that they had very similar performances, the opposite was rather true.

Taking a closer look at Sititi’s game at Eden Park, it is clear that the Chiefs number 8 is a confidence player, someone who can really get into a flow and become nearly unstoppable. At the same time, when his confidence is at a low ebb, his game suffers.

Sititi started the game very well: in the third minute of the game, with the ABs having an attacking lineout deep inside the Wallaby 22, Sititi first physically dominates Frost at the pillar, making the maul move forward. Seconds later, he runs to the open, positions himself as a carrier and bursts through two tackles. A few phases later, the ABs score at the other end, the Wallaby defensive line unable to recover from the two early dents.

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Sititi excels when he is able to ‘stack up’ multiple positive involvements

Quickly afterwards, though, Sititi’s play would lose its momentum. The trigger seems to have been a series of defensive sets, where Sititi was simply too passive in the tackle, allowing players like Wilson easy yards and the Wallaby attack to get in behind the AB defensive line.

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Sititi being passive in defensive contact, after which he shirked away from the physical stuff for large parts of the first half

For much of the first half after these poor tackle attempts, Sititi would start deferring to his teammates too much. Instead of offering up the carry and looking for physical dominance on attack, he would enter into more of a support role as a cleaner or passer, which is not a role he necessarily excels at.

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With Sititi passing and cleaning, the ABs became a bit too lateral in the second part of the first half

So while, at first glance, Sititi’s breakdown involvement numbers are a positive (21 total, 15 at attacking rucks and 6 at defensive rucks), in reality they are more of a negative, as they came at a detriment to his natural game and seemed to originate from him going into his shell somewhat (only 6 carries during the first 40, with most of his breakdown involvements - 19 out of 21 - coming during this period as well).

It was only at the end of the first half that he would again start bringing more of a physical edge on both sides of the ball. He would continue being much more assertive in the second half, perhaps after getting a halftime talking to, as he again looked like a proper number 8 between minutes 41 to 61. During these 20 minutes, he would rack up 8 carries (75% gain line and another 2 defenders beaten) and help ensure that the ABs would remain on the front foot during their time in possession.

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Sititi is at his best when he’s running it straight

So while Sititi has, at times, been very good, it has only been in patches so far this season. If his confidence is low, he can start shirking away from his duties while also struggling to be his physically dominant self. For this reason, it’s not strange that the coaches were interested in seeing how Lakai would go as starting number 8, as consistency is probably one of the latter’s standout traits.

One area in which this consistency was a marked improvement was on defence, where Lakai was much more successful in bringing some of the main Wallaby carriers down quickly.

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Stopping opposition carriers dead in their tracks: Lakai was a big contributor in the ABs’ improved defensive effort in Perth

Another benefit is Lakai’s greater experience as a flanker, with his cleaning technique again being much more impactful and consistent than Sititi’s. While both have similar numbers for ruck attendance, behind those numbers, the quality of Lakai’s cleans at the attacking ruck and his disruption at the defensive ruck was much more effective.

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Swiftly moving bodies out of the way: Lakai is decisive when he’s going into the breakdown

Lakai also had some nice carries, using both leg drive and deception to get over the gain line. With his 3 defenders beaten, he wasn’t far off Sititi’s contribution (4 DB), even if the style of carrying is perhaps somewhat different.

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Using his fend, leg drive and deception: Lakai isn’t as physically abrasive as Sititi but is excellent at finding ways at moving the play forward

The only downside is perhaps that Lakai is more of a 7.5 than a typical number 8: he’ll get stuck into the breakdown even when perhaps it would be better that he kept himself available for a hard carry. 8 carries in 60 minutes is just a little on the low side for where you want your number 8 to be. Then again, his willingness to get stuck into attacking and defensive rucks makes him a better foil for someone like Savea, who can sometimes lose himself in his carrying game.

So who starts, and who goes to the bench?
With Sititi, Lakai and Lio-Willie, the ABs have three solid options at the back of the scrum (not to mention obvious others, like Savea). And while Sititi is, due to his high-carrying numbers and physical directness, probably the most classic number 8, both Lakai and Lio-Willie have good arguments to start as well, their compatibility with Savea and defensive robustness being two of them.

We can also take a brief look at the respective bench impacts from both players, again from the two Tests against the Wallabies.

20 minutes worth for each player from the bench

While it’s hard to take away too much from just two games, what was noticeable from Sititi’s bench appearance was his increased aggression in the tackle and the clean. Whereas he’d been way too passive in the previous week, in Perth Sititi showed that he can combine his effective carrying (75% gain line from 4 carries, with 2 defenders beaten) with better efforts in defence and at the breakdown.

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In an ideal world, Sititi would be able to combine his carrying excellence with consistent efforts on defence and at the breakdown, like he did in his short spell off the bench in Perth

Lakai, on the other hand, offers pretty much the same effort from the bench as he does starting. While not as dynamic and physical as Sititi in the carry, he combines a high work rate with technical excellence, which are valuable traits for a team to have both at the beginning as at the end of games.

Lakai starts now, Sititi in the future
Perhaps, for the coming Test matches at least, it would be more logical if Lakai started in the number 8-jersery. The ABs are a side severely lacking in confidence right now, and they can spiral when they have a poor start defensively. For this reason, it would be best, in my view, for someone like Lakai to start the game, as he’s a more consistent performer on the defensive side of the ball.

For the future, I’d still think someone like Sititi potentially offers the most. But for him, the task is relatively clear in the next few seasons: improve the defensive efforts and work on consistency rather than relying on confident patches. If he’s able to do this, then he’ll have gone a long way towards becoming the long-term All Blacks number 8.

@antipodean said in All Blacks 2025:

I like Norris' work this season - he's doing a good job in the scrum but is he doing enough around the field for the All Blacks?

These are the Opta stats for some of the loosehead candidates – X. Numia, T. Mafileo, O. Norris, J. Fusitua, and G. Bower – on both the attacking and defending side.

Attack

So on attack, especially as a carrier, Numia seems to offer the most out of the available options, averaging 8.7 carries/80min, while pairing this with the highest percentages in gainline (56.9), dominant carries (52), 2+ tacklers committed (84.5), and tackle evasion (23.1). In contrast, Bower seems to offer the least on attack: while his 7 carries/80min is a respectable number, he scores the lowest on all other percentages, such as dominant carries (7.1), gainline (30), 2+ tacklers committed (60.6) and tackle evasion (6.7).

As a cleaner for attacking rucks, Norris stands out, making 22.6 cleans/80min at a very high rate of effectiveness (91.9%). The others all average around 18-20 cleans/80min, with only Numia having a considerably lower rate at 13 offensive cleans/80min, which can be explained through his higher carrying rate.

Defence

In terms of defence, it has to be said that no single candidate looks to be a bad defender. A tackle success rate of 90+% is more than respectable for a prop, and no loosehead from this group dips below that. In terms of volume – Numia: 11.5 tackles/80min; Mafileo: 12.4 tackles/80min; Norris: 15.6 tackles/80min; Fusitua: 17.8 tackles/80min; Bower: 19.4 tackles/80min – Fusitua and Bower score the highest, while Norris puts in the most dominant tackles (5). As far as the defensive ruck is concerned, Numia and Norris offer the most threat in that area, at 16% and 5.7% effectiveness respectively.

The choice
What the selectors eventually pick will most likely come down to their specific requirements. I suspect they’ll look at scrummaging and other set-piece work first, before seeing whether they want a more offensive-carrying profile (Numia), a hardworking cleaner on attack (Norris), a volume defender (Bower/Fusitua) or someone who can effectively scrummage on both sides (Mafileo).

Looking at these profiles, as well as the eye test, it has to be said that loosehead is a position of decent depth right now, as this group doesn’t even take the current AB players into consideration. The biggest question mark will be their scrummaging ability at Test level. And while Norris, Fusitua and Numia have taken considerable leaps in this area in the past two seasons, it still remains to be seen whether they can produce similar results against international tighthead props.

I would argue that the biggest area of potential improvement for the ABs, going from the Rugby Championship to the Autumn Internationals, was the defence. While there was plenty of stuff happening in attack, on the defensive side the team gave up plenty of easy scores against their opponents, whether it was through an all-too easily penetrable goal-line defence (South Africa 2), clever set-piece attack from lineout (Australia 1) or complex phase play patterns (Argentina 1).

In Ireland, they had an opponent which could exploit all three areas, so it was a big tick in the box of defence coach Tamati Ellison that the Irish were only limited to 13 points in Dublin. So what changed between the RC and November? Well, it turns out that quite a lot can change in the space of a few months. As an example, I’ve tried to compare the Irish game with the defeat to Argentina in Wellington, as both Ireland and Argentina play with the Leinster blueprint of phase-attack, with Argentina more or less adopting this system after Contepomi has come in. While the defence wasn’t the main reason the ABs lost in Wellington – before the Savea brain explosion in the 68th minute, they were still in an excellent position to win the test – it played a big role in the consistent loss of momentum. In contrast, against Ireland, the defence put consistent pressure on the Irish attack, creating the conditions for McKenzie to kick them to victory in Dublin.

The first thing that stands out when comparing these two games is the AB exit kick strategy. Whereas the ABs kicked long off 9 for their first exit play against Argentina, against Ireland they went with a short contestable kick off 9. Both strategies led to wildly different defensive lines and set-ups at the point where the opposition receivers where able to set up their attack:

In the first example, Perenara doesn’t look for or fails to find touch going long and the Argentine backfield is immediately able to launch an attack against a very fractured and disorganized Kiwi chase. The Argentinean forwards are positioned well as blockers and in the subsequent phases, the AB defenders are consistently on the back foot, with multiple Argentine switches off 10 able to outflank the AB defence, which isn’t effectively numbering up. After another gain-line carry off Carreras, the Argentine first five is able to get an offload away, with the only thing preventing a certain Argentina try being Beauden Barrett blocking the passing lane for the final pass. Throughout this game, the ABs consistently kicked long without a solid idea behind the defensive purpose of their chase, inviting pressure onto themselves and giving plenty of opportunities for the Argentinean phase attack.

Contrast this to the Irish scenario, where the AB defence is perfectly aligned at the start of the Irish phase attack, as a result of the contestable kick. The Irish try several passes out the back which are well read by the AB defenders, which leaves the Irish attack with little space and few numbers, and a mistake by Aki leads to a positive outcome for the All Black defence. When New Zealand did kick long after the restart, off of McKenzie, they presented a coherent defensive chase (a single hard chaser to put pressure on the opposition kick receiver followed by a set defensive line), making sure they go up together rather than at individual speeds as they did in Wellington.

Back in the Wellington test, time and time again, the New Zealand defence found itself badly outnumbered against the Argentine attack, who have the typical Leinster tendency to overload one side of the field so as to overwhelm the defence with carriers, blockers and backdoor options:

In this particular phase of play, Mallia, the fullback, is allowed to make a line-break and a huge amount of metres, simply because the Argentina numbers are able to fix their opposite defenders, creating options for the attack and doubts for the defence.

In contrast, the Irish were very rarely able to fabricate such scenario’s, as the AB defenders were often effectively able to move into the Irish passing lines. A good example can be found around the 18 minute mark, when Tele’a is stripped off the ball in contact by Beirne, who passes out the back. Normally, this presents an ideal counter-attacking opportunity, only Sititi has immediately sprinted off the line as soon as the turnover happened in order to make this option much more difficult:

Another example occurred early in the game after the first Irish set-piece attack, with Tele’a simply moving into the passing space of the Irish attack, not so much with the intent of making an early defensive read as spooking the Irish passers and putting doubts into their mind. Again it worked, as Aki hesitates for a moment before throwing a pass that wasn’t on, leading to a Doris knock-on:

It’s not like the system fundamentally changed between these two tests, as Lienert-Brown also shot up out of the line after turnover ball in the Wellington test for example. The only problem was his execution of the principle. The idea is (1) to get in-between opposition players, and (2) to do this close to where the ball is in order to shut down the movement at its point of origin. Here, Lienert-Brown shoots up (1) into no man’s land instead of getting into the opposition passing space, (2) and, more importantly, far away from the ball:

The result is fairly predictable: the Argentineans can use their afforded time and space in order to exploit the non-existent connection between ALB and his inside defender, producing an easy line-break and eventual try to Cinti. If anyone was going to shoot up in-between the Argentina players, it needed to be Savea or Darry close to the ball, in order to shut down the attack before it could get started. Now, the attack was neither impeded, with the added downside of Lienert-Brown opening the door for the Argentina attack.

While the New Zealand defence is by no means the finished product yet, at the very least there are clear signs that both the coaches are getting better at strategically implementing its principles (through kick strategy) and the players are getting better at putting the system into play (by choosing when and where to shoot up, for example). There are more examples of defensive cohesion in the Ireland test – the solid execution of double tackles, the effective pairing of low tacklers and jackal threats, both signs of good defensive communication – but this is already long enough as it is, so I’ll leave it at that.

The French attack will pose a different sort of threat to the Irish (speedy counter-attack, snipes off 9, overloading the spaces around the ruck with big carriers), so it will be intriguing to see whether Ellison is able to prep his defence accordingly. If he does, important steps will have been taken by this coaching team towards both an improved attack and defence.

When Jason Holland was confirmed as backs coach at the end of 2023, I wasn’t quite as disheartened as many seemingly were on this forum, a feeling especially common amongst Hurricanes fans. While Holland had his considerable limits as head coach and selector at the capital-based franchise, there was one facet in which he and his Hurricanes teams excelled in, and that was set piece-attack. All things considered, that was pretty much the exact reason he was brought in for, as first Leon Macdonald and then Scott Hansen would take care of the broader principles of the attack. When Will Jordan was asked about his try against England ahead of the Dublin test, he was quick to redirect the plaudits to his backs coach for meticulously planning out the strike move: “It was good to connect with Beaudy and he put a great ball back to the inside, so. But the credit must go to Jase Holland who organizes our lineout strikes. [He] spotted an opportunity there and it paid dividends.”

So when France infringed in the 74th minute of Saturday’s Test match, the stage was set for a Hurricane strike move to finish the job. And yet, Scott Barrett went for three rather than a lineout attack, seemingly signalling a distrust in the efficacy of the strike moves. So what exactly has happened? In order to understand this moment a bit better, I’ve taken a look back at the Hurricanes’ set-piece attack under Holland, why it didn’t make an appearance at the end of the game against France and some of its teething issues in Test rugby.

The Hurricane lineout attack
Holland’s lineout attack at the Hurricanes was characterized by its simplicity, its efficacy and its potential for small but successful variations. Its most effective shape was marked by its use of a six-man lineout with a plus one in the boot, who functioned as the in-field passer to a running 9. The core principle of this move was to have multiple runners in motion, organized around an “arrow runner” (not quite sure what to name this, but arrow seemed appropriate) in midfield, with passing options off both shoulders as well as a further one (typically, the first five) out the back.

A good example of both this signature strike move as well as a slight variation to it can be found in the Hurricanes match against the Rebels in Wellington, in Round 14 of Super Rugby Pacific 2022.

youtube.co/watch?v=CS0OEguwrgA&t=16s

Highlight with timestamp

Early in the game, the Canes have a lineout just outside the Rebels 22. They call a six-man lineout formation, set-up to maul, with Kirifi as plus one. O’Reilly throws to Gibson at the front who quickly transfers to Kirifi, who passes to a running TJ Perenara. Perenara throws a cut-out pass to Proctor in the midfield (the arrow runner), with Love running a hard inside cut while Morgan loops around. Proctor throws the backdoor to Morgan after the Rebels’ midfield has bitten in on Love, creating a two-on-one, leaving Julian Savea with only one man to beat.

Vaihu has bitten in on Love, leaving Morgan free to create the overlap

Seven minutes later, the Canes have another lineout, this time just inside the Rebels 22.
youtube.co/watch?v=CS0OEguwrgA&t=59s

The Canes set up in the same formation and you can see how the Rebels midfield defender, Kellaway, identifies this. This time, he aims to shut down the overlap by targeting the out the back option (Morgan). The only problem is that the Hurricanes have gone for one of their slight variations: Perenara holds the ball a fraction longer, Proctor, the arrow runner, drifts to Kellaway’s inside shoulder and when the 9 passes, a gap has already been created through the Rebels’ midfield’s anticipation of the back-door option. They have taken their eyes off the arrow runner as a potential carrier, leaving the latter to simply run through the space and score the try. Simple but effective.

A visibly dejected Kellaway, after being burned again by the strike play

The six+1 lineout strike made regular appearances in the Hurricanes’ highlight reels across the Holland seasons. I’m sure it greatly enhanced Holland’s reputation as a set-piece specialist. It is also understandable how a portfolio like Holland’s would be attractive to someone like Scott Robertson. While Robertson is a firm believer in defence, counter-attack and set-piece pressure, set-piece attack, especially the lineout peel in the opposition 22, was a staple of the Crusaders during Razor’s tenure. It typically acted as a kind of secondary source of scoring income, an added platform for opposition pressure rather than the core game plan. The in-play superiority of the team would set the team up for victory, and the set-piece attack could act as the killer blow. While Hansen is Razor’s trusted companion, Holland seemed to be appointed to be his sword. So why was it so blunt against France?

Lineout attack at the Stade de France
At first, it seemed as if the Hurricane lineout strike would not get to make an appearance in the test match. Instead of the typical six-man lineout set-up, with the +1 in the boot to act as the in-field passer, the ABs went for five-man lineouts, with Roigard at the base to throw the in-field pass to Barrett at first receiver. Rather than set-up for any sort of immediate strike, the goal seemingly was to secure possession and settle into phase-play, with several passages of play after an NZ lineout going to 7+ phases. While these lineout attacks weren’t necessarily unsuccessful – apart from the botched Savea to Ioane transfer in midfield and the breakdown penalty – it ultimately resulted in very little on the scoreboard, New Zealand’s tries coming from good counter-attack on kick return and a forced turnover around the French 22.

It was only in the 52nd minute, after France had just scored two quick tries in succession, that the call came for a six-man lineout, with Lakai in the boot. It was a field position typical for the Hurricane lineout strike, in and around the opposition 22, with the likely goal being to create a scenario where Caleb Clarke is put into space and in a one-on-one situation close to the try line.

The French, however, quickly identified what was coming: Roumat immediately spots the pattern, runs to the middle while calling lifters to him and promptly steals the ball.

Roumat calling lifters to him after seeing what’s about to happen

The ABs would get another shot at it in the 59th minute, after a breakdown penalty won by Savea. With the gap at seven points, this is the perfect moment to pull out a strike with a high-success rate. The lineout set-up is the same, 6+1, only this time the call is to go to the front. Savea secures the ball and transfers quickly to Lakai, who throws the pass to Ratima. The 9 passes long to ALB who acts in this scenario as the arrow runner. In an interesting variation to the play – which catches the French midfield defence off guard – Lienert-Brown quickly passes to Ioane, who, instead of acting as the dummy inside cut, functions as a sort of secondary arrow, with McKenzie on his shoulder and Barrett as a back-door option.

In the standard play, ALB would take up the ball, with Ioane as the dummy runner. Instead, ALB passes to Ioane, creating a secondary arrow.

The variation works, as Ramos is caught in no man’s land, allowing Ioane to put McKenzie into space who still has Jordan on the outside.

Bielle-Biarrey seems fixed but isn’t.

The only thing that saves France is Bielle-Biarrey’s ability to act as two defenders at the same time. First, he is in position to make a tackle-assist on McKenzie but as soon as the latter passes to Jordan, he uses his incredible pace to shut down the space in the corner. Jordan is unable to finish against the French scramble defence and the AB trump card, the Hurricane lineout strike, is successfully foiled.

This is, at least, one good reason why Barrett didn’t go for the corner at the end of the game, as one of the signature strike moves of Holland had been earmarked and recognized by the French defence, both at the lineout (Roumat) and in the scramble (Bielle-Biarrey). If your opposition already knows what is coming, your chances of success drop drastically. Even when the ABs used an unexpected variation to the strike with the secondary arrow, the French defence was still able to adjust quickly.

AB lineout attack in 2024: a mixed bag
Another potential reason for Barrett’s choice is that the NZ set-piece attack has had a season with very mixed results. There were some great tries scored off lineout (SA 1, ENG) and scrum (JP), but other promising movements often fell short through lack of execution. There were also quite a few signs that what worked well in Super Rugby didn’t translate so well to test rugby, including the signature Hurricanes lineout strike.

The second game against the Springboks in Cape Town offers some nice examples of this difficult transition, in my view. After creating a lot of opportunities but just coming up short in Joburg, the ABs, once again, were able to produce plenty of line-breaks off lineout attack in Cape Town. In the 13th minute, for example, the ABs have a lineout near the Springbok 22:
youtube.co/watch?v=2CU83puKqzA&ab_channel=AllBlacks&t=16m16s
Cane breaks off of his position as plus one and Taylor throws it over the top. After a relatively quick recycle, Sititi makes a powerful midfield carry. The Springbok defence is struggling to keep the pace with the AB attack and in the next phase, Ratima passes to Savea who, targeted by both De Allende and Du Toit, passes back inside to Taylor who makes the line-break, as Wiese is too late in taking up his spot on Pieter-Steph’s inside. While this is a nice lineout strike, at the same time, this is the situation immediately after the line-break:

The Springbok defence is more alert to the break than the ABs. Scott Barrett is watching it all unfold and Sititi is only just getting off the floor. While Tamaiti Williams has nicely anticipated the situation, Ratima is the only realistic option to finish the break. Seeing this, Wiese follows the script from the RWC final (run every single support runner off their line, at whatever cost) and clumsily trips up the AB 9, costing himself a trip to the sinbin.

This simple fact – that Test defences react much, much quicker to breaks than Super Rugby defences – has been the single biggest Achilles heel of the 2024 AB lineout attack, as it has been unable to fully anticipate this fact into its strikes. One final example to show this, and where else to finish than with the Hurricane lineout strike.

In the 56th minute, with the ABs trailing the Springboks 13 points to 9, New Zealand has a lineout within the Springbok 22.
youtube.co/watch?v=2CU83puKqzA&ab_channel=AllBlacks&t=74m20s

The six-man plus one formation is called and, after Barrett secures the ball at the front, Cane acts as the in-field passer to Perenara at 9. Perenara throws a long pass to the arrow runner, ALB, with Jordan running the dummy cut. Lienert-Brown passes out the back to McKenzie, who has Ioane on his shoulder and Reece out wide. McKenzie passes short to Ioane to bypass Kolbe, allowing Rieko to release Reece towards the corner.

Besides the addition of Ioane – which is necessary because of the throw to the front as well as the presence of the Springbok defensive shooter (Kolbe) – this is a mirror image of the typical Hurricane lineout strike. As a result, we can compare some stills side-by-side (I have taken a Hurricanes lineout strike from their game against the Fijian Drua in 2023:

youtube.co/watch?v=FDC3aiUjvHg&t=2m56s

First, the situation of the arrow runner when he is close to the line.

What is noticeable is how different the space off of the arrow runner’s shoulder is in both situations: whereas in the Canes example Moorby is still a solid option for the pop-pass by Sullivan, forcing the Drua edge defender to turn inside, against the Springboks, Am has beaten Jordan into this space. The Jordan dummy run then has no effect on the Springbok scramble to the outside, as they can fully focus on the backdoor options and collectively push to the outside.

This is the end result of both strikes. Whereas the Fijian Drua defence is comprehensively outflanked by the play, leaving Goosen a simple run-in try, the Springbok defence, on the other hand, has outpaced the AB attack to the corner, leaving Reece face-to-face with four Springbok defenders on their feet. A few aspects have led to this situation: the throw to the front rather than the middle, which means that there is more space to make up; the necessity of McKenzie being a metre further back in order to be able to execute the overlap with Ioane against the Springbok shooting defender (Kolbe); and Jordan being beaten to the space, leaving the scramble defence free to sprint to the outside. These are matters of inches and seconds, but, as it turns out, that is the difference between scoring and getting turned over, between winning and losing.

Returning to the 74th minute in Paris
We will never know what was really going on in Scott Barrett’s head when he pointed to the sticks near the end of the Test match against France. Perhaps he felt they were on the right side of the referee and could eke out a win through Razor’s principles of in-game superiority: defensive intensity, set-piece superiority and dynamic counter-attack phase-play, forcing a penalty in the dying minutes. What we do know, is that he didn’t feel comfortable going to the Hurricane lineout strike as a means of guaranteed points. After being foiled in Cape Town, the French defence had shown itself more than capable of dealing with it as well, both at the lineout and through the scramble, even in the face of clever innovations. If the Hurricane lineout strike is going to return to Test rugby in 2025, Jason Holland will need to find a way of sharpening it, where it can finally cut through South African and French Test defences. If he can, we can expect some of these results to reverse in the next Test season. If he doesn't, Barrett will have to keep going for 3, hoping that this time they can secure an opportunity for the winning kick.

I thought it would be interesting to take a closer look at the performances of the four AB props on Saturday, seeing how the top 2 AB props (Williams and Lomax) are currently unavailable and the 4 props of the 2nd French Test (de Groot, Newell, Norris and Tosi) all got considerable minutes on the field. Focusing solely on them for the 80 minutes, I ended up with some observations, one part focusing on their collective numerical output, the other on facets which don’t really show up in (public) stats.

Some numbers
Sifting through the footage, I eventually came up with these numbers (Sidenote: some numbers will differ from the publicly available stats like those provided by RugbyPass, due to, I assume, different interpretations of what constitutes a completed and missed tackle).

Abbreviations:
MP: minutes played
SP: scrum penalties
ARI: attacking ruck involvements
DRI: defensive ruck involvements
CT: completed tackles
MT: missed tackles
C : carries
MM: metres made

While numbers very rarely tell the whole story, much less from such a limited data set, I think there’s a surprising amount that can be gleaned from this particular table. What stands out like a sore thumb is the breakdown work of the starting props compared to the bench props. While Newell and de Groot (to a somewhat lesser extent) were omnipresent at the attacking breakdown, moving bodies and ensuring clean ball, the bench props were much less present there.

This was, when looking at the game, clearly by design. Norris and Tosi often took up positions in the first pod outside the breakdown, ready to carry and use their big frames to bend the French line. But this is the rugby equivalent of counting your chickens before they hatch. Because what happened on the field was that, suddenly, backs like Barrett and McKenzie were needed to clean ball in the middle of the field, with rather predictable results.

Norris looking rather sheepish while the play switches in the other direction

In the picture above, for example, we can see Norris standing on the right side of the goalposts, ready for a carry close to the line. But instead, Roigard switches the play back to the open, similar to the switch play for the Jordan-try in Dunedin. But with both props playing relatively far away from the source, it’s now up to Beauden Barrett and Will Jordan to clean after the Vaa’i carry.

An ugly breakdown, which is more the norm than the exception when you have a 10 and 15 cleaning out a hooker like Bourgarit

While the sequence eventually ends with a try to Rieko Ioane in the corner, it’s clear how the composition of the bench, together with the gameplan of ball-carrying bench front-rowers, caused havoc for the AB attacking ruck. This havoc was further compounded by Codie Taylor leaving the field, who was, quite literally, everywhere during the first half. And while Taukei’aho did his best to carry a similar load, he simply does not have the engine of a Taylor.

In the end, the gameplan bore very little fruit, Norris’ and Tosi’s combined 4 carries for a total of 7 metres made barely a fundamental upgrade on de Groot’s and Newell’s combined 4 carries for 3 metres made. Norris put in a big shift on defence but the argument can be made that this defensive shift wouldn’t be necessary if the quality of the breakdown, maul and lineout hadn’t plummeted with the bench forwards coming on. If the bench plan is to bring carrying impact then the coaches need to make sure that there are enough forwards on the field who focus on securing the breakdown. Because any plan that results in your backs having to consistently provide clean ball is a plan destined to fail.

Beyond the numbers
Fletcher Newell is an excellent Test tighthead. He combines set-piece solidity with a frankly staggering work-rate. While Newell’s and de Groot’s attacking ruck involvements don’t look too dissimilar on paper (24 and 17 respectively), the nature and quality of these involvements does differ considerably. Whereas Newell is often the first arriving player at the breakdown, responsible for the actual shifting of bodies, many of de Groot’s ruck attendances were what you’d call secondary involvements, where the breakdown has already been secured and the secondary player arrives to provide further strength in numbers.

I don’t want to be too harsh on de Groot, as he put in a more than solid shift around the field and in the set-piece. But when put next to Newell, it is noticeable that he doesn’t quite offer the same work-rate. In the following sequence during the 22nd minute, for example, where the ABs are trying to go through the middle of the French forward pack, the difference between de Groot’s and Newell’s appetite for repeat efforts is stark:

https://media3.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExcG90eHloYWIzajk2cmswcTMwbDh3NnJnY2kwYnUzMWFvMXZ4Njh3aCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/sh3HrSjUiNaRx3ym41/giphy.gif
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In this particular series of rucks, Newell physically shifts three French players, going to the floor and getting up again. De Groot, meanwhile, is mostly ruck-watching, securing the attacking ruck while mostly leaving the actual physical shifting of bodies to others.

In de Groot’s case, it might still be an issue of fitness. While he started the Test very well, being active and physical at the breakdown, as the first half wore on it did start to look as if he was starting to struggle with the pace of the game. In the 19th minute, with the French attacking in the NZ half, de Groot was slow to fold back to the openside, leaving a gap in the defensive line which was all too eagerly exploited by the French backs.

https://media0.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExaW9odjFpcHM2NmcyMXM2cnM0N3JlMXY4dHh6bzZ4enM3Nm40YzRhdiZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/Xgh6KqCjko0dAcF4yD/giphy.gif
de Groot, jogging along in the background, is consistently behind the play

Taylor is already pushing de Groot to fold and take up the spot as a pillar defender but he’s slow to take up his position, forcing Holland to stay near the ruck. The latter is then unable to cover the ensuing gap between himself and Jordie Barrett, the French line-break eventually resulting in the yellow card for Beauden Barrett.

While I don’t think de Groot’s spot is immediately in danger – he still provides a lot more stability in the set-piece than someone like Norris – what the Chiefs’ loosehead does offer is superior fitness and mobility in the defensive line. If the latter is able to prove his reliability at scrum- and maul-time, then there might be some nervy times ahead for Gore’s finest.

Tl;dr: while the propping stocks are looking decent – Newell especially coming of age as a Test tighthead – there are still some teething issues with the gameplan and how they’re used off the bench, resulting in chaos at the AB attacking breakdown. Also, while de Groot still has an edge on Norris at the set-piece, the latter’s superior fitness does present a selection threat to the former.

@canefan said in Final - Crusaders v Chiefs:

I'd like Mauss to watch the game again and record the tackle stats for the collective

I'd like it to be on the Fern's record that I, contrary to how it may appear, do actually have a life.

A good Test to watch. Can’t say I’ve read everything in the thread but Proctor seemed to pop up quite a few times when skimming through so thought it would it be interesting to focus my rewatch on his game.

So why Billy Proctor?
While I think Proctor has an underrated attacking game (SRP: 43% tackle evasion, which makes him one slippery customer), it seems to me that his selection at outside centre is mostly based around his defence. And yes, I understand that’s a strange point to make when his most notable moment in the past 4 Tests was his miss on Attissogbé in the first French game in Dunedin. But what I mean is that I believe the selectors value his defensive style of play.

One very noticeable aspect of this AB season is that the team is increasingly successful in its implementation of defensive line speed. They already tried to introduce more defensive pressure in 2024, but this was often met with very mixed results (see the Wellington Argentina Test, for example). While the defence is by no means perfect, at least the players are showing an increased understanding of their roles and responsibilities on the field.

One of these principles is that the ABs work with a split midfield in defensive multiphase. After defending the first phase of a set piece strike together, the midfielders would each move to one side of the field. There, they have the task of organizing and bringing defensive line speed, each midfielder connecting with their outside winger in order to shut down backdoor plays or sweeping moves.

It is in this regard that someone like Proctor becomes valuable. Proctor excels in reading backdoor plays and is consistently able to shut these plays down, catching opponents on the backfoot and creating potential turnovers. In Super Rugby Pacific, he had one of the highest rates of dominant tackles across the competition (14.9%), reflecting his proficiency in catching ball carriers behind the gain line.

Against Argentina
In the weekend’s Test match against Argentina, Proctor gave plenty of examples why he is selected to perform this task. Argentina have an excellent attacking shape, using similar diamond pods and first five looping plays made famous at Leinster, courtesy of Contepomi’s Dublin connection. Early in the match, Proctor had a chance to show his abilities, after Jordie Barrett kicked long from his own 22, leading to an Argentina attack from kick return.

With Argentina setting up a midfield ruck and with plenty of numbers to the openside, Proctor has as his job to bring line speed in order to either deter the wide attack or reach man and ball at the same time, if they do decide to go there.

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In the next phase, Albornoz goes flat to Oviedo who is immediately wrapped up by Proctor, driven back in the tackle and subsequently driven off the ball, after the AB 13 quickly got back to his feet to initiate the counter-ruck alongside Rieko Ioane.

https://media3.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdDk4MzAxam83am14c2VvOW0wNzk1cWtobzNudGNwcThqN2oyaGU1YSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/GOzLUgLtLwFCw4w1c7/giphy.gif

This is why the Hurricanes centre is in the AB midfield: organize the defence, initiate line speed, connect with the outside backs and pressure the opposition recycle behind the gain line. The ABs win the penalty and march deep inside the Argentina 22.

Twenty minutes later, Proctor and Ioane would repeat their double act, this time reading the play well from an Argentina scrum attack, Chocobares throwing the backdoor to Albornoz who quickly tried to transfer Delguy.

https://media1.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExZWU4MXN6ODRhNTg0OTFxOG14eTRyc3MzOHp2dHIzcHdtbXA1Mjc2biZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/2JLse0bQ4yzMUz3ooV/giphy.gif

First, Proctor is nearly able to grab man and ball again but Ioane is on hand to finish the defensive stop comprehensively. The ABs are unlucky that Ioane is pinged for a tackle without the ball – despite Delguy first having the ball, making him a legitimate target – otherwise it would’ve been another defensive win.

So why not Billy Proctor?
So far, so good, I’d say. Proctor is a centre who works well in Tamati Ellison’s defensive system, with the potential to eventually come alive on attack as well. Then again, there are a few reasons to be critical of Proctor, some of them systems-related, others from a purely individual perspective.

Looking back at the split midfield defensive set-up, it’s clear it works well in shutting down outside threats (if your midfielders are able to read the play well, that is). But like any system, it often just means that you’re relocating your vulnerabilities. In this case, the seam between each midfielder and their inside forwards is often ripe for the picking.

For an example, we can turn to the 49th minute. Argentina has a lineout attack inside the AB half. After first defending together for the initial move, Jordie and Proctor quickly split, Barrett moving to the right hand side, with Proctor on the left. With Barrett now moving to the right wing in order to organize line speed there, it leaves Ardie defending in the midfield, inside Proctor.

With Argentina mostly shut out in the first half, they’ve clearly discussed other possibilities during halftime, the space such as that between Savea and Proctor here a likely topic of discussion

Using this system asks a lot of forwards like Savea who suddenly has a critical role in midfield defence. It becomes apparent pretty quickly that this responsibility – shooting up to close the space and quickly retreating to get back onside – isn’t a particular strong suit of the number 8, first being slow to connect in the advance, then being behind in getting back onside.

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Watch Ardie in the midfield, creating a fracture in the defensive line

In the very next phase, Albornoz would easily exploit this disconnect, floating a ball between Savea and Proctor for Oviedo to run hard onto, splitting them open for the important line break.

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While it’s hard to lay the blame at someone’s feet without hearing what’s being said on the field, you’d think this is most likely a comms issue. Here, Proctor’s inexperience likely works against him. Still, he needs to coach Savea to be aware of the different threats and connect properly with his insides and outsides.

A second critical note can be boiled down to purely athletic factors. While Proctor clearly has a good head on his shoulders, his execution can at times be found wanting. For example, in the 12th minute, Proctor again correctly reads the Argentina attacking play but allows Cinti to step out of the tackle.

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While it doesn’t lead to a particularly bad territory loss, these kinds of tackles need to be made, since there won’t always be a proper defensive scramble available. It’s something that Jordie Barrett unfortunately had to find out the hard way for the Albornoz try early in the 2nd half.

And while I like the fact that Robertson seems more inclined to select glue players in glue positions, in recent years the All Blacks have escaped with wins they shouldn’t have, simply because they had more talented players across the park than the other team (I like to call it the ‘Beauden Barrett special’). With Proctor, you lose that particular gambit. Provide him with terrible ball, he will just get turned over.

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A player like Leicester Fainga’anuku won’t provide you with the same defensive reads as Proctor (76.6% tackle completion at Toulon, with only 5.6% of those dominant) but in these kinds of situations, it wouldn’t surprise you to see the former make something out of nothing, whether through an offload or by simply bulldozing through contact. So far at least, the coaches seem quite firm in the decision they’ve made for the kind of player they want at 13.

Summary
So far, Billy Proctor seems to be mostly doing what I believe he’s being selected for: he’s organizing and bringing line speed from outside in, he’s connecting well with his outsides (whether it’s Ioane or Reece) and he’s tackling at a high rate of dominance (18% across his 3 Tests in 2025, which is comparable to England’s Henry Slade during the 2025 Six Nations). The line speed defence is also running increasingly smoothly but as all systems are apt to, is showing frailties in other areas.

So is Proctor showing enough at 13? Lienert-Brown did well in the third Test against France (20% tackle dominance and a well-taken try) but his continuous ill-discipline (4 penalties and a yellow card in less than 80 minutes played total) makes him a hard case to argue for. Fainga’anuku, with his utility value as being able to play midfield, wing and loose forward, seems like an ideal bench player while others, like AJ Lam, might find it difficult to gain selection, with an already congested squad.

Proctor’s objectives, on the other hand, seem relatively clearcut: make sure to finish your defensive reads and start finding ways to contribute more on attack, for example, by working harder to stay alive in contact . But if his development at Super Rugby is any indication, then there’s reason to think that it should only be a matter of time.

@Tim said in Ireland v All Blacks - Chicago2:

Rewatched the 1st half. We really get very little out of our loose forwards. Despite being a man up for 20 mins, they were hardly hitting rucks. Let alone making aggressive tackles. It looks like Tupaea, Faingaʻanuku, and even Clarke had better breakdown technique. Savea is absolutely not a 7.

The Savea-at-openside discussion is interesting. To be honest, I don’t think it makes a whole lot of difference what number Savea is wearing on his back, he pretty much plays his game whether he’s wearing 7 or 8 (or 6 or 12...). If you’d look at the table here, who’d you reckon the openside would be and who’d be the 8?

Guess the player: carries, post-contact metres, tackles completed, attacking rucks attended, defensive rucks attended and turnovers won

Player B has all the hallmarks of your classic number 8: double figures in carries and tackles, significant post-contact metres and multiple defenders beaten. Player A, on the other hand, fits more the profile of an openside: more rucks attended than carries, with less impact made per carry.

In case you’re still wondering: these are the numbers of Savea and Lakai against the Irish in Chicago, with Savea being player B and Lakai being player A. So while Savea is ‘technically’ wearing the openside-jersey, he is very much playing like a 7/8-hybrid right now (his 17 rucks attended and 2 pilfers being a solid contribution at the breakdown, as well).

And let me get ahead of critiques of Lakai’s “low numbers”: Lakai was effectively acting as the defensive ‘key’ throughout the game, connecting the ruck defence with the defensive line as third defender out from the ruck, shutting down opposition backline moves (his charge down of Gibson-Park is a good example of this, as defensive work that doesn’t show up on the stat sheet). As a result, he was continuously all over the pitch, making reads and shutting down potential gaps in the line. It’s typically one of the roles given to a mobile openside.

So why the numbers?
So why not just put Lakai in the openside-jersey and Savea in the number 8? This is just my own speculation but if I were to hazard a guess, it’s an attempt at turning both Savea and Lakai into more complete players. The ABs are trying to implement a very fluid structure, where everyone can fill into another’s role, whether it’s as a cleaner, as a carrier or as a playmaker (the Savea-try, with de Groot and Lord in the attacking line being a good example of this).

Savea, if put at 8, does have a tendency to abandon some of his other responsibilities. By putting him at openside, you could argue that he’s forced to play closer to the breakdown, balancing out his natural tendency to drift to the edge.

Funnily enough, Lakai has the opposite tendency: when playing at openside, the Hurricanes loose forward can become too focused on his support role, foregoing his own carrying ability. He's often been rather anonymous when playing at 7 for the Hurricanes, unable to complement his openside-role with his excellent carrying ability. By putting him at 8, he’s being forced to balance the two (Sidenote: Papali’i has a similar issue, where he can find it difficult to involve himself beyond the team's structures; his low contribution of 3 carries for the AB XV against the Barbarians would be another example of this).

Those are just my own observations and speculations on why Savea and Lakai are wearing their current jersey numbers, I could be totally off. But it (kind of) makes sense to me. Either way, in reality, Savea is certainly fulfilling the role of a number 8.

And finally, the loose forwards as a whole
I’ll agree that the AB loose forward-mix is a work in progress but I don’t agree with this idea that they’re consistently being outplayed. Against Ireland, the AB loose forward group thoroughly outplayed their counterparts on attack, carrying more, making more metres, beating more defenders, and winning the turnover battle.

Irish and AB loose forward involvements: carries, post-contact metres, defenders beaten, offloads, turnovers won/lost, tackles completed/missed, and dominant tackling

It is only on the defensive side that the Irish loose forwards were more involved, putting in double the tackles while only missing two. But that is also the result of the Irish inability to win the possession-battle, especially in the 2nd half. They were unable to force the ABs into turnovers, allowing the latter to build rucks and pressure in their own half.

This ties in with another often-heard claim about the AB loose forwards losing the breakdown battle. Throughout the Rugby Championship and now this Test against Ireland, the ABs have typically come out on top when it comes to turnovers won (+1.3 on average), lost (-3.3 on average) and rucks lost (-0.6).

Possession and breakdown stats: turnovers won, turnovers lost, rucks won, and rucks lost

That means that the ABs win the ball more often, lose it less than their opponents and lose less rucks than their opponents on average.

By far the biggest stumbling block throughout the Rugby Championship is that the ABs have not built enough rucks to accumulate pressure on their opponents. They’ve averaged around 10 rucks less formed than their opponents, which has given them insufficient opportunities to score. That means that they’ve kicked away too much possession that they haven’t been able to regather. This doesn't mean that the ABs have to kick less; it simply means that they have to kick better.

The balance was better against the Irish, with 23 more rucks formed than their opponent. The ball-carrying and -retention from the bench is a huge factor in this regard as well, with Sititi (8 carries, 45 post-contact metres), Taukei’aho (3 carries, 14 post-contact metres) and McKenzie (8 passes, no kicks) providing lots of impetus in this regard. It’s a template that Robertson will want to expand on during the tour. But that means keeping the scores close for the first 60 minutes, before overwhelming your opponent in the final quarter through set piece- and carrying-dominance.

The loose forward-duo of Savea and Lakai - with their breakdown disruption (8 defensive rucks attended) and defensive mobility (18 tackles with zero misses) - seem set to continue in this regard.

I know there’s a lot of criticism on this forum towards the incessant turn to kicking by Barrett in this game, but, rewatching the game, I’d argue that the kick-option was the right choice a lot of the time, but it was Barrett’s mixed execution of his kicks which led to mixed outcomes. Charlie Morgan of The Telegraph already highlighted this example around the first minute of the game. Barrett, following an over the top lineout win by Savea, receives the pass around the halfway line and puts up a great wipers kick. The kick is regathered by Telea, who offloads to Ioane, leading to a linebreak and the England defence in disarray. Several Abs have realigned to the openside and this is the picture:

Caleb Clarke, who is out of frame here, is the target for the cross kick. Taylor and Savea are on his inside with only George Furbank covering the English backfield (Marcus Smith is all the way on the opposite side, with 14 English players being bunched up within 20 metres from each other).

What saves England is Itoje’s chargedown of Barrett’s kick, with Barrett probably needing to be just a little bit further back in order to avoid the oncoming rush defence.

Something very similar occurred early in the second half, where the kick option was the right call, only for the execution to fall just short. After Sititi rips out the ball and bats the ball back to Barrett around the 10-metre line, the latter passes to Clarke who breaks through the English defensive line. Following (another) great carry from Tuipulotu, Barrett has called for a kick, with multiple runners (Jordan, Jordie Barrett, Ioane, Telea) preparing to rush:

The kick is the best option here, as the defensive line is solidly set, yet only Marcus Smith (outside the frame) is covering the backfield, with Furbank up in the line. Barrett’s choice of kick, however, the grubber, is the wrong one, as there is very little space between the England defenders and they already know that a kick is coming following the body positioning of the Kiwi backs. The right choice, I’d argue, would be the short chip kick into the space between the English defensive line and Marcus Smith, allowing for either one of the All Black backs to regather or pressuring Smith as well as the potential counterruck. Again, Barrett needs to start just a few metres further back, rather than be so close to the line, in order to execute this option.

One of a first five-eights’ most important skills is their ability to orchestrate the space between his own outside backs and the opposition defenders. Taking a few extra steps forward in order to play flat and manipulate the speed of the defensive line against itself, or taking a few back in order to exploit the space behind, the first five’s orchestration of space through his own subtle movement is the key to a successful attack. Barrett has a great array of kicks at his disposal, but what he often still lacks is his feel for the defensive line. A bit more detail around his own positioning, and the ABs’ attack could’ve been a lot more efficient at Twickenham.

I thought it was a great game to watch, if somewhat frustrating at times. A good first half before another inconsistent 2nd half, mostly caused by poor decision-making and ill-discipline. The Tupaea-Fainga’anuku midfield struggled defensively at times – against, to be fair, a very well-coordinated Scottish attack – but I think it’s worth persevering with.

There are not a huge number of areas in which the ABs are improving but offloading, with Fainga’anuku at the forefront, has consistently become a bigger and bigger facet of the AB attack. Unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between successful offloads and higher numbers in both line breaks and post-contact metres, as a shifting point of attack becomes much more difficult to contain for a defensive line under pressure.

After a rather conservative TRC – the Wellington spectacle notwithstanding – the ABs are starting to keep the ball alive in attack more

Defences which are set well typically require offloading as a way to get in behind (looking at you, Eden Park Wallabies). Exceptional defences, however (Cake Tin Springboks), can sustain high numbers of opposition line breaks (9) and offloads (8) without suffering on the scoreboard

While Fainga’anuku is leading the way in offloading in the past two Tests (2 against Ireland, 3 against Scotland), his desire to keep the ball alive in attack is more and more shared by his teammates. What it does, is put the ABs behind the defensive line, creating doubt in the mind of Scottish defenders as well as a defensive line that is being pushed backwards. Just one phase before the Josh Lord-snipe through the ruck, Fainga’anuku, Clarke and Tupaea cause some havoc out wide, using the offload to keep the ball alive.

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One phase later, Cummings is directing defensive numbers towards the right while Ashman only has eyes for Roigard and the attacking shape that the ABs are setting up, completely switching off for his duties as the pillar defender.

Two of Lord’s more outstanding abilities are his game intelligence and his ballhandling, both of which were on clear display for Roigard’s try

Through the offload, quite a few opportunities were created in the first half, a few of which probably should’ve been finished. In the 9th minute, the ABs make good inroads through short passes at the line, before the ball is eventually moved wide. Tupaea squares up before throwing a beautiful cross-the-face pass to Sititi, who keeps the move alive by throwing the one-handed offload back inside after contact.

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If the ABs would’ve been able to better manipulate the space against the two last Scottish defenders – Carter throwing the behind-pass to Clarke or Clarke running a switch to give Taylor another passing option on the outside – another score seems inevitable.

Around 10 minutes later, the ABs would once again be around the Scottish 22. This time, they would attack the space around the ruck rather than out wide, with forwards flooding the space and keeping the ball alive after Roigard made a short incision around the Scottish breakdown. Holland makes proper use of his long leavers to free the ball and put Jordan through the gap.

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Ironically, the ABs became much too conservative once inside the Scottish 22, turning to one-off carries and pick-and-go’s which were easily absorbed by Scottish defenders. It’s ironic because it is pretty much the inverse of the Argentina Tests: in those two matches, the ABs barely created anything but were lethal once they were inside the Argentina 22, using intricate strike moves from set piece (4.7 points per entry in Argentina I). Little evidence could be found of such intricacies inside the Scottish 22, however, as the ABs consistently ignored both the space as well as their teammates already there.

A point of focus for the English Test will be to finish any line breaks that are made, rather than get bogged down and turned over in the opposition redzone. The midfield-axis of Tupaea and Fainga’anuku will again be seriously tested on defence, as the English attack has come on in leaps and bounds since the previous meeting of these two teams. Then again, the AB attack is evolving as well, using the offload the find space both through the middle and out wide.

The side which will be able to best contain and disrupt the other’s attacking structures is most likely to come out on top, in my view.

During the second half of Saturday’s AB XV game against England A, former England and Bath outside back Matt Banahan made an astute observation while commenting on the game. “There’s definitely been a tactical change for All Blacks XV in the second half with the high cross-fields to catch the wingers under the ball, so they don’t have the open field [to counter-attack] and these centre-field kicks from 9.” As these words were leaving his mouth, Havili threw a beautiful bridge pass over the head of England A winger Noah Caluori to put Sevu Reece into space. Just seconds later, Reihana would finish the move by dotting down underneath the post.

So why did this tactical shift take place? Banahan already mentioned the first part: by targeting the kick space on the edge, the AB XV could take away one of England A’s main threats in the first half, their counter-attacking platform from centre-field, through which they set up their dangerous attacking shapes. Because while England A fumbled their way through that first half by dropping nearly every pass, they had created several line break opportunities, with only their lack of hands preventing further scores.

But there is another, more attacking reason for these kicks as well. This second reason is more concerned with the opposition rush defence – specifically, the role of the backfield cover and the outside defensive shooter – and how the AB XV attack could circumvent these back 3 defenders. It also brings the midfield bridge pass back into play: simply passing over the rush defence isn’t enough to actually break down this defensive structure. You also need to manipulate the numbers and field position of the opposition defence beforehand.

In this sense, the AB XV has shown some nice attacking nuances and developments which may well be implemented soon with the senior side. So what were these nuances?

Breaking down the AB XV Reihana try
While the Reihana try at first glance might look like a relatively straightforward backs move – setting up a few rucks before throwing the wide ball – there are a number of components to it which are crucial for the move to work. They are crucial because they change the way England A is able to defend the strike. These 3 components are: 1. The Fakatava box kick, 2. The midfield ruck, and 3. The AB XV backline realignment to the openside.

The kick
After an AB XV scrum in their own half, the All Blacks XV cart it up once before Fakatava sets up the box kick into England A territory.

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Fakatava box kick

While this kick might seem innocuous enough, the purpose of it is threefold. The AB XV want to (a) regather possession, (b) bring the England A fullback, Josh Hodge, into play and pull him out of the backfield cover and (c) force the England A first five, Charlie Atkinson, into the fullback defensive positioning on the openside.

All of these targets are met as Hodge is unable to gather cleanly under pressure from Tangitau, with the England A fullback now brought out of position and Atkinson now moving into the open backfield, to cover the opposite edge.

Atkinson (10, red) is moving to the defensive openside to cover the right edge. Meanwhile, Reihana (22, black) is already organizing the shape for the Havili cut-out ball 2 phases later

The midfield ruck
After the ball is regathered from the box kick by Fakatava himself, the temptation might have been to immediately swing the ball wide, in order to exploit any potential defensive chaos. Fakatava, however, resists such temptation and instead takes the ball into contact, setting up a ruck on the right edge.

We can already see Reihana, in the picture above, taking matters into his hands and organizing the attacking shape for the phases to follow. After the Fakatava ruck, another two rucks will be set up, each one moving closer and closer to the centre of the field, until the ball is eventually presented straight in the middle.

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Setting up midfield ruck

This, again, is an intentional ploy. The goal here is twofold: (a) to split the England A defence down the middle, so they don’t have a full defensive line to rush with, and (b) to realign the backline in anticipation of the attacking launch from the midfield ruck. While the forwards are moving the ball to the middle of the field, the backs are all realigning to the left edge, so that when the midfield ruck is set up, we get this picture.

Nearly the entire backline – Havili, Ennor, Reece, Tangitau, Jacomb and Reihana – are bunched together in a 20 metre-channel from the side line, in anticipation of the outside break

This brings together two things: pace and ballhandling. So when the outside break is made via the Havili bridge pass to Reece, the outside channels are flooded with pacy players who can execute any numerical mismatches with ease.

The backline realignment
It is now that the risk of the extra rucks in midfield starts paying off: the AB XV have huge support numbers which can flood the channel after Reece has made the outside break. Both Jacomb and Reihana already start sprinting towards the space on Reece’s inside shoulder even while Havili’s bridge pass is still in the air.

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Havili bridge pass

This also further reinforces the value of the box kick: the England A backfield cover defence has the responsibility of shutting down any outside breaks, yet Atkinson, as a first five rather than an experienced defensive fullback, is slow in closing down the space for Reece to run into. While Josh Hodge isn’t a good defender by any means either, the logic of the kick is still sound: it forces the defensive backfield to move and realign, which can make the eventual exploitation of the backfield space a bit easier.

Meanwhile, the value of the midfield ruck is also clearly visible: the English defensive line was strongly pushing forward so, after the outside shooter was passed by through the bridge pass, they didn’t have the time or space to catch up to the AB XV support runners who were already in motion. If the AB XV had gone wide immediately from their ruck all the way on the edge, any break on the opposite edge would’ve been faced with a defensive scramble in full-motion, which makes it much harder to outpace.

The English defensive line is still in structure rather than in scramble mode. This has the effect that they’re miles away when any line break is made on the edge

The value of these particular components – box kick, midfield ruck, backline realignment – becomes even further emphasized when we compare it to a similar attacking launch point, performed by the senior AB side in Wellington against the Springboks in September.

Getting swallowed by the scramble
A few months ago, I wrote about that Wellington Test that it showed a lack of clarity in the AB game plan in its attempted combination of tactics and technique: “Tactically, there are too many links in the chain and technically, there are not enough links that can do what is asked of them.”

This referred to a specific launch play in the first minutes of the game, where the ABs set up a ruck on the right edge and tried to go wide immediately.

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Wellington edge ruck launch

The differences to the AB XV strike are considerable: (1) there is no use of the box kick to manipulate backfield cover and draw Bok defenders up, (2) there is no midfield ruck to split the Bok rush, and (3) there is no backline realignment to the open to put pace and support into the space after the outside break.

This was the eventual result:

When Leroy Carter (11, black) receives the ball on the edge, he is already covered by the Bok first five – Feinberg-Mngomezulu (green) – as the latter didn’t have to realign in his backfield coverage due to a lack of kicking. The Bok defensive line is also still ahead of the ball and is in full movement.

And rather than a full backline in support – remember the full AB XV backline inside a 20 metre radius around the ball – the closest players to Carter are Sititi, Jordie Barrett and Tuipulotu. Beauden Barrett, McKenzie, Proctor and Will Jordan are still around the middle of the field or even further away, and are in no position whatsoever to help exploit any line break that is made. Even if Carter is able to beat his man, there are no means for the ABs to actually finish any break that is made.

Instead, what the AB XV have done, to combat principles of rush defence, is to borrow from the Wallaby game plan in Ellis Park. Set up midfield rucks to split the Bok defence, use the bridge pass to get over the outside-in defensive shooter and flood the outside channel with pace and support (Frost, O’Connor and Wright are all in close support around Jorgensen).

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JOC Ellis Park bridge pass

It is good to see that NZ coaches aren’t too proud to borrow what works from others and to shelve those plans – edge ruck launch platforms against rush D – that simply haven’t produced the goods.

I ended the Wellington-piece with the following thoughts: “Now firmly in the bottom of TRC skillsets, it is time for NZR to seriously address either the way they want to play the game or the manner in which they build their skillsets, as right now both facets of the game aren’t complementary of each other. While Wellington might not represent the end of future NZ rugby supremacy, it certainly signals a fork in the road, with administrators needing to make decisions and take action.”

With the tactical nuances and developments put forward by the AB XV, hope springs that administrators and coaches in the game have indeed taken note. And while it still remains to be seen whether the senior coaching team is pragmatic enough to swallow some of its pride and adapt, the AB XV have shown that rugby pragmatism in NZ rugby certainly isn’t dead yet.

Well, that wasn’t great. I think a lot has already been covered in the discussion here so I’m not going to rehash what I believe are the clear factors in deciding the result – losing the aerial contest and territorial game – but I did want to take a look at what’s hampering the backline. In order to do this, I focused on the ABs’ set piece attack in Buenos Aires.

Why set piece attack (SPA)?
One of the easiest ways to both control the flow of the game and get your backline involved is through prepared strikes from either lineout or scrum. A lot of it can be brought back to analysis and preparation: where is the opposition weak, how do they typically defend, where is the space available that can be exploited, etc.?

In the second Test against Argentina, the ABs had 13 set piece platforms inside the Argentina half (11 lineouts, 2 scrums), with 6 taking place between the halfway line and opposition 22, and 7 inside or around the ARG 22. The difference in positive outcomes between the two zones is stark, as the following table attempts to show.

Set piece attack in ARG II: a lack of efficiency between the 22 and 50 metre lines, as well as an inability to string together momentum in the 2nd half

From the 6 opportunities to launch a set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, just one led to a positive outcome: the final play of the game where Argentina infringed at the breakdown in the 80th minute, the game already having been won by the Pumas. All other opportunities led to negative outcomes, whether it was a handling error, a loss of gain line or the set piece itself breaking down.

Contrast this to the AB set piece attack inside or just outside the ARG 22: of the 7 opportunities, 6 led to positive outcomes, with either a try being scored or momentum being sustained, through winning either a penalty advantage or gain line.

Red zone efficiency
One consistent aspect which the coaches have clearly worked on is efficiency inside the opposition 22. From only 5 entries inside the opposition 22, the ABs averaged a scoring rate of 3.4 points scored per entry.

The basis of this scoring efficiency is, I believe, (1) the use of creative set-ups from lineout attack and (2) improved decision-making on the edge. On the first facet, the ABs would consistently employ a 6-man lineout throughout the game, with the +1 (Savea) typically being used in a myriad of ways (front-option decoy, lifter, hidden run option) to manipulate opposition defence.

A good example of this creative thinking in the lineout occurs in the 23rd minute. Joining the line as a front-option decoy, Savea places himself in a hidden position after Holland’s lineout take, in order to be able to make an arcing run-up to the line.

Here, the 5+1 set-up is used to integrate Savea’s running game, positioning himself as a front-option decoy from which he can attack the seam at the back of the lineout

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While this lineout strike didn’t lead to a try, it shows the ability of the AB red zone attack to consistently put the Argentina defence on the back foot (see also Taylor’s blindside run for the first try), getting on top of the opposition defence before they can properly organize.

The second aspect is improved decision-making on the edge. In 2024, the ABs tended to go for single-phase lineout strikes, using complex backline moves which were meant to bypass the defence in first phase. This often led to players being swarmed by the scramble defence out wide, after which the AB attack would consistently be on the backfoot against an aggressive defence with line speed.

Reece (2024 Cape Town Test) attempting to go for the corner after the lineout arrow attack, yet being swallowed up by the Bok scramble

In 2025, the ABs seemed to have moved away from the first phase-patterns, instead looking to shift the point of attack in order to disrupt the opposition defence first before going wide. Newell’s try is a good example of this, Savea acting as a distributor which effectively draws the defence away from the point of contact.

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The ABs again show some nice attacking innovation, with short passes – from Reece to Proctor (not in the gif), Savea to Parker and Savea to Newell

The first try to Proctor is another: similar to Reece in Cape Town, Ioane is put into space out wide, with the Argentina scramble racing straight towards him.

Ioane has to wait for the pass so if he tries to make the corner, he most likely gets scragged into touch by the Argentina scramble D

Unlike Reece, however, Ioane immediately steps off his left foot, cutting back against the grain and looking to draw as many of those four defenders onto him as possible. With so many defenders now off their feet and space everywhere around the ruck, Christie is easily able to draw the last defender and pass to Proctor, who falls over the try line practically untouched.

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It shows, at least, that there’s been improvement in certain areas, with clear weaknesses of last year being identified and solutions being found for overcoming them. But another weakness of last year – backline strikes between the 22 and halfway line – remains worryingly clunky, with few signs of improvement.

A malfunctioning backline
I have mentioned above that set piece attack is not just a way to control the game’s momentum but also to get your backline involved. In the second Test against the Pumas, on 5 occasions (out of a total 13 SPA) the ball was moved into the backline within 3 phases, with just two of those leading to positive outcomes. Between the halfway line and the opposition 22, the backline was given the ball on just three occasions from set piece, just the one being (sort of) successful.

So what exactly seems to be going wrong here? I’d argue that there are three factors: coaching, player skillsets and team identity. I’ll try to further clarify these factors by comparing the ABs’ SPA from ARG II to a 2025 Six Nations game between France and Scotland at the Stade de France. These two teams were the most effective in constructing 22 entries so they present an interesting comparative framework for what the ABs aren’t currently getting right in their approach.

(1) Coaching
A good example of some of the things going wrong in the AB backline can be found by taking a closer look at the lineout attack at around the 17th minute. The ABs have the throw in – again, going for a 5+1 set-up – and briefly form a maul before Ratima passes the ball into midfield. From there, you have Jordie running the crash line with Parker in support, Beauden and Reece looping round, Proctor running an unders line and Jordan out the back, with Ioane keeping width. This is how it plays out.

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The idea is relatively straightforward, I believe: get Jordan into a one-on-one situation out wide where he can use his game-breaking ability to either create a line break for himself or others. What ends up happening, however, is Jordan being tackled more than 10 metres behind the gain line, with the ABs lucky not to concede the turnover.

A comparison to a Scotland lineout, also around the halfway line, shows where things went wrong. A first thing to note is that Scotland use a 4 man-lineout instead of a 6 man. The immediate benefit of this is that the backline is much more robust, with players filling the field, allowing for multiple attack shapes and realignments.

The four man-lineout allows for both sides of the field to fill up with options and support, allowing a team to attack either through switch plays

This set-up gives the Scotland attack multiple options: they can either (a) try to engineer a line break on the openside or (b) they can swing their backs back round to the blind after the ruck’s been built in order to attack trailing French forwards. They go for option (b) and make a sizable territorial gain while being on the front foot.

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Compare this set-up with the one the ABs ran against the Pumas and it quickly becomes apparent how Jordan has very little support around him when he eventually receives the ball.

Jordan is completely isolated when receiving the ball, with two Argentinean defenders – Cinti and Chocobares – fully focused on him. If the ABs want to run a set up like this, the play here calls for a territorial kick from Jordan, after which the backline can put pressure on the ARG backfield. But looking at the play, it never appears as if this was the plan.

This strikes me, first and foremost, as a coaching failure, the attack being improperly set up from lineout attack, with fairly predictable results. The backline here is stretched way too thin, way too quickly, with an improper estimation by the coaches of the risk/reward-balance.

(2) Player skillsets
Staying with the same example, it becomes further apparent how flawed skill execution makes an already difficult strike move near-impossible. First, Jordie passes too quickly out the back, failing to draw any defenders onto him while also not being able to impede any defenders from drifting to the open. And secondly, Beauden Barrett’s pass is too high and hits behind Jordan’s inside shoulder, which means the latter has to stop to catch the ball rather than accelerate onto it. With execution like this, the strike is basically already over before it has begun.

We can again compare this to Scotland’s skill execution on set piece attack, this time from a scrum around halfway.

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Tom Jordan passes out the back at the last instance, holding his defender while basically running into the French defensive line without the ball, which opens up the space for Russell to run into for the line break. Jordie already showed in this game that he has the skillset to execute this timing (see his ball out the back for the first try) but he needs to be able to consistently execute this skill for the backline to properly come to life.

(3) Team identity
It does appear as if this All Black team is at a crossroads, with their traditional strength (backline play) not clicking while their current strength (scrum and maul) not fully being given the keys to the castle. The even distribution between forwards and backs from SPA between the 50 and 22 – each receiving 3 possessions out of 6 – a reflection perhaps of this conflicted identity.

And there is certainly a case to be made for clarity. Looking at the game between France and Scotland, each team was clear in how and where they wanted to play.

Whereas France kept it amongst their forwards to maul the ball up-field, Scotland wanted to make use of their backline, with 9 out of their 11 set piece attacks moving into midfield. And while neither side were perfect in their execution, for both sides their positive outcomes outweighed the negatives.

If the ABs want to improve their outcomes from set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, they might do well to decide what kind of team they want to be, whether they want to maul everything or whether they want to throw it around amongst the backs. What can be said with some certainty is that the current strategy – to balance the two – doesn’t seem to be working.

Tl:dr
The coaching staff have improved some areas (22 efficiency) while failing to improve others (SPA between halfway and opp. 22). This failure has also impacted the ability of the backline to click, while significantly contributing themselves to this inability as well.

The main factors impacting this failure to improve seem to me to be coaching, player skillsets and team identity. While it shouldn’t all be doom and gloom, the sheer number of areas which still need improvement, would indicate that this side is still some time away from putting it all together.

@Victor-Meldrew said in All Blacks 2025:

His foray into the NZ U20's wasn't great either.

He was clearly NZR's poster boy and there's the nagging suspicion he was a "face fits" hire more than anything else. NZR have to support him and the players to get thru this mess - though not naming Holland's successor when he resigned shows a disturbing lack of nous.

Alright, the revisionism is getting out of hand now. His foray into U20s wasn’t great? He has, by some distance, the best record from the post-2011 era (I’ve already discussed in another post how the 2008-’11 years in NZ age grade rugby were a statistical outlier so I’m not going to get into that again).

Robertson lost two games: one against Australia at the Oceania Championship and one against Ireland at the U20s World Cup. That was an Irish team that would go on to make the final and contained players like James Ryan, Andrew Porter, Jacob Stockdale, Jimmy O’Brien, Will Connors, Shane Daly, Max Deegan and Hugo Keenan. These are all regulars in the Irish professional game and includes multiple British and Irish Lions. The other 13 games at U20 level he won, including the 2015 U20 World Cup final against what was a very good English U20 team.

I’m not defending Robertson’s current performances – which, in my view, is a firm argument for prior international coaching experience – but to argue that he was this kind of ‘poster child’ who was picked on anything but his coaching record is just plainly false. Two things can be true at the same time: (1) Robertson’s tenure is a disappointment with little evidence of it moving in the right direction, and (2) his coaching record before the All Blacks has little to no precedent in terms of overall success and win rate. He made a lot of sense as a coaching candidate for the top job.

I thought it was a great Test match. Normally, I’d like to reaffirm such an occasion by giving it as much time and space as possible: watching the game multiple times, comparing it to other Tests, sifting through numbers and footage before writing a (too) long review of the match at hand. But as I’m suffering (yes, suffering) from a combination of work and rugby fatigue, no such time could be afforded. Fortunately, the ABs are once again showing what to do in times like this: why slog away when it’s easier and more efficient to do things as quickly as possible?

Stop overwriting, stop overplaying
I’m sure everyone remembers my treatise written after last year’s French Test on the AB set-piece attack. It was an avalanche of information: YouTube videos with time stamps, picture frames, and words, so many words. In a way, it mimicked what was happening on the field, the ABs trying to overwhelm their opposition with an avalanche of possession, carries and passing. Against the biggest sides in Test rugby, South Africa and France, the All Blacks simply tried to do too much in 2024.

A lot of passing (186 on average), more than their fair share of 22 entries (8.3) but not a lot of purchase from those entries (2.3 points per entry): this was the story of 2024. On Saturday against the Springboks, however, a very different picture appeared.

Way less passing (125), way more kicking (34) and, most importantly, the appearance of brutal efficiency when entering the opposition 22 (4.2 points per entry). So less really is more?

The tragedy of Jason Holland
In last year’s verbose review, I tried to finish somewhat succinctly: “If the Hurricane lineout strike is going to return to Test rugby in 2025, Jason Holland will need to find a way of sharpening it, where it can finally cut through South African and French Test defences.”

As if Holland took that little comment personally, we saw the set-up for the arrow attack return in the very first minute of Saturday’s Test. But rather than some elaborate midfield play, Barrett went for the simple first-phase cross-kick, directly attacking the defensively weak Willie Le Roux in the simplest way possible.

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The real Wayne Smith-doctrine: play to space as quickly as possible

Things do not have to be complicated to work well. Why try to go through the Springbok midfield defence – by far the best in the world – if you can simply go around it, targeting the obvious backline weakness?

Holland has seemingly learned a lot from last year’s often overcomplicated Test campaign, as simplicity and straightforwardness are key terms in this year’s set-piece attack. 15 minutes later, with another lineout on the opposition 22, another set-piece strike embodied the same principles. Target the slower Bok seams with your best hole runners (Jordan/Jordie Barrett) and find out what happens. As it happened, the secondary runner (Jordie) wasn't even necessary to finish the play.

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Not all Boks are great defenders so the goal is to isolate and target them

If Jason Holland’s main responsibility is to create strike plays, then I think it’s fair to say he’s more than earning his coin at the minute, with an increase in redzone efficiency against a side like the Springboks. Whether he'll get much credit for this is still up in the air. But as the Greek tragedies have taught us, future glory never comes from a clear and easy path.

Finishing the job
I guess I could keep going, looking at defensive patterns, some individual performances, and what may happen next week. Big occasions can tempt you like that: you want to be elaborate, give it the attention it really deserves, keep basking in its light for as long as possible.

But if Robertson and his coaches have seemingly learned anything from last year, it’s that the bigger arena doesn’t necessarily require a more complex playbook. Rather, it requires cutting back and doing the simple things well: kick for territory, make your tackles, attack opposition ball. Try the easy things first before making it harder for yourself.

And since they so obviously want all of us on their journey with them, perhaps I should try taking a page out of their book. Keep it nice and simple, and just see what happens.

I’ve seen some questions around the precise value of Josh Lord and what he brings to the All Blacks so I thought it would be interesting to briefly take a closer look at his profile as a rugby player. Saturday’s Bulls’ game against the Taniwha provides, I think, a nice summation of Josh Lord’s style of play and how he’s able to impact the contest on the pitch.

Four aspects – lineout ability, general skillset, defence, and rugby intelligence – stand out to me, with Lord shaping essentially as a tight five glue player at Test level, someone who shows good understanding of the flow and rules of the game, which he uses to put pressure on the set piece and skillset of the opposition.

Lineout ability
The first aspect, lineout ability, speaks rather for itself. Lord has long arms and a good jump, so even when the timing of the lift and height of the throw is somewhat off (not an unlikely scenario with some of the hookers around), Lord is often still able to grab the ball.

If the French series has shown anything, it’s the importance of genuinely tall units who can provide lineout ball as well as get up high in the air for contestable restarts.

General skillset
A typical facet of the current AB game plan is ball movement, the ball being kept alive through the phases in a quick and swift manner. In this regard, the tall lock has shown smooth hands throughout his career, being both comfortable as a backdoor passer as well as willing to serve as makeshift 9 in order to keep the play moving.

Lord trusts his handling and passing skills, quickly moving into the halfback position with Lennox caught up in the ruck.

Furthermore, Lord is comfortable with the ball in his hands in space, showing good technique in the 47th minute by holding the ball in his two hands, using multiple pass fakes in order to manipulate opposition defenders.

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Defensive ability
The Taranaki lock is massive (2.03m) but remarkably agile for his frame. He moves well around the field and is versatile in the tackle, being both able to chop carriers around their ankles as well as wrap ball and man in upper-body hits with a strong shoulder.

In the 24th minute, for example, Lord engages in a double tackle, with O’Neill going low and Lord going high on Alaimalo, the lock targeting the carrying arm with force and forcing the spill.

Forcing the knock-on: Lord targets Alaimalo’s carrying arm, creating the turnover

A few minutes later, Lord goes low in the tackle on Caird, with Lennox and Poliko this time targeting the upper-body.

Lord going very low on Caird, stopping him in his tracks

Added to this tackle versatility is the ability to scan the opposition attack, anticipating overlaps and working hard to plug gaps in defence. Right after making the chop tackle on Caird, Lord spots that the Taniwha have numbers on the left and immediately starts sprinting towards the opposite side.

Lord gets up from the tackle, scans the Northland attack and starts sprinting to the other side of the field

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The sequence in full, which is Josh Lord in a nutshell: equal parts vision and mongrel. Keep your eyes on Lord in back play

Here, we see the combination of Lord’s work rate and shithousery: after going full throttle in order to help stop the Northland line break, he first bumps Pasitoa out of the play without the ball (that’s a clear penalty and probable yellow card) before assisting Tikoisolomone with the tackle on Trainor. While he gets away with it here, Lord clearly pushes the boundaries. Then again, the anticipation of the opposition line break shows a remarkable rugby brain in action.

Rugby intelligence
Throughout the game, Lord showed signs of being quick on his feet, literally and figuratively. Another, more legal instance was in his understanding of the offside line, for example, by quickly moving into the Taniwha attacking line when the ref called the ball out of the ruck.

Lord (5, in the front) moves as soon as the ref indicates that the ball is out. Someone like Eben Etzebeth has shown the importance of knowing the nuances of the offside line and breakdown rules to be effective as a Test lock

Another example occurred during a Northland lineout: with the Taniwha throwing to the front, Lord reacts immediately to the ball being shifted to the 9 (and the lineout being effectively over), making him able to pressure Nock’s transfer to the backline.

Quick as a flash: Lord nearly catches Nock by being aware of the lineout rules on offside

Summary
Josh Lord doesn’t offer the work rate of a Barrett or Holland, the attacking instincts and footwork of a Vaa’i or the carrying power of a Patrick Tuipulotu. But what he does offer in spades is rugby intelligence and mongrel, as well as the traditional set piece abilities of a 2m+ lock.

But while he has, I think, qualities which should really shine in Test rugby, his inability to simply stay on the field makes it doubtful whether we will ever see him for a long period in the black jersey. In this sense, Saturday’s match against the Taniwha was perhaps the most indicative yet, Lord watching from the side lines after getting a knock, his body not quite able to produce what his rugby brain wants it to.

Ardie Savea’s 50 minutes at openside
The international game, both past and present, has seen a plethora of player-types occupying the 7-jersey in Test rugby. When asked in 2008 by World Rugby what exactly constituted an openside flanker, Josh Kronfeld gave a typically blunt answer: “You’ve got to have good handling skills, good vision, be a bit of mongrel. You want to be able to be doing stuff, grovelling on the ground as well as doing the airy fairy stuff upright with the ball in hand so you have to be pretty well rounded in terms of your rugby skills.”

Within this broad range of skills, each seven will look for their own identity, whether it be through jackalling (Pocock), disrupting the breakdown (McCaw), being a defensive stopper (Dusautoir, Cane) or being a link-man on attack between forwards and backs (Michael Jones). Looking at Ardie Savea’s game, it is clear that he mostly belongs to this latter tradition of the offensive openside, who excels through his vision and support in attack.

This support play was quickly apparent against the French and was a feature throughout the game. In the 15th minute, from a scrum around the halfway line, the ABs break the line through a tidy set-piece move from midfield. After a quick recycle and with McKenzie at first receiver, Savea has positioned himself on the former’s inside shoulder, in perfect position for an inside pass and a potential linebreak. McKenzie chooses to go outside, though, the pass eventually being intercepted by an alert Attissogbe.

But what about some of these other core facets of openside play, the mongrel and the grovelling on the ground? Here, I think it’s fair to say that Savea was selective yet impactful. The breakdown, during Savea’s stint at openside, was relatively safe and quick, with 62% of the ruck speed between between 0-3 seconds. Only two ruck turnovers were conceded, both to diminutive winger, Gabin Villière. One, in the 6th minute, when Holland and Barrett couldn’t shift him and once more in the 45th minute, again beating Scott Barrett to the ball after a Roigard linebreak.

Was Savea at fault for these turnovers? Yes and no. Again, Savea was selective rather than omnipresent at the breakdown but he was effective when and where he cleaned. Here, in the 38th minute with the ABs on attack in the French 22, Savea puts in a strong shoulder, cleaning out a well-positioned Guillard, and preventing a certain turnover.

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At other points, he was able to effectively slow down the French ball, by wrapping up the opposition ball carrier and disrupting the momentum of the French attack.

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Savea worked well together with Lio-Willie during the first half, often combining in defence and attack as dual menaces around the ruck area

So why was he partially at fault for the Villière turnovers? While Savea certainly tried to fulfil his openside responsibilities to Test standard, during the opening stanza of the second half especially, he lost control of the balance between these responsibilities and his own specialty, the carrying game.

After another gruelling series of carries through the middle early in the second half, it quickly becomes apparent that Savea has overexerted himself. So when Cam Roigard wants to put pace in the attack by going for the quick tap, Savea no longer has the energy to follow him.

Savea, seen here farthest on the right, can’t keep up with the AB attack

The final 5 minutes of Savea’s stint at openside also equal his weakest. After being unable to keep up with Roigard, he compounds his fatigue-induced, erratic play by, first, being unable to close the defensive gap for the van Tonder linebreak, and then second, when defending the try-line in the subsequent phase, Savea allows Woki to go underneath him for the score.

Herein also lies the biggest ‘learning’ (apologies, I couldn’t resist!) for the flanker/number 8-hybrid. Savea hasn’t played openside at Test level for a number of years. Looking at this game, I think it’s reasonable to suggest that he has both the tools and the brain to ultimately be effective in the position. But what he will need to do, however, is make sure he finds the proper balance between his carrying game and his openside responsibilities, being careful not to blow his engine when racking up the carries into a crowded defence.

Having more carriers on the field - like Williams, Sititi and Taukei'aho - should at least help with this, so Savea isn't tempted to take up too much of the carrying load on his own shoulders. Then again, Savea needs to be smarter as well, and self-regulate his energy levels.

Tldr; Savea can be a 7 at Test level, in my view, as he has the tools and brain for the position but will need to be careful not to overexert himself with his carrying game, neglecting his openside duties.

@Chris-B said in England Vs All Blacks:

It would be interesting to do a detailed season-wide analysis of catching high balls to verify who is best (and worst). Not just a raw score of catches and drops - but, looking at catches in traffic and outcomes compared with expected outcomes - some sort of rational scoring system and commentary.

Unfortunately, it would probably require "someone" to watch all the games again. Maybe he (or she!) can do it next year!

That sounds like an awful lot of work for whoever you’re referring to.

Anyways, speaking of unpaid labour and the exploitation of the working class, this whole high ball-discussion reminds me of a recent Gary’s Economics-video where he’s talking about the rising housing prices. He makes the point that everyone thinks their specific city has a housing crisis while, in reality, it’s a global issue, necessitated by the growing inequality between the ultrarich and the working poor. [Just in case I happened to have piqued someone’s interest, this is the video I’m referring to: youtube.co/watch?v=BTlUyS-T-_4]

I think a similar misconception is at work in the high ball-discussion. The reality is that it’s not just the All Blacks who are experiencing a high ball-crisis. All teams are currently struggling with defensive kick receipts: Welsh fans are about ready to lynch Blair Murray, Freddie Steward shelled multiple high balls against the Wallabies on the 1st of November, Tom Wright didn’t catch a single attacking bomb against the Boks at Ellis Park, and, for the All Blacks XV, 6ft3 Chay Fihaki couldn’t deal with the England A aerials. Whether you're a tall high ball-expert or a scrumcapped Bok midget, the results will most likely be the same: you're going to drop more balls than you're going to catch.

Right now, if your halfback has a solid kicking game, chances are you’re going to be handsomely rewarded for going to the boot. Quietly, box-kicking 9s have been making a clear comeback: Nic White was crucial for the Wallaby success against both the Lions and the Boks, Reinach’s contestable kicking has been instrumental in the post-Eden Park Bok resurgence, and someone like Ben Spencer, the 33-year old Bath halfback, has suddenly become an important piece within the English attacking puzzle.

Galthié has already been criticized for quite a few selection errors against the Springboks but arguably his biggest one was selecting Le Garrec ahead of Maxime Lucu. Le Garrec’s kicks were consistently too deep at the Stade de France which gave the Boks backfield breathing space. Whenever the kicks were on the money, there was little that Kolbe, Willemse and Arendse could do against the French chasers.

Anyway, all of this to say that this isn’t something uniquely pertinent to the All Blacks alone. But where the ABs have been lacking, I think, is in those moments right before and after high balls. What the ABs need to do, more than anything else, is work on their defensive retreat and make sure that any spilt ball from the high ball is cleaned up.

This will be especially critical against England. The English chasers have very little interest in actually catching the ball: they will aim to flood the receipt space with their band of chasing wingers/flankers, making sure that the AB back 3 can’t catch cleanly. After that, they can either (1) attack the space behind themselves (see Pollock try against Wallabies) or (2) release the ball to a backline that is already expertly aligned by George Ford and ready to pounce.

So in my view, while the catch is obviously important, it’s only the first step. What is as crucial, if not more, is the collective coordination both before and immediately after the catch. The AB backline will need to match the speed of English realignment and get off the line, making sure that England don’t have the clean width of the field to attack in these kinds of situations.

@OomPB said in ABs picking overseas players - inevitable?:

The Springboks will pull away .

It’s interesting, I was looking at the profile of the current Springbok overseas players and it’s noticeable how they’re all experienced, senior players. Of the originally selected November touring squad, the 13 overseas players averaged 56 test caps, with an average age of 31.

That’s interesting because when Rassie first started in 2018, the overseas influence was often made up of inexperienced but highly promising players who, more importantly, were playing in some of the best-coached teams in Europe. In the 2018 Rugby Championship, there was Vincent Koch, with only 9 caps and coached by Mark McCall at Saracens, there was Faf de Klerk with 14 caps who was at Sale Sharks where he worked with renowned kicking coach Jon Callard, and a young Cheslin Kolbe was plucked out of high-performing Toulouse to make his Springbok debut.

Fast forward 6 years and where are the overseas Springboks playing? Urayasu D-Rocks, Honda Heat, Shizuoka Blue Revs... You see where I’m going with this. Look at the current top 6 teams in the Top 14: Toulouse, Bordeaux Bègles, La Rochelle, Bayonne, Toulon, and Clermont. At these 6 clubs combined, a total of 6 South Africans can be found (Carlu Sadie and Rohan Janse van Rensburg at UBB; Raymond Rhule and Dillyn Leyds at Stade Rochelais; Pieter Scholtz and Uzair Cassiem at Bayonne). It seems very unlikely that any of them will feature for the Springboks in the future. 6 years ago, these total numbers would be unthinkable. In the 2018/19 Top14 and Pro D2 seasons, across these 6 clubs (Bayonne was in the second division at the time), 16 South African players could be found, more than twice as many. Furthermore, these players were often much younger at the time, like Wiaan Liebenberg (26), Rynhardt Elstadt (27) and the aforementioned Kolbe (23). Of the six South Africans in these teams today, only Carlu Sadie is younger than 30 (27).

The reason for this seems relatively clear. South African players and especially young South African players, just aren’t that attractive a prospect anymore for high-performing European squads, due to their eligibility for their national team. Racing 92 dumped Kolisi after a single season when it became clear that his performances for them and those for the Springboks were of a totally different level. Saracens, their success basically built on South African players, currently have a grand total of 1 South African player, 29-year old Ivan van Zyl. This year’s Champions Cup Final had one South African across the 46 players, 1-cap fringe Springbok Jason Jenkins.

Again, I’m not claiming the coming demise of the Springboks but to me, it also seems quite clear that the market reality of 2018 when the eligibility rules were opened and the market reality of 2024 are markedly different for South African players. Where are the young promising South Africans in Europe who are benefiting from different high-performance environments, like Kolbe and de Klerk did when they left South Africa? Someone like Steven Kitshoff benefited greatly from his two seasons at Bordeaux before returning to South Africa, Esterhuizen became a different player playing alongside Marcus Smith in the all-attack system at Harlequins. The Springboks reaped the rewards (while, to be clear, obviously also doing their own part in the development of these players). There doesn’t seem to be an equivalent available in the coming years.

The introduction of overseas players for the Springboks wasn’t just a money thing, it also reintroduced valuable IP into the team, like Duane Vermeulen and Willie le Roux who had been experienced voices in big European teams. But when the best teams in Europe are seemingly uninterested in getting the best young South African players, where exactly is this IP going to come from? Might be interesting to contemplate those things some more. I’m sure that Rassie is more than aware of it.