The Silver Fern

With the recent rumours about Frizell potentially returning to NZ and the persistent questions surrounding the AB blindside position, I thought it would be interesting to take another look at the past, present and future of the 6-jersey.

Specifically, I’m interested in the selection policies and thought processes, why exactly it’s been so hard for the selectors to find a suitable, long-term replacement for Jerome Kaino, and how current candidates in 2025 would fare in the face of historical selection patterns and requirements. In the end, it boils down to the perennial question: what is a blindside, really?

There’s a lot to unpack, as you’d expect. Apologies in advance for the rather lengthy post.

The past: a Kaino-sized hole
8 July 2017. This was the last Test start for Jerome Kaino in the #6 jersey, against the British and Irish Lions at Eden Park. Since that time, 12 players have worn the jersey across 95 tests over 7 years, with varying degrees of success and duration. This is the list of all the Tests played, the starting 6, opponent, and result.

When looking more specifically at some of the cumulative numbers of the different players – number of starts, starting streaks, and win percentages – we get the following table.

I’ve highlighted a few things, Frizell, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been the most consistent name on the team sheet, making 26 starting appearances between 2018 and ’23 as the starting six. Behind him figures Akira Ioane, with 15 starts. Ioane had a somewhat consistent spell in the jersey from 2020 onwards, only to be unceremoniously dumped ahead of the 2023 Test season.

Neither of these two players were ever obvious first-choice selections, with both only ever stringing together 5 consecutive starts. And while rotation is normal – Kaino’s longest starting streak was 9 consecutive Tests across 2 seasons, starting during the 2015 Rugby World Cup and finishing after the 2nd 2016 Test against Wales – both players often lost their place against top tier opposition, something which was much rarer for Kaino from the 2009 season onwards. So the selectors never really settled on a single player, the closest being Frizell during the 2023 Test season, where the selectors seemingly finally backed the Tongan flanker as their main man.

It certainly didn’t help that the post-Kaino heir apparent, Liam Squire, was unable to put together a consistent streak of performances due to a number of factors, only ever starting 3 Tests consecutively as the AB blindside. And while someone like Vaea Fifita had some intriguing performances around this period, the fact that Fifita was the 2nd-choice behind Squire, despite being such a different type of player, already anticipates some of the muddled thinking of then-AB selectors on what they actually wanted from their six.

So what could’ve been some of the factors in this inability to produce consistent blindside appearances? Selection policy is certainly partly to blame: players were put into the jersey without seemingly any sort of preconceived or long-term plan in mind. An example of this is someone like Dalton Papali’i being tested out in the position during a crucial Test against Ireland in Dunedin during the 2022 Test series. When the results don’t go as planned, however, the player isn’t seen in the jersey again. So why was he put there in the first place?

Perhaps the best example of this is the appearances of players in the 6-jersey during crucial World Cup matches who didn’t have any experience of playing there – Barrett against England in the 2019 semi-final, and Vaa’i against France during the 2023 group stages. There seemed to be a too strong belief in the power of tactical surprise and not enough belief in the power of future-proofing from both Hansen and Foster. Faced with obsessive planners during the World Cup – Eddie Jones with England in 2019, Fabien Galthié with France in 2023 – their response seemed to consist solely of the selectorial equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. Particularly clever, it ain’t.

Why is it so hard for the ABs to find the right six?
Another factor surely is not so much the timing of the selections, but the selected player profiles themselves. The first two blindsides selected after Kaino are a good example of this, Squire and Fifita: one is a hard-nosed flanker who excels in the close quarter collisions; the other is at his best out wide, playing and accelerating into space. Fifita’s own interpretation of the blindside’s role – “I like six, because I can use my athleticism to do what I can do on the outside, rather just stay tight and do the hard work, like running into a brick wall and getting your body tired” – is telling in its own right.

Squire, on the other hand, had a very different view on the requirements of the jersey. Speaking on James Marshall’s What A Lad-podcast, he commented: “I just wanted to run into it as hard as I could... I sort of knew if I could hit someone as hard as I possibly can each time, then I’d most likely win the contact.” It’s hard to imagine more contrasting mindsets as those of Squire and Fifita.

So why were both selected then? My own guess is that the AB selection criteria for the jersey suffer from a kind of schizophrenia, where the selectors really want two playing profiles for the price of one: on the one hand, they want the player to comply to the Test requirements of a proper blindside – someone who is a physical presence, dominates the collisions, while bringing a more dynamic element to core tight five roles such as cleaning and carrying up the middle. This Test blindside has size, grunt and mongrel, which needs to be used to stop mauls, bring carriers down quickly and to smash breakdowns.

This, however, isn’t enough for the voracious demands of the AB selectors, adding on game-specific requirements unique to their own game plans: their blindside needs to do all of the above, while also being comfortable as an edge forward, someone who has an offloading game, attacking vision as well as a genuine athletic edge. It’s not hard to imagine the AB selectors looking at Pieter-Steph Du Toit and telling him to work on his handling and attacking support play.

If this sounds like an unreasonable and overly long list of demands, then you’d be right. To me, one of the foundational reasons for the AB blindside-conundrum is, in other words, self-inflicted, with the requirements of the player simply being too demanding. What is described here are two players, not one. This becomes further obvious if we were to re-classify the previous blindside-suitors into two groups, those of tight and loose blindsides.

It is important to mention now that this distinction isn’t in any shape or form meant to be normative, meaning that one style is by definition better than the other. Both styles are requirements, not options, within the AB game plan. My classification here is mostly based on what I consider to be the respective player’s foremost strength, the style which fits closest to what the player themselves consider to be their bread and butter.

Furthermore, I’m also not claiming that these players aren’t able to thrive playing those other styles. Dalton Papali’i has fantastic abilities on the edge, while Ioane can be destructive in the tight. My argument is more that these players, like almost every other player, excel in a particular part and space of the game, be it in the tight or the loose.

The AB selectors, however, have made no decision on what kind of style they want their blindside to focus on. The six needs to be able to do everything, almost equally well, in their view. This is where the problems start.

The present: decisions, decisions
So what does this mean for the present and the upcoming selection of potential AB blindsides? If we were to separate these two styles, as we did above, then the New Zealand rugby landscape offers plenty of potential candidates:

This isn’t meant as an exhaustive table of potential blindside-candidates, more a selection of players who clearly fit one of these two specific playing styles. Others who are more difficult to categorize, like Jacobson, an undersized tight six candidate, I’ve left out for now.

The distinction is pretty clear: the players on the left are typically lock/6s, while the players on the right are equally comfortable at 6 and 8. The players on the left are proficient in the lineout, have high tackle numbers and prefer to spend most of their time in the middle of the field. The players on the right have a more developed attacking identity, able to play in space on the edge, have an offloading game and, importantly, possess rapid acceleration. All of these players can play blindside at Test level. But they are considerably different in their focus, style and areas of specialization.

The issues start when tight sixes are being asked to do loose six-roles, and vice versa, something which already acts as a predictor of potential issues at Test level within the AB game plan. Take the Round 10 clash between the Chiefs and the Highlanders, for example, which puts a tight six like Oliver Haig opposite a more loose six like Samipeni Finau. Very quickly, the differences between the two become apparent due to the distinctive nature of each of the two halves.

In the first half, the match was stop-start, a continuous struggle between the two forward packs for territory and possession. The ball went from set-piece to set-piece, from kick to kick, with most of the rugby being played between the 22s as a contest for the ball. This kind of style suits a player like Haig, who likes to play in a supporting role, whether it be in the tackle, carry or clean, alongside the tight forwards.

Playing tight: Haig likes to stay close to his tight forwards, contesting for possession in the middle of the field

Haig could most often be found in or around the ruck in defence, typically in partnership with either Holland or Lasaqa

While Haig seemed to enjoy this contest- and forward-focused first half, a player like Finau thrives in the open spaces with the ball in his hand. When the ball barely reaches the edge, however, due to the nature of the breakdown contest in the middle of the field, Finau finds it more difficult to involve himself in the game.

Finau, away from the ball, calling for the ball to come his way but the movement doesn’t reach the end of the chain

Instead of getting caught up in the forward tussle in the middle of the field, Finau keeps his width, waiting for the ball to eventually come his way. While this width stresses the defence somewhat, it leaves the Chiefs tight five with fewer bodies to contest the breakdown battle.

Again, it’s not as if Finau doesn’t or isn’t able to effectively clean, with this dynamic clean on Renton preventing a certain turnover.

Finau clean

But it’s less of a central facet to his game than it is to Haig: if Brown doesn’t slip, Finau probably continues moving out wide to take up an attacking position rather than execute a dominant clean alongside the Chiefs openside flanker. In contrast to Haig, Finau doesn’t continuously work in pairs, like Jacobson, Brown, Vaa’i and Ah Kuoi do for the Chiefs.

If Haig felt at ease during the first half forward slog, with Finau struggling to get into the game, the roles would completely reverse in the second, with the game suddenly breaking open for the attack.

With Finau, you get a player who is incredibly comfortable in open space, who is able to see attacking opportunities unfold before they’ve happened. He also possesses a skillset which is invaluable in unlocking certain attacking movements on the fly. For the Chiefs’ first score after the break, Finau first runs a great, self-spotted line from the lineout, while then calling himself as the spontaneous backdoor passer in the following phase, when the ball shifts back to the open.

Here, Finau is at his best, acting as a crucial link player between forwards and backs. Ten minutes later, Finau’s persistence on the edge would be rewarded when McKenzie finds him with a well-executed cross-kick.

Finau try

The contrast in attacking sensibilities between Haig and Finau is strong. While the latter is like a fish in water in attacking spaces, the former looks more like a deer in headlights. In a rare moment when the ball came to him in attack on the edges, Haig struggled to move away from his natural tendency to play a supporting role and keep his width.

Early in the first half, for example, with the ball moving out wide with the Highlanders on attack, Haig needed to drift on his opposite, creating space for his inside man while providing the latter with a legitimate passing target. Instead, Haig’s tight instincts immediately kick in, looking to position himself on his inside man’s shoulder as a support and cleaning option.

Closing the space

But the unintended effect is that the space becomes shut down as well as the attack, with the Highlanders being saved from being turned over courtesy of an earlier penalty advantage.

During the second half, with the game breaking up a bit more, Finau started to thrive while Haig struggled to find his feet out wide, the latter being hooked relatively quickly in the half with TK Howden coming on.

Both Finau and Haig’s issue, in other words, is that they struggle to switch up how they play, making them relatively dependent on the in-game context for them to be effective rather than being able to impact the game no matter the type of contest. And this is where the blindside’s role becomes important. As the player who connects the tight five with the loose forwards, the blindside is a player who needs to be able to take on a multitude of roles and styles: sometimes playing creatively on the attacking edge, and sometimes playing in close support, being closely bound with the tight forwards in collective play.

More than anything, it’s what the ABs seemingly demand from the position, as someone who can play in the right style, at the right time. This is, however, far easier said than done, and Finau’s and Haig’s contrasting skillsets show why. While both have their own unique strengths, playing as the AB 6, they will be expected to be equally proficient in both the loose and the tight.

But when this isn’t a skillset which comes particularly naturally to those players, they are on a hiding to nothing. We have seen how players, when faced with the difficult demands of Test rugby and Test coaches, start playing outside of their natural game. It’s easy to imagine how both players would look to overcompensate their own perceived weaknesses in the Test arena – Finau starting to play tighter and more conservative, Haig looking to force himself to stay wide on attack – to detrimental effect.

Someone like Taniela Tupou is on record as saying how he’s starting to feel like he doesn’t know how to play rugby anymore, after constantly being told to change certain parts of his game. A similar difficulty potentially awaits AB blindsides, as long as the selectors have such ambitious demands of their number six.

Future: the key(s) to the blindside position
So what is a blindside, really? From an AB perspective, more than a lineout option, a physical presence, an edge forward, or a collision specialist, the ideal blindside is essentially someone who is equally proficient in tight and loose responsibilities. And, perhaps even more importantly, is someone who has mastered the art of knowing when to play tight and when to play loose, at the right time.

Wallace Sititi did an admirable job during the 2024 Test season as an interim blindside: his incessant work rate and energy allowed him to be (relatively) effective in both tight and loose situations, showing up all over the field while being a bruising physical presence. But Sititi is about as natural a number 8 as there is: he will carry relentlessly and put his team on the front foot, using both his considerable physical power as well as his skillset to break tackles and gain terrain. He seems destined to end up at the back of the AB scrum.

So what are the options available to the coaches? What the AB selectors will be looking out for, I think, is a player who falls into one of the two aforementioned categories, but who shows genuine ability in playing the other style as well. And the player who has shown the most improvement in this sense, during the 2025 SR season, has been Simon Parker. Parker has always been a player of promise, a big body who moves well and shows solid technique in the tackle, carry and clean. But what he has shown this season is a new dimension on attack, a willingness to play a central role on attack.

This moment late in the recent game against Moana Pasifika highlights Parker’s newfound confidence on attack, first throwing the wide pass before running the support line and throwing a beautiful offload for the Ratima try:

Parker double involvement on attack

To look at this development a bit more closely, the game against the Crusaders in Round 2 nicely encapsulates the growth of the Kaiwaka flanker’s game. In the first half, Parker was able to display his traditional strength, his work and physicality in the tight exchanges.

Aggressive cleans, dominant tackles, multiple involvements on both attack and defence through the middle, typically in close cooperation with the tight five

But what he has improved upon this season is his development of a genuine attacking game, running great lines, being creative in the wider channels and showing a deft array of passing.

Number 8 skills from Parker: finding gaps and keeping the attack alive

So someone like Parker will be of great interest to the AB selectors, as he fits the template of an AB blindside, currently. He is able to impact the game, no matter the type of encounter, due to his ability to be efficient in both the tight and the loose. The grunt of a lock and the soft skills of a number 8, this is, in the end, what they are looking for in a blindside flanker.

For a final note on this already way too long collection of thoughts, it’s relevant to emphasize the importance of coaching in Parker’s development. The Chiefs have been clear about how they want to play during games, taking on the opposition pack in a direct tussle during the first half in order to tire them out, before playing a more expansive game in the second. Parker clearly knows his assignments during each half, making it easier to balance between tight and loose styles of play and to make decisions on attack and defence.

Herein also lies a key directive for the AB coaches in their search for a new blindside: clarity around game plan and requirements eases the task of the blindside flanker, who already has to juggle different styles and roles across 80 minutes on the field. There are plenty of suitable candidates in NZ to be a quality number 6 at Test level: what is needed is a clear selection policy as well as a straightforward plan, which allows these varied skillsets to shine. Whether it be a tight or a loose blindside, or someone who is able to switch between the two, performance starts with the long-term planning and vision of the AB coaches. And looking at the state of the jersey for the past 7 years, it’s clear they have some work to do.

I would argue that the biggest area of potential improvement for the ABs, going from the Rugby Championship to the Autumn Internationals, was the defence. While there was plenty of stuff happening in attack, on the defensive side the team gave up plenty of easy scores against their opponents, whether it was through an all-too easily penetrable goal-line defence (South Africa 2), clever set-piece attack from lineout (Australia 1) or complex phase play patterns (Argentina 1).

In Ireland, they had an opponent which could exploit all three areas, so it was a big tick in the box of defence coach Tamati Ellison that the Irish were only limited to 13 points in Dublin. So what changed between the RC and November? Well, it turns out that quite a lot can change in the space of a few months. As an example, I’ve tried to compare the Irish game with the defeat to Argentina in Wellington, as both Ireland and Argentina play with the Leinster blueprint of phase-attack, with Argentina more or less adopting this system after Contepomi has come in. While the defence wasn’t the main reason the ABs lost in Wellington – before the Savea brain explosion in the 68th minute, they were still in an excellent position to win the test – it played a big role in the consistent loss of momentum. In contrast, against Ireland, the defence put consistent pressure on the Irish attack, creating the conditions for McKenzie to kick them to victory in Dublin.

The first thing that stands out when comparing these two games is the AB exit kick strategy. Whereas the ABs kicked long off 9 for their first exit play against Argentina, against Ireland they went with a short contestable kick off 9. Both strategies led to wildly different defensive lines and set-ups at the point where the opposition receivers where able to set up their attack:

In the first example, Perenara doesn’t look for or fails to find touch going long and the Argentine backfield is immediately able to launch an attack against a very fractured and disorganized Kiwi chase. The Argentinean forwards are positioned well as blockers and in the subsequent phases, the AB defenders are consistently on the back foot, with multiple Argentine switches off 10 able to outflank the AB defence, which isn’t effectively numbering up. After another gain-line carry off Carreras, the Argentine first five is able to get an offload away, with the only thing preventing a certain Argentina try being Beauden Barrett blocking the passing lane for the final pass. Throughout this game, the ABs consistently kicked long without a solid idea behind the defensive purpose of their chase, inviting pressure onto themselves and giving plenty of opportunities for the Argentinean phase attack.

Contrast this to the Irish scenario, where the AB defence is perfectly aligned at the start of the Irish phase attack, as a result of the contestable kick. The Irish try several passes out the back which are well read by the AB defenders, which leaves the Irish attack with little space and few numbers, and a mistake by Aki leads to a positive outcome for the All Black defence. When New Zealand did kick long after the restart, off of McKenzie, they presented a coherent defensive chase (a single hard chaser to put pressure on the opposition kick receiver followed by a set defensive line), making sure they go up together rather than at individual speeds as they did in Wellington.

Back in the Wellington test, time and time again, the New Zealand defence found itself badly outnumbered against the Argentine attack, who have the typical Leinster tendency to overload one side of the field so as to overwhelm the defence with carriers, blockers and backdoor options:

In this particular phase of play, Mallia, the fullback, is allowed to make a line-break and a huge amount of metres, simply because the Argentina numbers are able to fix their opposite defenders, creating options for the attack and doubts for the defence.

In contrast, the Irish were very rarely able to fabricate such scenario’s, as the AB defenders were often effectively able to move into the Irish passing lines. A good example can be found around the 18 minute mark, when Tele’a is stripped off the ball in contact by Beirne, who passes out the back. Normally, this presents an ideal counter-attacking opportunity, only Sititi has immediately sprinted off the line as soon as the turnover happened in order to make this option much more difficult:

Another example occurred early in the game after the first Irish set-piece attack, with Tele’a simply moving into the passing space of the Irish attack, not so much with the intent of making an early defensive read as spooking the Irish passers and putting doubts into their mind. Again it worked, as Aki hesitates for a moment before throwing a pass that wasn’t on, leading to a Doris knock-on:

It’s not like the system fundamentally changed between these two tests, as Lienert-Brown also shot up out of the line after turnover ball in the Wellington test for example. The only problem was his execution of the principle. The idea is (1) to get in-between opposition players, and (2) to do this close to where the ball is in order to shut down the movement at its point of origin. Here, Lienert-Brown shoots up (1) into no man’s land instead of getting into the opposition passing space, (2) and, more importantly, far away from the ball:

The result is fairly predictable: the Argentineans can use their afforded time and space in order to exploit the non-existent connection between ALB and his inside defender, producing an easy line-break and eventual try to Cinti. If anyone was going to shoot up in-between the Argentina players, it needed to be Savea or Darry close to the ball, in order to shut down the attack before it could get started. Now, the attack was neither impeded, with the added downside of Lienert-Brown opening the door for the Argentina attack.

While the New Zealand defence is by no means the finished product yet, at the very least there are clear signs that both the coaches are getting better at strategically implementing its principles (through kick strategy) and the players are getting better at putting the system into play (by choosing when and where to shoot up, for example). There are more examples of defensive cohesion in the Ireland test – the solid execution of double tackles, the effective pairing of low tacklers and jackal threats, both signs of good defensive communication – but this is already long enough as it is, so I’ll leave it at that.

The French attack will pose a different sort of threat to the Irish (speedy counter-attack, snipes off 9, overloading the spaces around the ruck with big carriers), so it will be intriguing to see whether Ellison is able to prep his defence accordingly. If he does, important steps will have been taken by this coaching team towards both an improved attack and defence.

@antipodean said in All Blacks 2025:

I like Norris' work this season - he's doing a good job in the scrum but is he doing enough around the field for the All Blacks?

These are the Opta stats for some of the loosehead candidates – X. Numia, T. Mafileo, O. Norris, J. Fusitua, and G. Bower – on both the attacking and defending side.

Attack

So on attack, especially as a carrier, Numia seems to offer the most out of the available options, averaging 8.7 carries/80min, while pairing this with the highest percentages in gainline (56.9), dominant carries (52), 2+ tacklers committed (84.5), and tackle evasion (23.1). In contrast, Bower seems to offer the least on attack: while his 7 carries/80min is a respectable number, he scores the lowest on all other percentages, such as dominant carries (7.1), gainline (30), 2+ tacklers committed (60.6) and tackle evasion (6.7).

As a cleaner for attacking rucks, Norris stands out, making 22.6 cleans/80min at a very high rate of effectiveness (91.9%). The others all average around 18-20 cleans/80min, with only Numia having a considerably lower rate at 13 offensive cleans/80min, which can be explained through his higher carrying rate.

Defence

In terms of defence, it has to be said that no single candidate looks to be a bad defender. A tackle success rate of 90+% is more than respectable for a prop, and no loosehead from this group dips below that. In terms of volume – Numia: 11.5 tackles/80min; Mafileo: 12.4 tackles/80min; Norris: 15.6 tackles/80min; Fusitua: 17.8 tackles/80min; Bower: 19.4 tackles/80min – Fusitua and Bower score the highest, while Norris puts in the most dominant tackles (5). As far as the defensive ruck is concerned, Numia and Norris offer the most threat in that area, at 16% and 5.7% effectiveness respectively.

The choice
What the selectors eventually pick will most likely come down to their specific requirements. I suspect they’ll look at scrummaging and other set-piece work first, before seeing whether they want a more offensive-carrying profile (Numia), a hardworking cleaner on attack (Norris), a volume defender (Bower/Fusitua) or someone who can effectively scrummage on both sides (Mafileo).

Looking at these profiles, as well as the eye test, it has to be said that loosehead is a position of decent depth right now, as this group doesn’t even take the current AB players into consideration. The biggest question mark will be their scrummaging ability at Test level. And while Norris, Fusitua and Numia have taken considerable leaps in this area in the past two seasons, it still remains to be seen whether they can produce similar results against international tighthead props.

When Jason Holland was confirmed as backs coach at the end of 2023, I wasn’t quite as disheartened as many seemingly were on this forum, a feeling especially common amongst Hurricanes fans. While Holland had his considerable limits as head coach and selector at the capital-based franchise, there was one facet in which he and his Hurricanes teams excelled in, and that was set piece-attack. All things considered, that was pretty much the exact reason he was brought in for, as first Leon Macdonald and then Scott Hansen would take care of the broader principles of the attack. When Will Jordan was asked about his try against England ahead of the Dublin test, he was quick to redirect the plaudits to his backs coach for meticulously planning out the strike move: “It was good to connect with Beaudy and he put a great ball back to the inside, so. But the credit must go to Jase Holland who organizes our lineout strikes. [He] spotted an opportunity there and it paid dividends.”

So when France infringed in the 74th minute of Saturday’s Test match, the stage was set for a Hurricane strike move to finish the job. And yet, Scott Barrett went for three rather than a lineout attack, seemingly signalling a distrust in the efficacy of the strike moves. So what exactly has happened? In order to understand this moment a bit better, I’ve taken a look back at the Hurricanes’ set-piece attack under Holland, why it didn’t make an appearance at the end of the game against France and some of its teething issues in Test rugby.

The Hurricane lineout attack
Holland’s lineout attack at the Hurricanes was characterized by its simplicity, its efficacy and its potential for small but successful variations. Its most effective shape was marked by its use of a six-man lineout with a plus one in the boot, who functioned as the in-field passer to a running 9. The core principle of this move was to have multiple runners in motion, organized around an “arrow runner” (not quite sure what to name this, but arrow seemed appropriate) in midfield, with passing options off both shoulders as well as a further one (typically, the first five) out the back.

A good example of both this signature strike move as well as a slight variation to it can be found in the Hurricanes match against the Rebels in Wellington, in Round 14 of Super Rugby Pacific 2022.

Highlight with timestamp

Early in the game, the Canes have a lineout just outside the Rebels 22. They call a six-man lineout formation, set-up to maul, with Kirifi as plus one. O’Reilly throws to Gibson at the front who quickly transfers to Kirifi, who passes to a running TJ Perenara. Perenara throws a cut-out pass to Proctor in the midfield (the arrow runner), with Love running a hard inside cut while Morgan loops around. Proctor throws the backdoor to Morgan after the Rebels’ midfield has bitten in on Love, creating a two-on-one, leaving Julian Savea with only one man to beat.

Vaihu has bitten in on Love, leaving Morgan free to create the overlap

Seven minutes later, the Canes have another lineout, this time just inside the Rebels 22.

The Canes set up in the same formation and you can see how the Rebels midfield defender, Kellaway, identifies this. This time, he aims to shut down the overlap by targeting the out the back option (Morgan). The only problem is that the Hurricanes have gone for one of their slight variations: Perenara holds the ball a fraction longer, Proctor, the arrow runner, drifts to Kellaway’s inside shoulder and when the 9 passes, a gap has already been created through the Rebels’ midfield’s anticipation of the back-door option. They have taken their eyes off the arrow runner as a potential carrier, leaving the latter to simply run through the space and score the try. Simple but effective.

A visibly dejected Kellaway, after being burned again by the strike play

The six+1 lineout strike made regular appearances in the Hurricanes’ highlight reels across the Holland seasons. I’m sure it greatly enhanced Holland’s reputation as a set-piece specialist. It is also understandable how a portfolio like Holland’s would be attractive to someone like Scott Robertson. While Robertson is a firm believer in defence, counter-attack and set-piece pressure, set-piece attack, especially the lineout peel in the opposition 22, was a staple of the Crusaders during Razor’s tenure. It typically acted as a kind of secondary source of scoring income, an added platform for opposition pressure rather than the core game plan. The in-play superiority of the team would set the team up for victory, and the set-piece attack could act as the killer blow. While Hansen is Razor’s trusted companion, Holland seemed to be appointed to be his sword. So why was it so blunt against France?

Lineout attack at the Stade de France
At first, it seemed as if the Hurricane lineout strike would not get to make an appearance in the test match. Instead of the typical six-man lineout set-up, with the +1 in the boot to act as the in-field passer, the ABs went for five-man lineouts, with Roigard at the base to throw the in-field pass to Barrett at first receiver. Rather than set-up for any sort of immediate strike, the goal seemingly was to secure possession and settle into phase-play, with several passages of play after an NZ lineout going to 7+ phases. While these lineout attacks weren’t necessarily unsuccessful – apart from the botched Savea to Ioane transfer in midfield and the breakdown penalty – it ultimately resulted in very little on the scoreboard, New Zealand’s tries coming from good counter-attack on kick return and a forced turnover around the French 22.

It was only in the 52nd minute, after France had just scored two quick tries in succession, that the call came for a six-man lineout, with Lakai in the boot. It was a field position typical for the Hurricane lineout strike, in and around the opposition 22, with the likely goal being to create a scenario where Caleb Clarke is put into space and in a one-on-one situation close to the try line.

The French, however, quickly identified what was coming: Roumat immediately spots the pattern, runs to the middle while calling lifters to him and promptly steals the ball.

Roumat calling lifters to him after seeing what’s about to happen

The ABs would get another shot at it in the 59th minute, after a breakdown penalty won by Savea. With the gap at seven points, this is the perfect moment to pull out a strike with a high-success rate. The lineout set-up is the same, 6+1, only this time the call is to go to the front. Savea secures the ball and transfers quickly to Lakai, who throws the pass to Ratima. The 9 passes long to ALB who acts in this scenario as the arrow runner. In an interesting variation to the play – which catches the French midfield defence off guard – Lienert-Brown quickly passes to Ioane, who, instead of acting as the dummy inside cut, functions as a sort of secondary arrow, with McKenzie on his shoulder and Barrett as a back-door option.

In the standard play, ALB would take up the ball, with Ioane as the dummy runner. Instead, ALB passes to Ioane, creating a secondary arrow.

The variation works, as Ramos is caught in no man’s land, allowing Ioane to put McKenzie into space who still has Jordan on the outside.

Bielle-Biarrey seems fixed but isn’t.

The only thing that saves France is Bielle-Biarrey’s ability to act as two defenders at the same time. First, he is in position to make a tackle-assist on McKenzie but as soon as the latter passes to Jordan, he uses his incredible pace to shut down the space in the corner. Jordan is unable to finish against the French scramble defence and the AB trump card, the Hurricane lineout strike, is successfully foiled.

This is, at least, one good reason why Barrett didn’t go for the corner at the end of the game, as one of the signature strike moves of Holland had been earmarked and recognized by the French defence, both at the lineout (Roumat) and in the scramble (Bielle-Biarrey). If your opposition already knows what is coming, your chances of success drop drastically. Even when the ABs used an unexpected variation to the strike with the secondary arrow, the French defence was still able to adjust quickly.

AB lineout attack in 2024: a mixed bag
Another potential reason for Barrett’s choice is that the NZ set-piece attack has had a season with very mixed results. There were some great tries scored off lineout (SA 1, ENG) and scrum (JP), but other promising movements often fell short through lack of execution. There were also quite a few signs that what worked well in Super Rugby didn’t translate so well to test rugby, including the signature Hurricanes lineout strike.

The second game against the Springboks in Cape Town offers some nice examples of this difficult transition, in my view. After creating a lot of opportunities but just coming up short in Joburg, the ABs, once again, were able to produce plenty of line-breaks off lineout attack in Cape Town. In the 13th minute, for example, the ABs have a lineout near the Springbok 22:

Cane breaks off of his position as plus one and Taylor throws it over the top. After a relatively quick recycle, Sititi makes a powerful midfield carry. The Springbok defence is struggling to keep the pace with the AB attack and in the next phase, Ratima passes to Savea who, targeted by both De Allende and Du Toit, passes back inside to Taylor who makes the line-break, as Wiese is too late in taking up his spot on Pieter-Steph’s inside. While this is a nice lineout strike, at the same time, this is the situation immediately after the line-break:

The Springbok defence is more alert to the break than the ABs. Scott Barrett is watching it all unfold and Sititi is only just getting off the floor. While Tamaiti Williams has nicely anticipated the situation, Ratima is the only realistic option to finish the break. Seeing this, Wiese follows the script from the RWC final (run every single support runner off their line, at whatever cost) and clumsily trips up the AB 9, costing himself a trip to the sinbin.

This simple fact – that Test defences react much, much quicker to breaks than Super Rugby defences – has been the single biggest Achilles heel of the 2024 AB lineout attack, as it has been unable to fully anticipate this fact into its strikes. One final example to show this, and where else to finish than with the Hurricane lineout strike.

In the 56th minute, with the ABs trailing the Springboks 13 points to 9, New Zealand has a lineout within the Springbok 22.

The six-man plus one formation is called and, after Barrett secures the ball at the front, Cane acts as the in-field passer to Perenara at 9. Perenara throws a long pass to the arrow runner, ALB, with Jordan running the dummy cut. Lienert-Brown passes out the back to McKenzie, who has Ioane on his shoulder and Reece out wide. McKenzie passes short to Ioane to bypass Kolbe, allowing Rieko to release Reece towards the corner.

Besides the addition of Ioane – which is necessary because of the throw to the front as well as the presence of the Springbok defensive shooter (Kolbe) – this is a mirror image of the typical Hurricane lineout strike. As a result, we can compare some stills side-by-side (I have taken a Hurricanes lineout strike from their game against the Fijian Drua in 2023:

First, the situation of the arrow runner when he is close to the line.

What is noticeable is how different the space off of the arrow runner’s shoulder is in both situations: whereas in the Canes example Moorby is still a solid option for the pop-pass by Sullivan, forcing the Drua edge defender to turn inside, against the Springboks, Am has beaten Jordan into this space. The Jordan dummy run then has no effect on the Springbok scramble to the outside, as they can fully focus on the backdoor options and collectively push to the outside.

This is the end result of both strikes. Whereas the Fijian Drua defence is comprehensively outflanked by the play, leaving Goosen a simple run-in try, the Springbok defence, on the other hand, has outpaced the AB attack to the corner, leaving Reece face-to-face with four Springbok defenders on their feet. A few aspects have led to this situation: the throw to the front rather than the middle, which means that there is more space to make up; the necessity of McKenzie being a metre further back in order to be able to execute the overlap with Ioane against the Springbok shooting defender (Kolbe); and Jordan being beaten to the space, leaving the scramble defence free to sprint to the outside. These are matters of inches and seconds, but, as it turns out, that is the difference between scoring and getting turned over, between winning and losing.

Returning to the 74th minute in Paris
We will never know what was really going on in Scott Barrett’s head when he pointed to the sticks near the end of the Test match against France. Perhaps he felt they were on the right side of the referee and could eke out a win through Razor’s principles of in-game superiority: defensive intensity, set-piece superiority and dynamic counter-attack phase-play, forcing a penalty in the dying minutes. What we do know, is that he didn’t feel comfortable going to the Hurricane lineout strike as a means of guaranteed points. After being foiled in Cape Town, the French defence had shown itself more than capable of dealing with it as well, both at the lineout and through the scramble, even in the face of clever innovations. If the Hurricane lineout strike is going to return to Test rugby in 2025, Jason Holland will need to find a way of sharpening it, where it can finally cut through South African and French Test defences. If he can, we can expect some of these results to reverse in the next Test season. If he doesn't, Barrett will have to keep going for 3, hoping that this time they can secure an opportunity for the winning kick.

I thought it would be interesting to take a closer look at the performances of the four AB props on Saturday, seeing how the top 2 AB props (Williams and Lomax) are currently unavailable and the 4 props of the 2nd French Test (de Groot, Newell, Norris and Tosi) all got considerable minutes on the field. Focusing solely on them for the 80 minutes, I ended up with some observations, one part focusing on their collective numerical output, the other on facets which don’t really show up in (public) stats.

Some numbers
Sifting through the footage, I eventually came up with these numbers (Sidenote: some numbers will differ from the publicly available stats like those provided by RugbyPass, due to, I assume, different interpretations of what constitutes a completed and missed tackle).

Abbreviations:
MP: minutes played
SP: scrum penalties
ARI: attacking ruck involvements
DRI: defensive ruck involvements
CT: completed tackles
MT: missed tackles
C : carries
MM: metres made

While numbers very rarely tell the whole story, much less from such a limited data set, I think there’s a surprising amount that can be gleaned from this particular table. What stands out like a sore thumb is the breakdown work of the starting props compared to the bench props. While Newell and de Groot (to a somewhat lesser extent) were omnipresent at the attacking breakdown, moving bodies and ensuring clean ball, the bench props were much less present there.

This was, when looking at the game, clearly by design. Norris and Tosi often took up positions in the first pod outside the breakdown, ready to carry and use their big frames to bend the French line. But this is the rugby equivalent of counting your chickens before they hatch. Because what happened on the field was that, suddenly, backs like Barrett and McKenzie were needed to clean ball in the middle of the field, with rather predictable results.

Norris looking rather sheepish while the play switches in the other direction

In the picture above, for example, we can see Norris standing on the right side of the goalposts, ready for a carry close to the line. But instead, Roigard switches the play back to the open, similar to the switch play for the Jordan-try in Dunedin. But with both props playing relatively far away from the source, it’s now up to Beauden Barrett and Will Jordan to clean after the Vaa’i carry.

An ugly breakdown, which is more the norm than the exception when you have a 10 and 15 cleaning out a hooker like Bourgarit

While the sequence eventually ends with a try to Rieko Ioane in the corner, it’s clear how the composition of the bench, together with the gameplan of ball-carrying bench front-rowers, caused havoc for the AB attacking ruck. This havoc was further compounded by Codie Taylor leaving the field, who was, quite literally, everywhere during the first half. And while Taukei’aho did his best to carry a similar load, he simply does not have the engine of a Taylor.

In the end, the gameplan bore very little fruit, Norris’ and Tosi’s combined 4 carries for a total of 7 metres made barely a fundamental upgrade on de Groot’s and Newell’s combined 4 carries for 3 metres made. Norris put in a big shift on defence but the argument can be made that this defensive shift wouldn’t be necessary if the quality of the breakdown, maul and lineout hadn’t plummeted with the bench forwards coming on. If the bench plan is to bring carrying impact then the coaches need to make sure that there are enough forwards on the field who focus on securing the breakdown. Because any plan that results in your backs having to consistently provide clean ball is a plan destined to fail.

Beyond the numbers
Fletcher Newell is an excellent Test tighthead. He combines set-piece solidity with a frankly staggering work-rate. While Newell’s and de Groot’s attacking ruck involvements don’t look too dissimilar on paper (24 and 17 respectively), the nature and quality of these involvements does differ considerably. Whereas Newell is often the first arriving player at the breakdown, responsible for the actual shifting of bodies, many of de Groot’s ruck attendances were what you’d call secondary involvements, where the breakdown has already been secured and the secondary player arrives to provide further strength in numbers.

I don’t want to be too harsh on de Groot, as he put in a more than solid shift around the field and in the set-piece. But when put next to Newell, it is noticeable that he doesn’t quite offer the same work-rate. In the following sequence during the 22nd minute, for example, where the ABs are trying to go through the middle of the French forward pack, the difference between de Groot’s and Newell’s appetite for repeat efforts is stark:

In this particular series of rucks, Newell physically shifts three French players, going to the floor and getting up again. De Groot, meanwhile, is mostly ruck-watching, securing the attacking ruck while mostly leaving the actual physical shifting of bodies to others.

In de Groot’s case, it might still be an issue of fitness. While he started the Test very well, being active and physical at the breakdown, as the first half wore on it did start to look as if he was starting to struggle with the pace of the game. In the 19th minute, with the French attacking in the NZ half, de Groot was slow to fold back to the openside, leaving a gap in the defensive line which was all too eagerly exploited by the French backs.

de Groot, jogging along in the background, is consistently behind the play

Taylor is already pushing de Groot to fold and take up the spot as a pillar defender but he’s slow to take up his position, forcing Holland to stay near the ruck. The latter is then unable to cover the ensuing gap between himself and Jordie Barrett, the French line-break eventually resulting in the yellow card for Beauden Barrett.

While I don’t think de Groot’s spot is immediately in danger – he still provides a lot more stability in the set-piece than someone like Norris – what the Chiefs’ loosehead does offer is superior fitness and mobility in the defensive line. If the latter is able to prove his reliability at scrum- and maul-time, then there might be some nervy times ahead for Gore’s finest.

Tl;dr: while the propping stocks are looking decent – Newell especially coming of age as a Test tighthead – there are still some teething issues with the gameplan and how they’re used off the bench, resulting in chaos at the AB attacking breakdown. Also, while de Groot still has an edge on Norris at the set-piece, the latter’s superior fitness does present a selection threat to the former.

@canefan said in Final - Crusaders v Chiefs:

I'd like Mauss to watch the game again and record the tackle stats for the collective

I'd like it to be on the Fern's record that I, contrary to how it may appear, do actually have a life.

I know there’s a lot of criticism on this forum towards the incessant turn to kicking by Barrett in this game, but, rewatching the game, I’d argue that the kick-option was the right choice a lot of the time, but it was Barrett’s mixed execution of his kicks which led to mixed outcomes. Charlie Morgan of The Telegraph already highlighted this example around the first minute of the game. Barrett, following an over the top lineout win by Savea, receives the pass around the halfway line and puts up a great wipers kick. The kick is regathered by Telea, who offloads to Ioane, leading to a linebreak and the England defence in disarray. Several Abs have realigned to the openside and this is the picture:

Caleb Clarke, who is out of frame here, is the target for the cross kick. Taylor and Savea are on his inside with only George Furbank covering the English backfield (Marcus Smith is all the way on the opposite side, with 14 English players being bunched up within 20 metres from each other).

What saves England is Itoje’s chargedown of Barrett’s kick, with Barrett probably needing to be just a little bit further back in order to avoid the oncoming rush defence.

Something very similar occurred early in the second half, where the kick option was the right call, only for the execution to fall just short. After Sititi rips out the ball and bats the ball back to Barrett around the 10-metre line, the latter passes to Clarke who breaks through the English defensive line. Following (another) great carry from Tuipulotu, Barrett has called for a kick, with multiple runners (Jordan, Jordie Barrett, Ioane, Telea) preparing to rush:

The kick is the best option here, as the defensive line is solidly set, yet only Marcus Smith (outside the frame) is covering the backfield, with Furbank up in the line. Barrett’s choice of kick, however, the grubber, is the wrong one, as there is very little space between the England defenders and they already know that a kick is coming following the body positioning of the Kiwi backs. The right choice, I’d argue, would be the short chip kick into the space between the English defensive line and Marcus Smith, allowing for either one of the All Black backs to regather or pressuring Smith as well as the potential counterruck. Again, Barrett needs to start just a few metres further back, rather than be so close to the line, in order to execute this option.

One of a first five-eights’ most important skills is their ability to orchestrate the space between his own outside backs and the opposition defenders. Taking a few extra steps forward in order to play flat and manipulate the speed of the defensive line against itself, or taking a few back in order to exploit the space behind, the first five’s orchestration of space through his own subtle movement is the key to a successful attack. Barrett has a great array of kicks at his disposal, but what he often still lacks is his feel for the defensive line. A bit more detail around his own positioning, and the ABs’ attack could’ve been a lot more efficient at Twickenham.

Ardie Savea’s 50 minutes at openside
The international game, both past and present, has seen a plethora of player-types occupying the 7-jersey in Test rugby. When asked in 2008 by World Rugby what exactly constituted an openside flanker, Josh Kronfeld gave a typically blunt answer: “You’ve got to have good handling skills, good vision, be a bit of mongrel. You want to be able to be doing stuff, grovelling on the ground as well as doing the airy fairy stuff upright with the ball in hand so you have to be pretty well rounded in terms of your rugby skills.”

Within this broad range of skills, each seven will look for their own identity, whether it be through jackalling (Pocock), disrupting the breakdown (McCaw), being a defensive stopper (Dusautoir, Cane) or being a link-man on attack between forwards and backs (Michael Jones). Looking at Ardie Savea’s game, it is clear that he mostly belongs to this latter tradition of the offensive openside, who excels through his vision and support in attack.

This support play was quickly apparent against the French and was a feature throughout the game. In the 15th minute, from a scrum around the halfway line, the ABs break the line through a tidy set-piece move from midfield. After a quick recycle and with McKenzie at first receiver, Savea has positioned himself on the former’s inside shoulder, in perfect position for an inside pass and a potential linebreak. McKenzie chooses to go outside, though, the pass eventually being intercepted by an alert Attissogbe.

But what about some of these other core facets of openside play, the mongrel and the grovelling on the ground? Here, I think it’s fair to say that Savea was selective yet impactful. The breakdown, during Savea’s stint at openside, was relatively safe and quick, with 62% of the ruck speed between between 0-3 seconds. Only two ruck turnovers were conceded, both to diminutive winger, Gabin Villière. One, in the 6th minute, when Holland and Barrett couldn’t shift him and once more in the 45th minute, again beating Scott Barrett to the ball after a Roigard linebreak.

Was Savea at fault for these turnovers? Yes and no. Again, Savea was selective rather than omnipresent at the breakdown but he was effective when and where he cleaned. Here, in the 38th minute with the ABs on attack in the French 22, Savea puts in a strong shoulder, cleaning out a well-positioned Guillard, and preventing a certain turnover.

At other points, he was able to effectively slow down the French ball, by wrapping up the opposition ball carrier and disrupting the momentum of the French attack.

Savea worked well together with Lio-Willie during the first half, often combining in defence and attack as dual menaces around the ruck area

So why was he partially at fault for the Villière turnovers? While Savea certainly tried to fulfil his openside responsibilities to Test standard, during the opening stanza of the second half especially, he lost control of the balance between these responsibilities and his own specialty, the carrying game.

After another gruelling series of carries through the middle early in the second half, it quickly becomes apparent that Savea has overexerted himself. So when Cam Roigard wants to put pace in the attack by going for the quick tap, Savea no longer has the energy to follow him.

Savea, seen here farthest on the right, can’t keep up with the AB attack

The final 5 minutes of Savea’s stint at openside also equal his weakest. After being unable to keep up with Roigard, he compounds his fatigue-induced, erratic play by, first, being unable to close the defensive gap for the van Tonder linebreak, and then second, when defending the try-line in the subsequent phase, Savea allows Woki to go underneath him for the score.

Herein also lies the biggest ‘learning’ (apologies, I couldn’t resist!) for the flanker/number 8-hybrid. Savea hasn’t played openside at Test level for a number of years. Looking at this game, I think it’s reasonable to suggest that he has both the tools and the brain to ultimately be effective in the position. But what he will need to do, however, is make sure he finds the proper balance between his carrying game and his openside responsibilities, being careful not to blow his engine when racking up the carries into a crowded defence.

Having more carriers on the field - like Williams, Sititi and Taukei'aho - should at least help with this, so Savea isn't tempted to take up too much of the carrying load on his own shoulders. Then again, Savea needs to be smarter as well, and self-regulate his energy levels.

Tldr; Savea can be a 7 at Test level, in my view, as he has the tools and brain for the position but will need to be careful not to overexert himself with his carrying game, neglecting his openside duties.

@OomPB said in ABs picking overseas players - inevitable?:

The Springboks will pull away .

It’s interesting, I was looking at the profile of the current Springbok overseas players and it’s noticeable how they’re all experienced, senior players. Of the originally selected November touring squad, the 13 overseas players averaged 56 test caps, with an average age of 31.

That’s interesting because when Rassie first started in 2018, the overseas influence was often made up of inexperienced but highly promising players who, more importantly, were playing in some of the best-coached teams in Europe. In the 2018 Rugby Championship, there was Vincent Koch, with only 9 caps and coached by Mark McCall at Saracens, there was Faf de Klerk with 14 caps who was at Sale Sharks where he worked with renowned kicking coach Jon Callard, and a young Cheslin Kolbe was plucked out of high-performing Toulouse to make his Springbok debut.

Fast forward 6 years and where are the overseas Springboks playing? Urayasu D-Rocks, Honda Heat, Shizuoka Blue Revs... You see where I’m going with this. Look at the current top 6 teams in the Top 14: Toulouse, Bordeaux Bègles, La Rochelle, Bayonne, Toulon, and Clermont. At these 6 clubs combined, a total of 6 South Africans can be found (Carlu Sadie and Rohan Janse van Rensburg at UBB; Raymond Rhule and Dillyn Leyds at Stade Rochelais; Pieter Scholtz and Uzair Cassiem at Bayonne). It seems very unlikely that any of them will feature for the Springboks in the future. 6 years ago, these total numbers would be unthinkable. In the 2018/19 Top14 and Pro D2 seasons, across these 6 clubs (Bayonne was in the second division at the time), 16 South African players could be found, more than twice as many. Furthermore, these players were often much younger at the time, like Wiaan Liebenberg (26), Rynhardt Elstadt (27) and the aforementioned Kolbe (23). Of the six South Africans in these teams today, only Carlu Sadie is younger than 30 (27).

The reason for this seems relatively clear. South African players and especially young South African players, just aren’t that attractive a prospect anymore for high-performing European squads, due to their eligibility for their national team. Racing 92 dumped Kolisi after a single season when it became clear that his performances for them and those for the Springboks were of a totally different level. Saracens, their success basically built on South African players, currently have a grand total of 1 South African player, 29-year old Ivan van Zyl. This year’s Champions Cup Final had one South African across the 46 players, 1-cap fringe Springbok Jason Jenkins.

Again, I’m not claiming the coming demise of the Springboks but to me, it also seems quite clear that the market reality of 2018 when the eligibility rules were opened and the market reality of 2024 are markedly different for South African players. Where are the young promising South Africans in Europe who are benefiting from different high-performance environments, like Kolbe and de Klerk did when they left South Africa? Someone like Steven Kitshoff benefited greatly from his two seasons at Bordeaux before returning to South Africa, Esterhuizen became a different player playing alongside Marcus Smith in the all-attack system at Harlequins. The Springboks reaped the rewards (while, to be clear, obviously also doing their own part in the development of these players). There doesn’t seem to be an equivalent available in the coming years.

The introduction of overseas players for the Springboks wasn’t just a money thing, it also reintroduced valuable IP into the team, like Duane Vermeulen and Willie le Roux who had been experienced voices in big European teams. But when the best teams in Europe are seemingly uninterested in getting the best young South African players, where exactly is this IP going to come from? Might be interesting to contemplate those things some more. I’m sure that Rassie is more than aware of it.

Peter Lakai had his best spell of the season in the final 30 minutes of Friday’s game against the Crusaders. During that period, he had 9 carries, 8 of which across the gain-line, a try, 7 cleans, 3 breakdown contests, a lineout take, beat 3 defenders, won 2 turnovers and made 5 tackles.

But more importantly, he put the team on his back and led the fightback from the Hurricanes. Watching his performance, I was reminded of a recent interview with Nick Easter, the former England number eight, during the Six Nations where he discussed England’s options there and what he looks for in the position. He said: “I like my guys in the No.8 role to be like Alldritt and Duane Vermeulen, nuts and bolts guys who do the fundamentals on the back of the scrum with the ability to get everything moving forward. They are the guys who give the rest of the pack a target” [https://www.rugbypass.com/news/tom-willis-can-become-englands-answer-to-world-class-gregory-alldritt/].

Giving the rest of the pack a target, I think this best encapsulates what Lakai did in this game. He started the comeback with a line-break on the wing, after turnover ball, beating Tom Christie with the fend before accelerating and smartly passing back inside to his support.

The defining trait of Lakai’s 30-minute spell can perhaps best be characterized as ‘acceleration’: he continuously sped up the game, often acting as the 9 to continue the attacking movement or making a dominant clean to ensure quick ball. With the Crusader defence on the back foot, Lakai wanted to continuously increase the pressure, for example, by taking the quick tap inside the 22 after a penalty.

Lakai, in other words, clearly understood his role as a number eight during this part of the game: it was to keep the team going forward.

Ultimately, the Hurricanes came up short but those final 30 minutes did provide a template for the team. Lakai’s task for the rest of the season seems clear now as well: it is to keep repeating these kinds of performances, providing a target for the rest of the pack to follow, and ultimately lead them into the final six.

I thought the ABs played the right gameplan when you’re coming up against a side like this French team: keep the ball among the forwards, kick smartly and build scoreboard pressure. It makes little sense to overplay against a team that doesn't really want to attack the game themselves, as last week showed, since it allows the opponent to build momentum off defensive wins. I’m guessing next week will be the big one, with several French journalists indicating that this is the game the French will target with their most experienced squad.

So I don’t think there’s a whole lot that can be taken from this game. But there were still some interesting things to note. While I’d be willing to explain the poor 4th quarter performance by losing Vaa’i unexpectedly, there was one sequence of play for which I’m pretty sure a few players are going to get an absolute bollocking.

The sequence starts in the 69th minute in a positive manner, Will Jordan doing well to clean up a French chip into the NZ 22, before, a few hectic phases later, Tavatavanawai puts in a neat little kick through that results in a French goal-line drop-out. It’s here, however, that the issues start. The French are clearly looking to go quickly and retain possession, yet multiple ABs switch off and turn their back to the play. Only Proctor is alert to the situation.

The French end up going quickly and retrieve their own drop-out, before eventually kicking long through Hastoy. Robertson, by all accounts, is a coach who puts a lot of emphasis on effort. What he’ll have seen here, won’t particularly please him. This is the situation when Hastoy puts in the kick, with most players bunched up in the French 22.

McKenzie, who is brought on to speed up the play, keeps the ball from going out and passes to Jordan. The problem, however, is that the AB support is nowhere to be seen, with both the French backs and forwards moving to the space quicker than their jogging counterparts.

As the ball is being turned over by the French bench forward Bastien Vergnes Taillefer, Robertson will have been frustrated by the sight of his own bench forwards, Finau and Tosi, still jogging back onside while the French have already stolen the ball. The French heavy Top 14 forwards, like Taofifenua and Montagne, aren’t particularly renowned for their endurance and work-rate, yet they’ve still arrived before Tosi has even appeared in the frame.

While there’s not a whole lot to gain from this July series – with outstanding performances always being potentially questioned by the lack of top Test opposition – there is, however, a lot that can be lost. Test careers won’t be built on this victory of the Dave Gallaher trophy but a few could well be buried. For some All Blacks, the final Test of the series in Hamilton will have plenty at stake.

Unlike in previous years, there really doesn’t seem to be a side which seems destined to end up in the final. Even the top 4 sides have shown some clear weaknesses: the Chiefs’ forwards have been unable to get on top of their opposites on a few occasions despite choosing to take those packs head-on (Drua, Tahs); the Crusaders have shown some incredible defensive frailty more than once (Chiefs, Moana Pasifika); the Reds seem unable to lift their game against top opponents (Crusaders, Chiefs, Brumbies); and the Brumbies have shown an ability to score points but have also conceded the 2nd most points from all playoff teams, with only the Western Force conceding more.

There is a sense of incompleteness about all of the NZ Super Rugby sides as well which probably hasn’t been there since at least before the Razor-led Crusader sides from 2017. It did make me wonder how a lack of collective Kiwi SR dominance was related to the performance of the All Blacks during the Test season. So I gathered both the AB win rate and the average NZ SR sides win rate since 1996 and that resulted in this graph.

A few things stood out to me. First of all, it looks evident to me that collective NZ SR success does not equate to Test success, if anything the reverse seems rather true. In the golden decade of the All Blacks (2005-2016), where they had an average win rate of 88%, the NZ SR sides only averaged a win rate of 55%. By contrast, in the period since (2017-’24) when the AB win rate has gone down considerably (72%), the average NZ SR sides win rate across these years has gone up (63%).

Of course, this can be explained in itself in a number of ways. There’s the considerable factor of the British and Irish Lions series, which meant that in the years leading up to 2017 more provincial players probably sticked around longer than they normally would’ve, strengthening the NZ Super Rugby sides. Another factor, however, was the weakening of the competition during the 2010s: the South African and Australian sides suffered from considerable player drain and lack of depth while the competition was further diluted through sides like the Sunwolves. As a result, the opposition for NZ SR sides deteriorated, likely correlating with increasingly poor performances at Test level.

This brings us to the current season, where both the Australian sides and Moana Pasifika have shown both real signs of improvement as well as tactical innovation, with several Aussie sides using attacking shapes which are reminiscent of a Joe Schmidt-attack (high-rate of possession, focus on breakdown accuracy, target space around the ruck). It still remains to be seen whether the quality of the Aussie sides can be retained after the Lions tour, the departure of Schmidt, and the World Cup but, for the moment at least, I think it can be argued that the quality of the competition is a positive sign for the All Blacks. If the NZ players are genuinely tested at provincial level, both physically and tactically, it should only prove to be a positive sign for the next level, as a proper preparation for the rigour of Test matches.

Sidenote: yes, I know there are those who are expecting a collapse of the Australian sides in the coming weeks with the upcoming clashes against NZ opposition. I myself am not so sure that this will be the case, but I guess we’ll see soon enough.

On the game against South Africa, I just wanted to quickly highlight some other facets of the NZ U20 attacking shape and how they dealt with the Junior Bok rush defence (I still want to look at the NZ defensive pattern throughout the three games as well but that’s probably going to take a while). I felt like Stanley Solomon’s try in the 52nd minute showcased some interesting aspects of this shape.

The set-up
The Baby Blacks started their attack from kick return, Will Cole taking the ball into contact around the halfway line. The first thing to notice is how comfortable the NZ U20s are keeping the ball in hand and building the phases in the middle of the field, not looking to kick but instead searching to play towards the space. The goal is not so much to break on the outside – the Bok defence is set up cohesively – but to keep the defenders moving wide to wide. The NZ attackers are also wary of moving the ball into space to players lacking support. Wiseman has McLeod in space on the wing but he’s isolated and in danger of being turned over.

The space is a lie: Wiseman could play it wide but there’s no support in black available to protect the ball

Instead, Wiseman stays connected to his support and takes the contact. What the Baby Blacks are looking for are disconnected defenders, fractures in the line which are due to appear when defenders are starting to tire out. Eventually, the gap appears when Norton and Bester drift too far apart, Norton looking to make the big hit on Pole and Bester too focused on the threat of Wiseman in midfield.

Faleafā’s break allows the NZ U20s to move up field and start organizing an attacking strike.

The end goal of the set-up is to ultimately split the Junior Bok defence into two through attacking from a midfield ruck. This would give the NZ U20 attack two wide areas of the field to target, something which is made further possible by the abundance of playmakers on the field. The defensive scanners in the backfield can’t really exclude either option, so they’re forced to hold off rather than intervene in a decisive manner.

In the movement following Faleafā’s break, two attacking patterns typical for dealing with a rush defence coalesce into one. One is the so-called 21 attack play (two phases in the same way, then one phase back in the other direction) and the other is attacking from a midfield ruck. I’ve already mentioned the advantage of the midfield ruck against the rush defence, as it splits the defensive line, leaving fewer defenders available to fulfil the different roles within a rush pattern. On the other hand, the 21 attack play has as the goal to move defenders away from the space where you want to attack.

In the two phases immediately after the break, the attack moves to the open in both instances, first Tengblad carrying into contact with the first pod, before Bason takes the second carry with the second pod.

Setting up for the 21 attack play

The set-up is now complete: the NZ attack has gone two phases into the openside (drawing defenders away) while setting up a midfield ruck (split defence).

Now Sinton will move into the strike, going back to the blind

The strike
In the meantime, the backline has realigned to attack the blindside, with Faleafā and Pole setting up a blockers play while Cole, Simpson and Roberts are stacked behind each other, executing a double loop behind the attacking pod.

I’ve slowed the movement down so as to more clearly show the stacked formation of Cole, Simpson and Roberts

The final part of the strike is simply great skill execution: Simpson completing the overlap and finding Wiseman, Wiseman stepping inside before passing back outside to Solomon, Solomon stepping an overcommitted Bester, all of it is just part of what was consistently excellent decision-making on attack throughout most of the game.

Solomon try

Throughout the game, the NZ U20s were again able to showcase a very patient attacking game plan: rather than moving into the illusory space on the edge too quickly, where they would be at risk of turning the ball over and losing attacking momentum, the Baby Blacks took a measured approach. They used the middle of the field to gradually fracture the Junior Bok defence, using width to stretch the Bok defensive connection while attacking the seams which were gradually becoming more brittle with each new carry-and-clean.

The rush defence, at its best, can be experienced as being caught in a current: no matter how much you struggle to get back to surface, fresh waves coming through will keep pulling you down. That’s what it can feel like when you get on the back foot against the rush: at one moment, you’re in space. Next thing you know, however, you’re being engulfed by defensive wave after defensive wave, until it feels like you can’t possibly get on top of this thing.

What the NZ U20s have shown with their attack, is that you need to take a patient and measured approach to navigate the waters. You need a plan. You need control (breakdown), you need balance (support), and, most importantly, you need to take it one wave at a time. Once you’re able to do that, you’ll be riding those waves like it’s the most natural thing in the world in no time.

Now that the July series against the French is over, plenty of commentators are wondering what exactly can be taken away from the games, the French opposition being both inexperienced at Test level and overcooked from their long Top14 season. But not every aspect of play requires 100 Test caps nor a well-rested body to pressure the opposition: kick-off receipt only requires an excellent opposition kicker (check) and a coaching staff that is tactically astute (double check). And there’s plenty to unpack in that regard from these three Tests.

What is a successful kick reception?
But first, it might be interesting to quickly clarify what I understand kick reception to be about. Here, I’ll mostly be focusing on kick restart wins and losses. What do I consider to be a restart win? The kick receiver – who has been given a zone where he’s responsible for calling and making the catch, whether it’s near the 10 metre line, around the 22 or inside the 22 – takes possession from the restart, cleanly, and allows his team to set up an exit play.

The taking the ball cleanly matters. The ABs might end up with possession after the restart but only due to an opposition mistake (e.g. a knock-on). But I don’t consider that as a restart win per se since the planned reception failed. Here’s an example: Segonds kicks a restart after the first NZ try in Wellington which Holland misjudges, allowing Attissogbe to beat him to the space. The latter, however, knocks the ball on and the ball ends up in the hands of Lio-Willie.

While the ABs technically end up with possession after the restart, I do not consider this to be a restart win, since Holland was unable to properly judge the kick and get into the required position to make a clean kick receipt.

Then again, players can also immediately lose the ball after winning the restart. In the same Test, Holland catches a restart cleanly in the 55th minute, only for him to make a run and cough the ball up rather cheaply.

Still, that is a restart win in my books. The only thing that matters, in other words, is the moment of reception itself, not the eventual outcome of the passage of play. Others will have different definitions of course, with a site like RugbyPass coming to different numbers on both total restarts (e.g. 7 rather than 5 in the third Test) and win percentage (RP: 86, 78 and 73% across the Tests respectively, versus 80, 62 and 40% by my own count in the table below). I’m not quite sure how they got to those numbers but I’ll leave that aside.

Some numbers and a graph
As mentioned above, testing a team’s kick-off receipt only requires a solid boot and some tactical nous. Unsurprisingly then, the French restart kickers, Joris Segonds and Antoine Hastoy, were able to thoroughly test the AB kick-off receivers throughout the July series, putting more and more pressure on the different units across the field as the series wore on.

After first kicking exclusively to the AB left-wing reception zone (Vaa’i – Holland – Ioane) during the first two Tests (13 restart kicks, of which 9 were effectively dealt with), the French switched it around completely and exclusively targeted the ABs’ right hand side in Hamilton (Finau – Tuipulotu – Jordan) to good effect, Hastoy forcing the ABs into a paltry 40% retention rate in that final Test.

The All Blacks’ reception retention rate got lower and lower through the series, as the French were able to manipulate and consistently take the NZ backfield coverage by surprise. One reason for this is that most of the French restarts went deep but when they went shorter, they were very successful, with the ABs only catching 1 out of 5 French restarts between the 22 and the 10 metre line.

So what were the French trying to do with their restarts? Why did they mainly kick deep (10/13) when their short restarts were such a success? And what exactly went wrong for the ABs in this department throughout the series?

French tactics
The standard French restart tactic at the beginning of the Test series was to kick long, inside the AB 22, and close to the touch line. With an inexperienced Holland responsible for high ball receipts and a non-kicker in Ioane responsible for taking the ball in the 22, it allowed the French to chop down the AB kick receiver quickly and immediately pressure the NZ breakdown, looking to force them into mistakes and/or turnovers near their own try line.

In the first instance, Barlot is perhaps a bit unlucky not to be awarded for his jackal attempt, being deemed to have gone off his feet. In the second, Vaa’i is rather fortunate not to be pinged for coming in from the side. Small margins.

It fitted within a broader French strategy of pressuring the ABs in their own half, as they looked to fracture NZ confidence while steadily building scoreboard pressure and momentum through the accuracy of their kickers, Le Garrec and Segonds.

Another benefit to this tactic of kicking deep was that, when they did go short, it often caused chaos among the AB kick receivers, who weren’t expecting this change of depth. It looks like the French wanted to challenge some of the less familiar combinations within the ABs, such as those between Vaa’i and Holland in the first two Tests, and Finau and Tuipulotu in the third.

Exploiting frail combinations
The ABs use their taller, athletic back-rowers such as Finau and Vaa’i to patrol the area just beyond the 10 metre line, their coordination and jumping ability valuable commodities for potential contests in that area. But they have a double role: when the ball is kicked to near the AB 22, they are to function as the front lifters for locks like Holland and Tuipulotu. The complexity of this dual role formed the crowbar with which the French kickers wanted to break open the connection between the AB kick-off receivers.

In the Wellington Test, for example, Vaa’i was caught off guard when Segonds decides to go for a more shallow kick instead of the more typical deep kick. The former had already turned his back to the ball in order to lift Holland, only for Vaa’i to have to turn back once again in an attempt at catching the ball in his marked zone.

Vaa’i and Holland try to recover after being caught out but are in a poor position to make a successful catch, allowing the French chasers to tap the ball back and retain possession

It was more of the same in Hamilton, as the partnership of Finau and Tuipulotu was put to the sword by Hastoy’s accurate boot, as the latter tried to find the space between the two in order to make the timing and lift as challenging as possible.

In both cases where Tuipulotu loses the aerial contest to Gabin Villière, the lifting pod between Finau, Tuipulotu and Lomax is slow to form and tentative in its positioning. Tuipulotu needs to attack the ball and be quicker in claiming the space where he wants to be lifted.

Potential fixes?
It’s clear that the AB coaching staff is aware that the restart was becoming a real issue during the series. Even during the Hamilton game itself, the coaches tried to fix the problem, with Holland being put on the right hand side after Tuipulotu was unable to gather the ball off the restart two times in a row.

Jordan gathers the ball inside the 22 but Holland (number 5) is now where Tuipulotu had been in order to catch the restart

It’s an impressive feat for a 2.5-Test rookie to be asked to problem-solve in his debut series. But in the previous games, Holland had shown himself to be the most reliable option in these contestable scenarios, despite having multiple fumbles himself.

Beyond simply putting Holland at where the opposition is kicking towards, the AB coaches will do well to make sure that the combinations within the different backfield coverage-units are settled and familiar with each other. The probable return of a player like Barrett, who has built up a mutual understanding with someone like Vaa’i, would certainly help in this regard. But the players themselves will also need to show more tactical nous on the field itself, where they need to show more awareness of the potential restart strategies being employed by the opposition.

Summary or, TL;DR
While the July internationals against an inexperienced yet talented French squad cannot teach us much about the state of the AB attack, defence or set-piece, what it can show is the state of the restart reception, due to the quality of both the French kicking and tactical coaching.

In that sense, this series has shown two clear-cut things. First, the ABs have demonstrated some frailties in their kick-off reception, the inexperienced combinations between lifters and receivers able to be exploited by a clever and accurate French kicking game. And secondly, the coaches have been very quick with the faith they’ve put in the young Dutchman Fabian Holland, asking him to help fix a failing kick-off reception in Hamilton. Then again, this faith has been earned through his performances in the series, where he’s shown himself to be the most reliable option for restart receptions.

@canefan said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

But I might need to feed it into chat gpt for a summary in 100 words or less...

Yeah, I went a bit over the top with the word count. I suppose the summary is:

(1) Poor planning and future-proofing by AB selectors after Kaino
(2) Too many variables in selectors' demands of the position
(3) If divided into tight and loose blindside candidates, plenty of options in NZ
(4) Proper blindside: combination of tight five grunt work and number 8 soft skills
(5) Interesting option for 2025: Simon Parker.

That's, I think, the gist of it.

@Crazy-Horse said in WR U20 Championship 2025:

The French really fluffed their lines. They will be kicking themselves.

The best part for me was seeing the way the NZers aligned themselves to beat the French defence. It looked so natural to them. Perhaps we are finally seeing a generation of kids coming through with the instincts to beat modern defences.

It was great to see the shoe being on the other foot, for once, with the French being wasteful with possession and momentum. The amount of games the NZ U20s have lost in recent years because of overplaying instead of actually adapting their gameplan to the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses has been considerable (and frustrating).

The turnovers stats from the 2024 and ’25 semi-finals are quite indicative in this sense: a turnover balance of -23 (26 lost, 3 won) for the NZ U20s turned into one of -6 (11 lost, 5 won). The French U20s, on the other hand, went from -2 in 2024 (10 lost, 8 won) to -20 in 2025 (23 lost, 3 won). It’s basically a complete reversal of last year’s result, with the scores mostly staying closer, I believe, due to the NZ U20 cards (the Wiseman one being very soft, as already mentioned above).

As far as the attack is concerned, credit has to really go to the coaching, I think, because none of these players will have had a lot of experience with either these attack shapes (a combination of double stacked pods out the back, with elements of the currently popular flat pod-structures) or the kind of line-speed being brought by teams like France and South Africa U20s.

That being said, the players have shown an incredible skillset in playing close and quick to the line, choosing the right pass in a multi-option attack, and organizing strikes on the fly with enough support. Players like Cole, Simpson, Solomon and Wiseman have shown, like you said, a very natural sort of instinct for playing flat. I love how quickly a player like Will Cole shifts the ball when the attack is on and the space is available. It’s been really fun to watch.

@Darren said in Chiefs v Brumbies:

Brumbies just keep seeming to have an extra man out wide. Seems Chiefs having a hard time numbering up.

Just watched the game and this was quite noticeable. The Brumbies are, at times, using double backdoor pods in attack, which can create easy overlaps in the backline. It's a system used by quite a few teams. Taranaki, through their attack coach Brad Cooper, have used it to good effect. He also employed it with the NZ U20s last season.

You can recognize it pretty easily when you see attack lining up in a so-called "stack formation", creating extra options out wide.

Example from game against Drua

Typical is that the wings come in-field to act as extra passing options, in order to outnumber the defence.

I suppose what is surprising to me is that it took the Chiefs so long to find defensive solutions for it. What you want to do against this attack is launch defenders into those backdoor options. When the Chiefs finally started doing that - in the 80th minute - ALB scored that turnover try.

So I rewatched the NZ Schools game. It wasn’t pretty viewing, as you’d expect. NZ Schools first three possessions of the game all led to turnovers: Verster throws a miss pass when it wasn’t on, leading to Pahulu going rather meekly into touch; then, Verster, playing under advantage, tries an attacking chip with zero deception (the subsequent attacking lineout is lost because of a baulk); in the third possession, Sinkinson passes out the back to an unexpecting Saumaki who drops the ball. When they finally decide to turn to the kick as everything else isn’t working, Norrie kicks it out on the full after it was passed back inside the 22 by Verster, leading to an attacking Australian lineout. When it rains, it pours. And it didn’t get much better after that, unfortunately. So it was a rough watch.

I thought I’d share some notes, if anyone would be interested in reading them. What stood out to me was the NZ Schools defence, especially its breakdown in communication at certain times, of which I’ll try to give a few examples. This was further compounded by some clever Australian attack, which was able to identify similar weaknesses in both NZ Schools and Barbarian U18 defence, in its earlier game.

The first Australia U18 try would be a good place to start. Gold has a lineout on the NZ 22, a simple throw to Langi in the middle pod leads into a straightforward Lemoto carry (where he pretty much demolishes Sinkinson). After two quick rucks inside the NZ 22, Grover, the Aussie 9, throws a long pass wide and this is the state of the NZ defensive line:

Aussie alignment and Kiwi chaos

Stanley has shot up to make the spot tackle in the hopes of disrupting the Aussie overlap, Guerin has his back turned to the play and Wallis is disconnected from the defensive line. The predictable result: Bassingthwaighte waltzes between Stanley and Wallis to run in pretty much untouched. The basis of this try is the power of the Lemoto carry and the Grover snipes around the ruck but it’s made easy by the lack of communication and connection between the NZ Schools defenders. When you have lone ranger-defenders (Stanley) going alone because the situation is so desperate, then there’s been a bad breakdown in defensive responsibilities.

Another example is the series of events which is probably most indicative of the game as a whole. It displays NZ Schools' lack of patience in attack, their lack of communication in defence and Aussie U18s ability to pounce on these mistakes. The sequence occurs around the 21 minute mark. After 15 minutes of hectic and erratic play, NZ Schools pulls off a great backline move, Norrie getting around his man and nicely putting Stanley through the gap, the passage of play leading to a Verster try. They have a good restart and are working themselves all the way up to the Aussie U18 tryline, only for Spratley to attempt an overambitious placing of the ball (when recycling the ball and setting up the next phase would’ve been the much safer bet), leading to a knock-on and an Australian goal-line dropout. In the subsequent sequence, Spratley has a run-up receiving the drop-out (not making a dent in the defensive line), Sinton throws a low pass to Stanley who drops it. A scrum ensues where the ball is quickly released by the Aussie 9 and for some reason, the NZ Schools scrum keeps pushing even though the ball is already on the other side of the field. This is the situation after the first ruck post- scrum:

I’m pretty sure you can fit the Titanic through this defensive gap. More than enough room for HMS Lemoto.

There is about 15 metres of space between the first and second defenders outside the ruck (Keith and Spratley), which is, understandably, easily exploited by Heinz Lemoto. Again, the foundation is a breakdown in communication. Typically, the 9 shouts ‘break’ when the ball is released, signalling for his loose forwards to detach from the scrum and get into the defensive line. While I can’t pick everything up from the ref mic, Sinton does shout ‘hold’ twice before sprinting off. While Sinton is a very eager and willing defender for a 9, his first responsibility is still to organize and direct his forwards. It would be easy to blame Spratley for his tardiness but what really causes this wide defensive gap is a breakdown in communication between the 9 and his pack.

The irony of these examples is that I really don’t think Australia U18 needed this communicative breakdown to excel. They showed plenty of examples of clever play and identification of opportunities. I’ll limit myself to one example, a try in this game which was a near-exact copy of one in their game against the Barbarian U18s. The sequence starts with a missed kick at goal by Fowler. In the following restart, Lemoto carries Spratley with him for about five metres (there’s a theme here), after which Bassingthwaighte attempts a grubber through which deflects off of Saumaki into the open where it is collected by an Aussie U18 player. Again, an NZ Schools defender, Falloon, shoots up alone without anyone following or a cohesive line behind him:

Ceci n’est pas une ligne défensive.

The resulting linebreak is easy enough and after a number of ineffective phases around the NZ 22, the Aussie U18s set up a short switch play where they slightly fracture the NZ Schools defence. What is interesting about this movement is that Australia U18 ran a very similar set against the NZ Barbarians U18s, where they played a couple of phases in the area around the Barbarian 22 before trying a switch pass against the grain. While the Barbarian U18s read this play much better – leading to Edwin Langi being smashed behind the gainline – the desired result was ultimately the same: the created expectation of a quick pass out of the ruck by the 9 and the added attention to possible switch plays. Then, what Grover was really looking for was the lock 5 as the pillar defender:

Spot the difference. Grover identifies the 5 lock as pillar defender and sneaks through, both sequences leading to tries.

Both Falloon and Frazer Brown, the Barbarian U18 5 lock, were tasked throughout their games with being aggressive defenders, shooting out of the line and putting pressure on the opposition playmakers. I think that Grover is aware of the fact that this responsibility makes their role as pillar defenders more complicated, taking advantage of this responsibility-overload to sneak through around the ruck. This was not so much a breakdown in NZ Schools communication as it was beautifully executed manipulation of the defence.

So, those are some things I noticed and found interesting in the game. I still don’t think this is a bad NZ Schools team though, by any means. Guerin, Pahulu, Stanley and Norrie all seem like supremely talented athletes. Sinton, although he made a lot of mistakes in this game, is still a quality player who will hopefully learn a lot from the experience. Aio Keith always impresses me when I see him play, if only for the sheer levels of shithousery he gets up to. The forwards will bulk up and get their chances. The team as a whole just seemed to be a little underprepared, of which I think the lack of communication is a prime symptom.

If NZ Rugby wants to keep its current team structures intact, it would probably be best to have the NZ Schools team and NZ Barbarians U18s play against each other in a genuine match. I know they played and trained together in camp but a genuine game would have a lot more intensity and would serve as proper preparation for the other games. The upcoming game against the Māori U18 team should be a good contest.

I know this is way too much text and probably not in the spirit of the forum. But what can I say, I like writing and I like reading. Maybe there are others who are the same. Either way, I think I’m going to take a little break now. I’ve spent way too much time on watching these games and writing these posts. Good fun though.

Now that we know the make-up of the NZ U20 squad for the U20 Rugby Championship, it makes sense to take a look at some of their upcoming opponents and gauge their respective strengths and weaknesses. I recently watched some SA rugby age grade games – specifically, the SA U18 game against England U18 from late 2024 and the two recent SA U20 trial games against Georgia U20 from February ’25 – and I thought it might be interesting to share some thoughts on these games as well as some broader facets of SA age grade rugby.

Predicting the future performances of the SA U20 side might be one of the harder tasks within age grade rugby. While other U20 teams’ success will often depend on their ability to get the set-piece right, the South Africans very rarely suffer in either the scrum or the lineout. While this would seem like an excellent platform for continuous age grade dominance, in reality it has only led to a series of unpredictable tournament results.

Four tournament wins (1999, 2002, ’05 and ’12) followed by a whole heap of third place finishes (12 out of 26) with the occasional slip out of the top 4 (’01, ’11, ’24). It’s not particularly easy to explain why South Africa has only won 1 U20 tournament since 2008, as they’ve had some really good teams (2014; 2019) which came up just short. In these cases, the mind often wanders towards certain mental hurdles, which is not that surprising considering that they’ve 9 lost semi-finals at the U20 tournament. South African commentators typically explain this lack of finals success through a number of factors, such as rugby politics, poor coaching and, perhaps most prominently, the lack of meaningful competition for players aged 18 to 20 between schools rugby and provincial rugby.

All of which is fair enough, I suppose, but I don’t know enough about these things to get into those factors. Here, I just want to look at some of their players coming through in this cohort, their playing style under new coach Kevin Foote and whether these innovations might get them over some of their historical hurdles.

The problem of predictability
One potential reason for the SA U20s lack of ‘ultimate’ success since 2012 has been their predictability. Close your eyes and imagine, if you will, a stereotypical South African rugby team. What do you see? I see a ball being hoofed into the air, travelling a seemingly endless distance. I see a 12, built like a flanker, winning turnovers and ignoring his outsides. I see a front-row, spending as much time grinding their opposites into mush during a scrum as they are getting their breath back while the play is going on at the other end of the field. I see a defence rushing up and in. And I see an attack, throwing passes to the floor because nobody in the backline knows where they’re supposed to be.

Now this is somewhat harsh (apologies to readers from the Republic). But when watching that SA U18 match against England U18, it was difficult not to get a sense of déjà vu. The young South Africans won their game, to be clear, with their talented first five, Vusi Moyo, possessing a howitzer of a boot which he used to good effect. The SA U18s played a pressure game, mirroring their senior side’s up-and-in rush defence, while the front-row was putting the screws on their counterparts. But there was also a consistent lack of ambition, a refusal to use the backline as a platform for attack, and no willingness to try different things in attack. Again, to be clear once more, that is a perfectly fine way to play the game of rugby. But unpredictable, it’s not. With a bit more starch and a bit more luck from the ref, the English U18s would fancy their chances in a rematch.

It’s not hard to see how that trickles down into the next level. At U20 level, lots of other countries have big packs. Last year, we saw the Argentineans and English have senior-sized forward groups and both teams were able to effectively counter the South African pressure game, after which the SA U20s struggled to get their game going. One crucial factor for future South African success at U20 level, in other words, will be their ability to play in a different way when facing teams who can match them in the forwards and at set-piece time.

It's at this point where the appointments of Kevin Foote as the new Junior Bok coach, as well as Johan Ackermann as coaching consultant, is starting to make sense. Looking at their two recent matches against Georgia U20, it does appear as if Foote, the former Melbourne Rebels head coach, wants the Junior Boks to play with a bit more width and ambition. Foote developed a strong attacking identity at the Rebels, while Ackermann was responsible (alongside Swys de Bruin) for creating the most attacking SA Super Rugby side in recent history, the 2013-’17 Lions side. It looks part of a greater plan concocted by, who else, Rassie Erasmus to tackle one of the most consistent issues of the SA U20 side, their disjointed attack and all-too predictable game plan.

The fact remains, of course, that these were trial games against Georgia – with a lot of rotation and subs throughout the two games – so there’s limits to what it tells us. But one would expect that Foote and his coaching staff would use these games to give his players a sense of what they’re trying to achieve. Foote said as much afterwards: “We have a better understanding of how we want to play, although there still a lot of work to be done on the training pitch. [...] Our focus is on real intensity, speed, physicality, set pieces, and match management. The U20 Rugby Championship will be a really good and exciting challenge.”

Early in the second game against Georgia, we could catch a few glimpses of what Foote and Ackermann are trying to instil within the side:

Clear intention to keep the ball alive in attack

There’s the use of backdoor passes and offloads to keep the attacking movement going and to create space for the winger to finish. The movement isn’t particularly clean – with the prop’s offload being both blind and hitting the floor – but it ultimately worked. Furthermore, it shows genuine attacking ambition, something which the SA U20s have often lacked.

When going beyond the first pod of forwards, the SA U20s often found success and were able to break the Georgian line of defence. Forwards are clearly being encouraged by the coaches to distribute and even offload, which was something the Georgian defenders found difficult to deal with:

The ball consistently moves beyond the first pod, catching the Georgian defence off guard

The South African attack in a wide-wide set-up from set-piece. Again the ability of the SA forwards to offload is crucial for the score.

So far, so good. There are, however, still some teething issues with this new gameplan, closely interlinked with some deeper structural issues within SA rugby. Three issues came to the fore in these two games. First of all, a more expansive gameplan requires a lot of skill-work and decision-making, both for forwards and backs. Throughout the games, this caused a relatively high-error rate, through knock-ons, forward passes and wayward offloads, as players weren’t necessarily expecting some of the more impromptu decisions made by their teammates on attack.

Dropped ball after lineout

After some early go-forward, the attack quickly loses structure, leading to muddled running lines and a forward pass

The support runner isn’t expecting the tip-on pass, leading to a knock-on

A second issue is closely related to the first and refers to the more ingrained habits of South African players. The different nature of the two games against Georgia made this clear: while the SA U20s never trailed in the second game, in the first match the score was much closer, not in a small part due to some interesting calls by the Georgian ref. But whereas the SA U20s became more and more daring in the second game as their lead grew – even starting to offload and go wide in their own half – they became more and more conservative and narrow in the first game, when they started chasing the lead and experiencing time pressure. This shows the still- ingrained habit within South African rugby players: when the going gets tough, they start looking for the physical confrontation, taking one-off carries and chasing box-kicks like there’s no tomorrow.

Foote and Ackermann will be wary of the scenario that their players abandon the expansive gameplan at the pointy end of games, as it was clear that their wide approach was working well. Herein also lies an opportunity for their opponents. Opposition teams will look to build an early lead against this team and sucker them into more predictable – and more easy to defend – gameplans. The ghost of predictability will not easily be vanquished.

The first five issue
A third and final issue which became apparent, both throughout these games and different teams throughout the SA rugby pyramid, is that of the first five-eight and their lack of control. The typical habit within South African teams is to play off 9 and go through the forwards. This again is not a problem per se, only when the opposition team is able to predict and counter the style of play, after which it is mainly up to the 10 to find alternative ways of steering the team around the park.

I was reminded of this issue when recently watching the URC, with the Lions facing the Glasgow Warriors up in Scotland. There was a terrible wind, which dictated much of the play. The Lions, facing into the wind in the 1st half, struggled to get out of their half and were constantly under attacking pressure from the Warriors. But what was most noticeable was the lack of urgency from the Lions. An entire half passed and I still had no idea who the Lions 10 was (it was Gianni Lombard, by the way, typically a fullback). Rather than take control and try different things in order to get the attack going, there was remarkably little intervention from the first five.

In the three games that I watched – SA U18 vs. England U18; two games of SA U20 against Georgia U20 – there were three different 10s: Vusi Moyo (SA U18), Matthew Coetzee (SA U20, Georgia 1), and Dominic Malgas (SA U20, Georgia 2). Both Moyo and Coetzee have good passes on them but they have a tendency to stand quite deep and be rather selective with their interventions rather than have the ball in their hands as much as possible. Malgas did better in this regard but it remains to be seen whether he can keep demanding the ball when the side is chasing the game rather than cruising with a lead.

This is an issue for the SA U20s, as both Foote and Ackermann enjoyed their greatest success with sides who were largely defined by a ball-dominant first five who could play flat to the line: for Foote, Carter Gordon at the Rebels and for Ackermann, Elton Jantjies at the Lions. It also makes sense for Foote and Ackermann to emphasize this style of play more and demand more involvement from their 10, as it looks like the back three poses the biggest attacking strength of this SA U20 side. Gilermo Mentoe (15), Cheswill Jooste (14) and Chijindu Okonta (11) are all genuinely rapid, combine well with each other and are able to cut opposition defences open. It makes sense that the coaches want the ball in the hands of these players, who can break the line and make things happen out of nothing.

Cheswill Jooste is lethal against a fragmented defence

Jooste with the break before passing inside to his 9. Kicking poorly against this back three is a bad idea

Gilermo Mentoe with the excellent line and finish

Mentoe combining the two-handed carry, swerve and searing pace, mirroring another particularly effective U20 fullback from recent past, Will Jordan

Mentoe breaking the line with ease once again by carrying the ball in two hands

Okonta can use his length to step out of tackles and slip through

You want to get them involved in the game as much as possible, not just on the counter-attack and kick-chase, but in general play and through set-piece strikes as well. But this requires a 10 who is able to get them the ball and organize an attack which puts them into space.

Foote’s choice for 10 might then fall to utility back Dominic Malgas, as he looks to be a player who is most able and willing to play flat and attack the line. Then again, he might opt for the value of experience and turn to 2024 Junior Bok Liam Koen, who wasn’t involved in the Georgia tour and represents a more typical SA 10 who stands quite deep and kicks for distance. Will Foote and Ackermann go for the predictable and conservative? Or will they dare to wade into more untested waters in their search for the first SA U20 tournament success since 2012? We will find out at the U20 TRC.

Next up: the Junior Wallabies will be taking on a Japanese U23 XV later today, which will provide a first glimpse of Chris Whitaker’s plans for the side.

@Mr-Fish said in WR U20 Championship 2025:

Without sounding like a dolt, what is it that's had everyone gushing about Pledger as the second coming at halfback if he can't, you know, pass?

I have no idea where this notion that Pledger's passing is poor has come from. He is an excellent passer, with consistent technique, quick service and excellent decision-making at picking out his options.

Here, after Vaenuku made a clean break, Pledger makes use of the fast recycle to pick out a running Pole, putting him perfectly through the gap:

His service got poorer against Italy as the game wore on, presumably because he was suffering from the heat, just as everyone else was. Does he throw a poor pass at times? Sure. But in my view, his passing is considerably better than both Ratima's and Hotham's, when they were at age grade level.

If there are improvements to be made to his game, I'd say his kicking (both long and contestable) needs the most improvement, as his execution and selection of kicks can be pretty inconsistent.

As to why he's so highly rated, that usually becomes clear pretty quickly when watching him play:

That's a 14 point swing, within the span of a minute, put together by just the one player.