All Blacks v Argentina II
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@gt12 said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
Quite possibly an ice-cold take.
Wayne Smith is probably the greatest attacking mind in rugby, is clearly a fantastic person, and is beloved for all he has done for NZ rugby. I love him.
He also hates the box kick. As do I. I'd ban it if I could.
He's been on record telling his teams to avoid contestables of that nature.
He's the coach of the AB coaches.
It seems to me that NZ rugby has been trying to find a way to play 'in our style' without recognizing the reality of where Rugby is right now, ala 2009.
Are the coaches (and those coaching them) strategizing about how to play rugby in a way that just isn't possible under current law interpretations?
Is Smith the right person to help bring the coaches back to reality when they seem to be losing their way?
In 2009, the coaches were prepared to select in a way to at least negate the kick-chase game of other teams. Can he he bring that reality check to these guys and help them see that their desire to play in a certain way isn't looking achievable?
I'm fascinated to see whether NZR, the coaches, and those who coach the coaches respond to this loss.
The manner of it is of huge concern; we seem like a club team that had a bad week and the ABs just can not be that type of team.
This also feeds into our discipline issues - we don’t seem to want to face the rules and their application as they are, but rather how we wish they would be. Is it any wonder then that we get penalised and carded seemingly so much more than other teams…?
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I think whatever happens with the back three, Will Jordan probably needs to move to the right wing. That's not because I think he's performing poorly at fullback, I just don't think we have many quick wingers who are also strong under the high ball. I'd have either Jordie Barrett or Ruben Love at fullback (with Tupaea taking over at 12 if its the former) and then, when fit, Clarke on the left wing. In the mean time, I'd probably give Carter or Narawa a go - with the former faster and the latter better under the high ball (but still not great). Narawa is more a Sivivatu than a Rupeni and deserves a shot given the performances of Reece and Ioane. Realistically for the first Boks game the best we can hope for is a change on one of the wings, so ideally Reece replaced with Narawa or Carter.
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@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@brodean said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@brodean said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@canefan said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@canefan said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
Can anyone remember how Razor's Crusaders teams played? My recollection was they did the basics well. But I could be wrong
Strong set piece, good kicking game and put a lot of phases together to exert pressure on the oppositions defence.
That's what I thought. That's what I based my hope for Razor on. So what is this shit we're being served up then???
The one different piece of the coaching puzzle is Wayne Smith this really is a fingerprint of Smiths helter skelter run at all costs game, as it was mentioned above the Black Ferns used this pattern as soon as Smith came on board.
I can only think he is the person setting this way of playing.
As it makes no sense Razor,Hansen especially had a completely different way of playing for 7 years at the Crusaders.Razor and Hansen are culpable. You can't make Smith a scape goat. He's only an occasional mentor.
Who said I am making him a scapegoat but why change a game plan that worked for 7 years and won 7 titles to a game plan similar to what the Black ferns and other teams have used under Smith, seems to point to something changing.
He is a mentor they talk to every week more than once I know that for a fact.You continue to try and make Smith a scape goat with this comment.
Robertson and co are middle aged men with decades of coaching experience.
They can choose to take and leave whatever advice Smith gives them but the buck stops with them and ultimately Robertson is 100% responsible for the outcomes as head coach.
No I am stating a fact its there for you to see why things may have changed since the Crusaders.
And I did state Razor needs to be responsible for his decisions
You are just picking out a true statement and bleating about it.Why are you putting the change entirely down to Smith’s influence? Maybe Razor and co have decided they can’t or don’t want to play the same way as the Crusaders because of the talent available in the ABs. Maybe there is another reason why they think a different approach is warranted at AB and test level. Putting it all down to Smith’s influence - especially when you have Ryan and Holland also added to the mix - seems like a real stretch.
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Well, that wasn’t great. I think a lot has already been covered in the discussion here so I’m not going to rehash what I believe are the clear factors in deciding the result – losing the aerial contest and territorial game – but I did want to take a look at what’s hampering the backline. In order to do this, I focused on the ABs’ set piece attack in Buenos Aires.
Why set piece attack (SPA)?
One of the easiest ways to both control the flow of the game and get your backline involved is through prepared strikes from either lineout or scrum. A lot of it can be brought back to analysis and preparation: where is the opposition weak, how do they typically defend, where is the space available that can be exploited, etc.?In the second Test against Argentina, the ABs had 13 set piece platforms inside the Argentina half (11 lineouts, 2 scrums), with 6 taking place between the halfway line and opposition 22, and 7 inside or around the ARG 22. The difference in positive outcomes between the two zones is stark, as the following table attempts to show.
Set piece attack in ARG II: a lack of efficiency between the 22 and 50 metre lines, as well as an inability to string together momentum in the 2nd halfFrom the 6 opportunities to launch a set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, just one led to a positive outcome: the final play of the game where Argentina infringed at the breakdown in the 80th minute, the game already having been won by the Pumas. All other opportunities led to negative outcomes, whether it was a handling error, a loss of gain line or the set piece itself breaking down.
Contrast this to the AB set piece attack inside or just outside the ARG 22: of the 7 opportunities, 6 led to positive outcomes, with either a try being scored or momentum being sustained, through winning either a penalty advantage or gain line.
Red zone efficiency
One consistent aspect which the coaches have clearly worked on is efficiency inside the opposition 22. From only 5 entries inside the opposition 22, the ABs averaged a scoring rate of 3.4 points scored per entry.The basis of this scoring efficiency is, I believe, (1) the use of creative set-ups from lineout attack and (2) improved decision-making on the edge. On the first facet, the ABs would consistently employ a 6-man lineout throughout the game, with the +1 (Savea) typically being used in a myriad of ways (front-option decoy, lifter, hidden run option) to manipulate opposition defence.
A good example of this creative thinking in the lineout occurs in the 23rd minute. Joining the line as a front-option decoy, Savea places himself in a hidden position after Holland’s lineout take, in order to be able to make an arcing run-up to the line.
Here, the 5+1 set-up is used to integrate Savea’s running game, positioning himself as a front-option decoy from which he can attack the seam at the back of the lineout
While this lineout strike didn’t lead to a try, it shows the ability of the AB red zone attack to consistently put the Argentina defence on the back foot (see also Taylor’s blindside run for the first try), getting on top of the opposition defence before they can properly organize.
The second aspect is improved decision-making on the edge. In 2024, the ABs tended to go for single-phase lineout strikes, using complex backline moves which were meant to bypass the defence in first phase. This often led to players being swarmed by the scramble defence out wide, after which the AB attack would consistently be on the backfoot against an aggressive defence with line speed.
Reece (2024 Cape Town Test) attempting to go for the corner after the lineout arrow attack, yet being swallowed up by the Bok scrambleIn 2025, the ABs seemed to have moved away from the first phase-patterns, instead looking to shift the point of attack in order to disrupt the opposition defence first before going wide. Newell’s try is a good example of this, Savea acting as a distributor which effectively draws the defence away from the point of contact.
The ABs again show some nice attacking innovation, with short passes – from Reece to Proctor (not in the gif), Savea to Parker and Savea to Newell
The first try to Proctor is another: similar to Reece in Cape Town, Ioane is put into space out wide, with the Argentina scramble racing straight towards him.
Ioane has to wait for the pass so if he tries to make the corner, he most likely gets scragged into touch by the Argentina scramble DUnlike Reece, however, Ioane immediately steps off his left foot, cutting back against the grain and looking to draw as many of those four defenders onto him as possible. With so many defenders now off their feet and space everywhere around the ruck, Christie is easily able to draw the last defender and pass to Proctor, who falls over the try line practically untouched.
It shows, at least, that there’s been improvement in certain areas, with clear weaknesses of last year being identified and solutions being found for overcoming them. But another weakness of last year – backline strikes between the 22 and halfway line – remains worryingly clunky, with few signs of improvement.
A malfunctioning backline
I have mentioned above that set piece attack is not just a way to control the game’s momentum but also to get your backline involved. In the second Test against the Pumas, on 5 occasions (out of a total 13 SPA) the ball was moved into the backline within 3 phases, with just two of those leading to positive outcomes. Between the halfway line and the opposition 22, the backline was given the ball on just three occasions from set piece, just the one being (sort of) successful.So what exactly seems to be going wrong here? I’d argue that there are three factors: coaching, player skillsets and team identity. I’ll try to further clarify these factors by comparing the ABs’ SPA from ARG II to a 2025 Six Nations game between France and Scotland at the Stade de France. These two teams were the most effective in constructing 22 entries so they present an interesting comparative framework for what the ABs aren’t currently getting right in their approach.
(1) Coaching
A good example of some of the things going wrong in the AB backline can be found by taking a closer look at the lineout attack at around the 17th minute. The ABs have the throw in – again, going for a 5+1 set-up – and briefly form a maul before Ratima passes the ball into midfield. From there, you have Jordie running the crash line with Parker in support, Beauden and Reece looping round, Proctor running an unders line and Jordan out the back, with Ioane keeping width. This is how it plays out.
The idea is relatively straightforward, I believe: get Jordan into a one-on-one situation out wide where he can use his game-breaking ability to either create a line break for himself or others. What ends up happening, however, is Jordan being tackled more than 10 metres behind the gain line, with the ABs lucky not to concede the turnover.
A comparison to a Scotland lineout, also around the halfway line, shows where things went wrong. A first thing to note is that Scotland use a 4 man-lineout instead of a 6 man. The immediate benefit of this is that the backline is much more robust, with players filling the field, allowing for multiple attack shapes and realignments.
The four man-lineout allows for both sides of the field to fill up with options and support, allowing a team to attack either through switch playsThis set-up gives the Scotland attack multiple options: they can either (a) try to engineer a line break on the openside or (b) they can swing their backs back round to the blind after the ruck’s been built in order to attack trailing French forwards. They go for option (b) and make a sizable territorial gain while being on the front foot.
Compare this set-up with the one the ABs ran against the Pumas and it quickly becomes apparent how Jordan has very little support around him when he eventually receives the ball.
Jordan is completely isolated when receiving the ball, with two Argentinean defenders – Cinti and Chocobares – fully focused on him. If the ABs want to run a set up like this, the play here calls for a territorial kick from Jordan, after which the backline can put pressure on the ARG backfield. But looking at the play, it never appears as if this was the plan.
This strikes me, first and foremost, as a coaching failure, the attack being improperly set up from lineout attack, with fairly predictable results. The backline here is stretched way too thin, way too quickly, with an improper estimation by the coaches of the risk/reward-balance.
(2) Player skillsets
Staying with the same example, it becomes further apparent how flawed skill execution makes an already difficult strike move near-impossible. First, Jordie passes too quickly out the back, failing to draw any defenders onto him while also not being able to impede any defenders from drifting to the open. And secondly, Beauden Barrett’s pass is too high and hits behind Jordan’s inside shoulder, which means the latter has to stop to catch the ball rather than accelerate onto it. With execution like this, the strike is basically already over before it has begun.We can again compare this to Scotland’s skill execution on set piece attack, this time from a scrum around halfway.
Tom Jordan passes out the back at the last instance, holding his defender while basically running into the French defensive line without the ball, which opens up the space for Russell to run into for the line break. Jordie already showed in this game that he has the skillset to execute this timing (see his ball out the back for the first try) but he needs to be able to consistently execute this skill for the backline to properly come to life.
(3) Team identity
It does appear as if this All Black team is at a crossroads, with their traditional strength (backline play) not clicking while their current strength (scrum and maul) not fully being given the keys to the castle. The even distribution between forwards and backs from SPA between the 50 and 22 – each receiving 3 possessions out of 6 – a reflection perhaps of this conflicted identity.And there is certainly a case to be made for clarity. Looking at the game between France and Scotland, each team was clear in how and where they wanted to play.
Whereas France kept it amongst their forwards to maul the ball up-field, Scotland wanted to make use of their backline, with 9 out of their 11 set piece attacks moving into midfield. And while neither side were perfect in their execution, for both sides their positive outcomes outweighed the negatives.
If the ABs want to improve their outcomes from set piece attack between the halfway line and the opposition 22, they might do well to decide what kind of team they want to be, whether they want to maul everything or whether they want to throw it around amongst the backs. What can be said with some certainty is that the current strategy – to balance the two – doesn’t seem to be working.
Tl:dr
The coaching staff have improved some areas (22 efficiency) while failing to improve others (SPA between halfway and opp. 22). This failure has also impacted the ability of the backline to click, while significantly contributing themselves to this inability as well.The main factors impacting this failure to improve seem to me to be coaching, player skillsets and team identity. While it shouldn’t all be doom and gloom, the sheer number of areas which still need improvement, would indicate that this side is still some time away from putting it all together.
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Your Jordan example wasn't about coaching
It was poor passing making the receiver check their stride that was the problem
If the ball had been passed for Jordan to run on to it he could have used that speed to bisect the two defenders and/or grubber kick ahead at close to top speed with both Argentinian defenders having to turn
Both options would have resulted in dramatically different outcomes
EDIT
Saw your point 2
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@pakman said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
I noticed during rewatch. Don’t have equipment to capture it clearly.
I think your eyes might be deceiving you. You can see the ball at the top of the right hand post, its shadow briefly appearing on the inside of the post as it's going through. Seems pretty clear to me.
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@junior said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@brodean said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@brodean said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@canefan said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@Chris said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
@canefan said in All Blacks v Argentina II:
Can anyone remember how Razor's Crusaders teams played? My recollection was they did the basics well. But I could be wrong
Strong set piece, good kicking game and put a lot of phases together to exert pressure on the oppositions defence.
That's what I thought. That's what I based my hope for Razor on. So what is this shit we're being served up then???
The one different piece of the coaching puzzle is Wayne Smith this really is a fingerprint of Smiths helter skelter run at all costs game, as it was mentioned above the Black Ferns used this pattern as soon as Smith came on board.
I can only think he is the person setting this way of playing.
As it makes no sense Razor,Hansen especially had a completely different way of playing for 7 years at the Crusaders.Razor and Hansen are culpable. You can't make Smith a scape goat. He's only an occasional mentor.
Who said I am making him a scapegoat but why change a game plan that worked for 7 years and won 7 titles to a game plan similar to what the Black ferns and other teams have used under Smith, seems to point to something changing.
He is a mentor they talk to every week more than once I know that for a fact.You continue to try and make Smith a scape goat with this comment.
Robertson and co are middle aged men with decades of coaching experience.
They can choose to take and leave whatever advice Smith gives them but the buck stops with them and ultimately Robertson is 100% responsible for the outcomes as head coach.
No I am stating a fact its there for you to see why things may have changed since the Crusaders.
And I did state Razor needs to be responsible for his decisions
You are just picking out a true statement and bleating about it.Why are you putting the change entirely down to Smith’s influence? Maybe Razor and co have decided they can’t or don’t want to play the same way as the Crusaders because of the talent available in the ABs. Maybe there is another reason why they think a different approach is warranted at AB and test level. Putting it all down to Smith’s influence - especially when you have Ryan and Holland also added to the mix - seems like a real stretch.
If you read my other posts you will see I have stated this is on Razor to make the ultimate decisions it is on his head.
That is hardly completely blaming Smith. -
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@antipodean and a player who spent a fair bit of time at FB
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From a mate who rewatched the game (which is probably more than a lot of professional pundits seem to do). Long story short, the stats support the initial response that our aerial work was suuuuuck.
NZ kicked for distance that was clearly a coaching tactic.
In the first half we only had two kicks out of 14 that we put pressure on the reciever (Not aerial contested just within about 5m of the player when he gets the ball). This was Jordie's Dumb Chip Kick that went 5min and Billy's 70 Punt from a turnover, ie not planned plays.
Second half we put Up a few more contestable but did not win a single aerial contest off our 27 kicks. We only put them under pressure a third of the time. On the wingers Reiko contested one, and Sevu Reece 0.Now Argentina They kicked 28 times and only 6 of those did not have pressure. When there was an aerial contest they won 9 out of 13 and there was a couple of no contests that they won too. Alot of these kicks were really short 10-15m but the 11, 14 and the two big flankers just got up and caused trouble.
Sevu Reece did not contest a single high ball all game, he often stood aside when Will J was coming through.
Largely they did not target Reiko under the high ball but the two that he "contested" he looked freaken terrible.
NZ got possession back on 2/7 contestables that Will Jordan went up for ie Kicks that WIll Jordan was in an aerial contest for (5 on defence, 2 on offence)
We won 4 of 18 aerial contests in the match. These are: a Holland Lifted catch off a kick off, a knock on in the contest and two tap backs by Will J and Jordie.
