Now that the July series against the French is over, plenty of commentators are wondering what exactly can be taken away from the games, the French opposition being both inexperienced at Test level and overcooked from their long Top14 season. But not every aspect of play requires 100 Test caps nor a well-rested body to pressure the opposition: kick-off receipt only requires an excellent opposition kicker (check) and a coaching staff that is tactically astute (double check). And there’s plenty to unpack in that regard from these three Tests.
What is a successful kick reception?
But first, it might be interesting to quickly clarify what I understand kick reception to be about. Here, I’ll mostly be focusing on kick restart wins and losses. What do I consider to be a restart win? The kick receiver – who has been given a zone where he’s responsible for calling and making the catch, whether it’s near the 10 metre line, around the 22 or inside the 22 – takes possession from the restart, cleanly, and allows his team to set up an exit play.
The taking the ball cleanly matters. The ABs might end up with possession after the restart but only due to an opposition mistake (e.g. a knock-on). But I don’t consider that as a restart win per se since the planned reception failed. Here’s an example: Segonds kicks a restart after the first NZ try in Wellington which Holland misjudges, allowing Attissogbe to beat him to the space. The latter, however, knocks the ball on and the ball ends up in the hands of Lio-Willie.
While the ABs technically end up with possession after the restart, I do not consider this to be a restart win, since Holland was unable to properly judge the kick and get into the required position to make a clean kick receipt.
Then again, players can also immediately lose the ball after winning the restart. In the same Test, Holland catches a restart cleanly in the 55th minute, only for him to make a run and cough the ball up rather cheaply.
Still, that is a restart win in my books. The only thing that matters, in other words, is the moment of reception itself, not the eventual outcome of the passage of play. Others will have different definitions of course, with a site like RugbyPass coming to different numbers on both total restarts (e.g. 7 rather than 5 in the third Test) and win percentage (RP: 86, 78 and 73% across the Tests respectively, versus 80, 62 and 40% by my own count in the table below). I’m not quite sure how they got to those numbers but I’ll leave that aside.
Some numbers and a graph
As mentioned above, testing a team’s kick-off receipt only requires a solid boot and some tactical nous. Unsurprisingly then, the French restart kickers, Joris Segonds and Antoine Hastoy, were able to thoroughly test the AB kick-off receivers throughout the July series, putting more and more pressure on the different units across the field as the series wore on.

After first kicking exclusively to the AB left-wing reception zone (Vaa’i – Holland – Ioane) during the first two Tests (13 restart kicks, of which 9 were effectively dealt with), the French switched it around completely and exclusively targeted the ABs’ right hand side in Hamilton (Finau – Tuipulotu – Jordan) to good effect, Hastoy forcing the ABs into a paltry 40% retention rate in that final Test.
The All Blacks’ reception retention rate got lower and lower through the series, as the French were able to manipulate and consistently take the NZ backfield coverage by surprise. One reason for this is that most of the French restarts went deep but when they went shorter, they were very successful, with the ABs only catching 1 out of 5 French restarts between the 22 and the 10 metre line.

So what were the French trying to do with their restarts? Why did they mainly kick deep (10/13) when their short restarts were such a success? And what exactly went wrong for the ABs in this department throughout the series?
French tactics
The standard French restart tactic at the beginning of the Test series was to kick long, inside the AB 22, and close to the touch line. With an inexperienced Holland responsible for high ball receipts and a non-kicker in Ioane responsible for taking the ball in the 22, it allowed the French to chop down the AB kick receiver quickly and immediately pressure the NZ breakdown, looking to force them into mistakes and/or turnovers near their own try line.
In the first instance, Barlot is perhaps a bit unlucky not to be awarded for his jackal attempt, being deemed to have gone off his feet. In the second, Vaa’i is rather fortunate not to be pinged for coming in from the side. Small margins.
It fitted within a broader French strategy of pressuring the ABs in their own half, as they looked to fracture NZ confidence while steadily building scoreboard pressure and momentum through the accuracy of their kickers, Le Garrec and Segonds.
Another benefit to this tactic of kicking deep was that, when they did go short, it often caused chaos among the AB kick receivers, who weren’t expecting this change of depth. It looks like the French wanted to challenge some of the less familiar combinations within the ABs, such as those between Vaa’i and Holland in the first two Tests, and Finau and Tuipulotu in the third.
Exploiting frail combinations
The ABs use their taller, athletic back-rowers such as Finau and Vaa’i to patrol the area just beyond the 10 metre line, their coordination and jumping ability valuable commodities for potential contests in that area. But they have a double role: when the ball is kicked to near the AB 22, they are to function as the front lifters for locks like Holland and Tuipulotu. The complexity of this dual role formed the crowbar with which the French kickers wanted to break open the connection between the AB kick-off receivers.
In the Wellington Test, for example, Vaa’i was caught off guard when Segonds decides to go for a more shallow kick instead of the more typical deep kick. The former had already turned his back to the ball in order to lift Holland, only for Vaa’i to have to turn back once again in an attempt at catching the ball in his marked zone.
Vaa’i and Holland try to recover after being caught out but are in a poor position to make a successful catch, allowing the French chasers to tap the ball back and retain possession
It was more of the same in Hamilton, as the partnership of Finau and Tuipulotu was put to the sword by Hastoy’s accurate boot, as the latter tried to find the space between the two in order to make the timing and lift as challenging as possible.
In both cases where Tuipulotu loses the aerial contest to Gabin Villière, the lifting pod between Finau, Tuipulotu and Lomax is slow to form and tentative in its positioning. Tuipulotu needs to attack the ball and be quicker in claiming the space where he wants to be lifted.
Potential fixes?
It’s clear that the AB coaching staff is aware that the restart was becoming a real issue during the series. Even during the Hamilton game itself, the coaches tried to fix the problem, with Holland being put on the right hand side after Tuipulotu was unable to gather the ball off the restart two times in a row.

Jordan gathers the ball inside the 22 but Holland (number 5) is now where Tuipulotu had been in order to catch the restart
It’s an impressive feat for a 2.5-Test rookie to be asked to problem-solve in his debut series. But in the previous games, Holland had shown himself to be the most reliable option in these contestable scenarios, despite having multiple fumbles himself.

Beyond simply putting Holland at where the opposition is kicking towards, the AB coaches will do well to make sure that the combinations within the different backfield coverage-units are settled and familiar with each other. The probable return of a player like Barrett, who has built up a mutual understanding with someone like Vaa’i, would certainly help in this regard. But the players themselves will also need to show more tactical nous on the field itself, where they need to show more awareness of the potential restart strategies being employed by the opposition.
Summary or, TL;DR
While the July internationals against an inexperienced yet talented French squad cannot teach us much about the state of the AB attack, defence or set-piece, what it can show is the state of the restart reception, due to the quality of both the French kicking and tactical coaching.
In that sense, this series has shown two clear-cut things. First, the ABs have demonstrated some frailties in their kick-off reception, the inexperienced combinations between lifters and receivers able to be exploited by a clever and accurate French kicking game. And secondly, the coaches have been very quick with the faith they’ve put in the young Dutchman Fabian Holland, asking him to help fix a failing kick-off reception in Hamilton. Then again, this faith has been earned through his performances in the series, where he’s shown himself to be the most reliable option for restart receptions.